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THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

BY

M. J. SAVAGE

THE pole-star may be clouded for a time, but it is never lost

BOSTON:

GEO. H. ELLIS, 141 FRANKLIN STREET

1885

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To O. F. P.

My dear Friend,—Begun in narrowness and fear, and gradually broadening toward a universality of trust and hope, I love to trace in the evolution of my own personal religious life a parallel (in little, for the same laws are seen in dew-drop and planet) to the larger unfolding of the religious life of the world.

You are a part of my memories of childhood and youth. You stand beside me in the larger trusts and hopes of manhood.

It is a pleasure, then, to link with your name some of the fruits of that development in which we both have shared.

M. J. S.

P R E F A C E

THIS volume contains a series of sermons preached in the regular course of my last winter's work. All but one of them was spoken, not written; and they are now published from the stenographer's notes.

They do not, then, pretend to be a complete treatise on their subject. They have the limits of their method and their immediate aim. But, having reason to believe they were helpful to many, as preached, I send them out to preach again, in another form and to another audience.

The statement of a few strongly held beliefs will show the stand-point of this book:—

1. I believe that religion is a permanent element in human life.

2. I believe it to be the most important of human interests.

3. It is being neglected or opposed, because those who claim to be its special exponents and guardians identify its essence with its clothing, and so refuse to recognize the changed conditions of the modern world.

4. I hold, then, that the grandest service a religious teacher can render his age is this: to show how religion persists through all changes of thought and life; and, instead of dwindling and dying out, how it ever expands, to match the grander universe revealed by modern investigation.

5. This is true faith. To fear that by recognizing his real universe God is in danger of being lost, this is infidelity.


So believing, I wish to do what I can, not to save religion,—truth is never in danger,—but to help bewildered men and women to find it.

M. J. S.

BOSTON, September, 1885.

CONTENTS

I. WHAT IS RELIGION ?	9
II. COMFORT AND HOPE	24
III. RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL SANCTIONS	39
IV. PERSONAL RELIGION	58
V. INNER LIFE AND OUTER	72
VI. EVIL AND GROWTH	87
VII. BELIEF AND TRUTH	102
VIII. THE GROWTH OF SECULARISM	118
IX. MODERN SAINTS	134
X. THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS	151
XI. CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES	166
XII. THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK	183
XIII. EVOLUTION AND IMMORTALITY	199



WHAT IS RELIGION?

THREE or four evenings ago, I had a long and intensely interesting conversation with a young man of this city, one highly educated and more than usually thoughtful. After discussing questions of poetry, of criticism, philosophy, ethics, and political economy, we naturally drifted on to the subject of religion. For some years, he has not been a regular church attendant anywhere, and the question came up, Why? Not that I was asking him to attend this church; for that is something I have never yet asked of any man or woman. But I was anxious to find out how he was looking at this question of the modern world. After giving me his own opinions, he said that he had a large number of acquaintances,—young men, educated, thoughtful, earnest, not given to any frivolous or light way of life, much less to vicious courses, but deeply absorbed in study, in thought, in investigation, getting ready, as they say, to grapple with the problems of practical life. If asked whether they go to church, the reply is: "No; I have no time for church. Religion does not appeal to my sense of what is practical and real." They look upon it as something that is being outgrown.

A few days earlier than this, I was talking with an intelligent and finely educated young lady, not in Boston; and she expressed it as her conviction that educated, refined, and thoughtful people were coming more and more to feel that it is not worth their while to attend church; that they look upon religion as something that does not touch their deepest

needs or highest thought and life. I suppose it is true that, if you should go through this city and converse with large numbers of intelligent business men, men of character, of standing, of integrity, and should ask them what they believe about religion, they would tell you, in many cases, that they did not know, or they would say in an off-hand sort of way, "I have no religion." They go to church, perhaps, because their wives do, and they do not like to sit at home and allow them to go alone; or because they feel in some general way that it is better that the children should be brought up under some kind of religious influence; or because their friends go and they are in this way brought into social contact with the society of some church; or perhaps they are interested in some particular minister, and, whether on Sunday or any other day, they like well enough to hear him talk. It is a change from the ordinary routine and wear of their business life. But they do not feel, in any deep sense, that they have any religion, or that religion is any deep and high thing that it is worth their while to have.

It seemed to me, therefore, that it would be a practical thing for me to raise and try to answer the question, What is religion? What is this thing that intelligent young men do not feel concerned about? What is this thing that plain common-sense business men do not feel touched by, that does not appeal to their practical business sense? What is this thing that is being more and more neglected, as some say, by the better classes of people?

As my method of answering this question, I want you to look with me at some widely different specimens of what has passed as religion in the world. I want you to look at people engaged in what they regard as religious services, and ask yourselves what it is that they are doing, or what they think they are doing.

As the first and crudest specimen, let us take one of the lowest savage tribes that worship a fetich,—a stick, a stone, a serpent, or any object, no matter what. How do they worship it? They bring it food; they chant some rude strain of praise to the spirit supposed to reside in and preside over the object which to them is the symbol of some mysterious life. Perhaps they bring it flowers, or they kill some animal and burn it as a sacrifice; or, perhaps, as in many cases it has been true, they mutilate their bodies or torture themselves in some way, in order to please this supposed deity. What is it that they are doing? what do they think that they are doing? Why, they look upon this spirit as the power that is supreme over their individual lives and destinies, no matter how it has become so. It stands to them for our modern Infinite. It is the power that holds their destiny in its hands, and they are trying to do what they think this power wants them to do. They are trying to please it, to placate it, to get on the right side of it, to get into right relations to it. They are trying to do what Paul was aiming at,—be reconciled to their god. The method by which they think they can do it may be ever so crude to us, may be ever so cruel; but that is what they seek.

Let us take another specimen. You will remember, in the story of the flood, after the waters had abated and the ark had rested on the mountain, that Noah and his sons and their families came out of the ark and slaughtered certain kinds of animals and birds that they regarded as clean, and built a fire and burned them as a sacrifice to Jehovah; and Jehovah is represented as being pleased. He is represented as being only a little way above them; for he was so near that he smelled the odor of the burnt animals and birds, and was pleased by it. Naïve and childish in the extreme the story seems to us. This God, but a little while before, was

supposed to have created these animals and birds; and one would have thought that he would have been a little tender about them, after he had made them. But no: he is delighted to have them killed. He likes to see their blood flowing, and takes pleasure in smelling the burnt offering; and, in consideration of this sacrifice, he promises to be kind to Noah and his descendants from that day forth. What did this mean? They had precisely the same idea in mind as the fetich worshipper. They were trying to please God, to get into right relations to him, to become reconciled to him.

Take another case. Come down to the city of Athens. See the greatest citizens of that ancient commonwealth,—at that time, the most civilized State on earth. Every day, they chose by lot certain men, whose business it was to go into the *prytaneum* at a certain hour, where the sacred fire was kept burning, and eat there a common meal, a sacrifice to the god represented by this fire. What are they trying to do? Precisely the same thing that they are trying to do when they examine the entrails of victims on the eve of battle, or when they watch the course of birds flying through the air. They are trying to find out the will of the god, to please him, to get on the right side of him, to get him to be friendly to them, to become reconciled to him.

Visit the city of ancient Mexico. You will find there, before the Spanish conquest, if you enter their central place of worship, a truncated pyramid dedicated to the service of a god well pleased with sacrifice. Many times, these people went to war with their neighbors for the sake of bringing home captives, that they might have them for the purpose of sacrificing them. From ten to twenty or thirty or a hundred of these captives, according to the majesty of the occasion, are slaughtered by the priest, till this truncated pyramid

drips and flows with human blood. What are these men doing? Are they purposely cruel? No: they may love their wives and children, they may be kind and neighborly; but, when this method of worship sprung up, it was a virtue to hate an enemy, to hate and put to death a foreigner. And the god of this particular tribe — who originally, perhaps, had been a chieftain illustrious in war, who had imbrued his hands over and over again in the heart's blood of his enemies — will be delighted, they believe, to see the blood of his enemies still flowing. They are trying to do what all the rest have been aiming at,— to please their god, to do what they think he wants them to do.

It is this, again, that the Jewish high priest was trying to do in the temple, when he entered into the holy of holies once a year, sprinkling it with the blood of the victim, and came forth to pronounce absolution on all the people gathered to receive with awe and submission his heaven-inspired words. They were trying to please God, to get into right relations to him, to become reconciled to him.

And, when we come down to the majesty and magnificence of the Catholic ceremonial of the Middle Ages, what do we see? Visit St. Peter's on some high festival day, and see the processions, the burning lights, hear the noble music chanted as a wail over the sins of the people or as a song of triumph at the sense of their having been forgiven; and then, when the host is lifted up at last,—the veritable incarnation of God in the wafer,—and the people fall prostrate before it, what does it all mean? What is it all for? They seek the same thing precisely as was sought in all these other cases that I have spoken of. They are trying to please God, seeking, again, in ceremonial and ritual and sacrifice the truest way, as they suppose, of pleasing God. And, when all that had passed away and Protestantism was born, what was Calvin

trying to do at Geneva, and Luther in Germany, and Knox in Scotland, and Wiclif in England? What were they trying to do with their prayers and hymns and preaching, their baptism and Lord's supper? They were trying to please God according to their conception of him and what they supposed he wanted them to do, trying to get into right relations to him, to become reconciled to him. What were Channing and Parker, with their changed conceptions of God, of man, of Church and service, trying to do? They were trying to please God according to their conception of him, trying to get into right relations with him, trying to be reconciled to him. What is Mr. Felix Adler in his Ethical Society in New York, with his denial of any personal God, with his profound doubt of any future life, trying to do? He is trying to get into right relations with what he regards as the supreme governing power of the universe, trying to become reconciled with his moral ideal, trying to get into right relation with the controlling force of the world. It does not make any difference what you call it. What are Herbert Spencer and Huxley trying to do? Spencer has wrought out his magnificent scheme of philosophy, beginning with the nebulous vapor in the heavens, and tracing its condensation into suns and planets; then, the first dawn of life on the earth, tracing its course, as it develops, through physical, mental, moral, spiritual life, up to Jesus and Shakspere and the grandest men of the world; then, the organization of men into society; then, the development through society of the moral purpose, the moral ideal, the dominant moral thought of the world. What is he after in all this? He simply outlines his scheme of the universe, getting his science and his philosophy of this ultimate power manifested through all these ten thousand forms. The Mexicans had their science and philosophy, such as it was.

Noah had his. The Athenians had theirs. The fetich worshippers had theirs. Herbert Spencer calls it, to-day, "becoming adjusted to our environment"; but this, which religion calls God, is the grandest part of our environment. The suns and the planets, the past history of the world, mountains and seas, the winds and the forests, human society,—all these, with their various manifestations,—art, science, and trade, education and government,—are only manifestations of this infinite and eternal power that religion has been calling God, and that Mr. Spencer refrains from naming, because he looks upon it as infinite and thinks no human name can cover or define it. But, after all, he is trying to do precisely what the fetich worshipper was trying to do, what Noah, what the Mexican, the Athenian, the Catholic Church, the Protestant, Channing and Parker and Adler, have been trying to do. "Reconciled to God," says religion; "Adjusted to our environment," says Herbert Spencer,—the religious term and the scientific term for precisely the same thing. The only difference is the change in the thought and the development in the moral ideal of man, that has gone on from age to age, beginning on the far-off shore of some primeval ocean, and ending with the highest ideal of human civilization.

But, say a great many, is it not now a matter of science and ethics, and no longer a matter of what used to be called religion? and, therefore, is not the necessity for the Church, for religious organization, gone by? Is there any need for having a Church any longer, or of my going to church?

Let us look at this a moment. Just as fast as human society develops and men co-operate with each other, just so fast does the principle of organization in human affairs become more and more dominant and necessary. There is going to be more, rather than less, organization in the future.

Men organize for the purpose of government. They organize scientific associations, art clubs, or for purposes of education. If there is something of a business nature that a man feels he cannot well attain alone, he combines with somebody else, and we have a business firm or a corporation. This is natural and wise. Should we not apply this principle in the sphere of religion as well as in other matters? It is not only true that the principle of organization which manifests itself in the church, the temple, the synagogue, no matter what you call it, is this simple, natural human thing; but it is true that this organization has been in the past, is to-day, and, in spite of its faults and defects, must become more and more, in the future, the grandest and most inclusive of all organizations.

Let us institute two or three comparisons. I said that, in all these cases of which I have spoken, when men have been engaged in these religious rites and services they have been trying to become reconciled to God, to become adjusted to their environment. What does that mean? Adjustment to one's environment means the condition of success, of happiness, of prosperity, of life. Men live, men prosper, men are happy, just in proportion as they are properly adjusted to the environment in which they live. Perfect reconciliation with God means perfect life, perfect happiness, perfect prosperity, perfect peace. Now, then, this search for God, this search for the truth in regard to man's environment, whether you call it religious or scientific, is nothing more nor less than the search for the secret of life.

Think what that means. Men great in their intelligence have, from the first, been searching after the secret of life,—more life, fuller life, higher life, happier life, better life. That is what they have been after.

Now, what is science? Science is simply man's search

after truth within certain departments of life. It is something subordinate to the religious search. The highest thing that science ever did or can do is to be the minister, the handmaid, of a true religion. It gives religion a groundwork, standing room, arms it with intelligence, lights its way that it may see the path of future progress.

What is art? Art is only the embodiment on the canvas or in marble or in architecture, or in any department of life, of man's highest and noblest, most beautiful and inspiring thoughts. It is only a department of life; while religion is life itself. Art, then, can never do any more than adorn and assist a true conception of religion. The same is true of education; the same is true of government and of business and of every occupation in which man can engage. These are ministers, helps, toward life; while religion, rightly conceived, is life itself.

If this is true, we need now to consider how it has come to pass that such strange misconceptions of this truth have become popular. How does it happen that the young man to whom I have referred could speak in this way, and that his companions could speak of religion as something no longer practical, that does not touch the deepest and highest life, that can be neglected for more important affairs? It has come about in one of the most natural ways in all the world. There is nothing more common among men than the perpetual mistaking of means for ends. People are doing it, not only in religion, but everywhere else. A man starts out on a business career. If he stops and thinks of it, he knows that the only object of doing business at all is to obtain means to minister to life. But the chances are, nine times out of ten with the ordinary run of men, that the business will master them; and the end is sacrificed to the means. Take a house. A house is made to live in. The

one object of the house is to furnish shelter for companionable, comfortable, easy, joyous life; but we have seen no end of houses where either husband or wife, by some hard and fast rule, so manages the home that happiness, comfort, and peace are sacrificed. They act on the principle that the family is made for the method of housekeeping, instead of the housekeeping for the family. They sacrifice the end to the means. Take it in education. We have some good illustrations of this principle in our Boston public schools, and in some private ones, too, perhaps. Education is intended to draw out the aptitudes and powers of the children; but we have established a machine method, and the children must be sacrificed to that. If they cannot conform to it, why, then, so much the worse for the children. The method of education is infallible, whether it produces the best results or not.

So in regard to the church. People can very easily become attached to a particular building or location or way of preaching, and sacrifice to that the prosperity and the power and the future of the organization itself, which is the soul, of which the other is only the shell. So this is not peculiar to religion: it is common enough in all other departments of life. But it works in general in this way. People become attached to a certain form or method of the religious life that has become instituted; and so they are ready to sacrifice religion itself and its future and its power in the world, for the sake of this institution. Let us see how this has come about. A good many years ago, a certain religion, we will say, a certain form, became established. At the time of its birth,—mark you this,—it represented the best thought, the highest feelings and moral impulses, and the grandest ritual that the people were capable of developing at that time; and it had for its purpose this one search for life, for

the secret of life,—reconciliation to God, adjustment to human environment. It became established. Money was invested in it. A hierarchy sprang up in connection with it, so that it possessed immense power over the world. There was a field in it for the gratification of human ambition. It became a repository and dispensatory of honors and emoluments of every kind. It became established in the interest of the people, and entwined with their reverence and sentiment. They believed that it represented the perfect, the eternal thought and wish of their God. But do you not see the absurdity of any such institution as this ever coming into existence and remaining forever unchanged? This is a growing humanity, and this is an infinite universe; and, however much we grow, there will always be more beyond us than there is behind. Unless we cease to grow, anything that we attempt will become antiquated, in view of the larger thought and nobler feeling and better method of service; while the hope, the purpose, will remain unchanged forever.

Now let us see the interests that are engaged in this institution and that are opposed to change. The ministers, all its officials, all those that live by it, will feel as the ministers and officials of the temple in Jerusalem did: they will be outraged, as they were at Jesus, at any word spoken against the institution. They will fight for it with all their power and all the indignation of their nature, and think they are even fighting for God himself. Then there are large masses of people, always, who take their opinions second-hand, that are only echoes of the supposed authorities of the time. Of course, they will be alarmed at any threat of dissolution or change; and they will join the clamor and outcry against those that dare speak a word against that which has stood for ages as the symbol of the divine. Then there is a

large class of those who do not care much about anything: they have no special opinions, no sacred convictions to be troubled. They like to live a comfortable life and are willing to conform to the dominant rule of the time, and do not wish to be disturbed or troubled; and they resent as an interference any suggestion to readjust their opinions or to lead a higher life. Then there is a class of people, like this young man, who are persuaded that religion is antiquated, outgrown, who have been hearing all their lives that the institution was identical with religion itself; and now at last they come to believe that this institution is discredited and is going to pieces. But they do not care, they will not fret. They believe in it no longer; so they propose to let it alone and let it go, thinking that, when it goes, religion will go. But they say: We have science and education and art left. If religion is dying, let it die: we care nothing about it. They have taken the authorities of the religious institution at their word, and have supposed that the institution was identical with religion, and have been willing to see it pass away.

There are only a few, the remnant, as Matthew Arnold calls them, in any age, who see that the outward form is not the *thing*, and that, while the outward form is getting ready to fall and become a thing of the past, are quietly and out of sight laying the foundations for the new and larger temple that shall be ready to receive the homeless thousands, when the old is gone. These are the men that read the meaning of the age, that understand the changes that must be the result of the process of human growth.

Now let me indicate what it is that is going on. What is taking place when the old form of religion is passing away and the new is coming as a substitute? Take religion apart. Consider the two or three elements of which it is composed.

Religion is, first, thought. Every religion starts with the

best science of the age. There are people who think that it is something against religion to-day that it talks about science. The Bible begins with science. The first word is science. Every religion begins with science, a scheme of the universe, a theory of the world, of God, of man, and of their relations to each other. Religion then goes on to find out what the relations ought to be; it tries to realize this *ought*. That is what every religion does. But, when the world has become wiser, the old scheme is discredited and passes away; and we get a new science, a larger, broader, deeper conception of things, wrought out of human experience and study. We get a "new heaven and a new earth"; and the first heaven and the first earth pass away, and are seen no more. But religion does not pass away. The creed changes and a new creed gradually takes its place,—a broader creed, that is all.

What next? The next element is the feeling, the emotional side of religion; and that depends entirely upon the thought. If a man thinks his god is cruel, he will be afraid of him. If he thinks he is kindly, he will feel tender and loving toward him. He will do what he thinks he wants him to do. Of necessity, the emotions that one must feel are shaped by the thought, the creed. When the creed changes, of course the emotions change, too; and a different class of feelings comes to predominate. If the thought is really larger, better, truer, the emotions will also be higher, better, more humane, as we actually do find them.

Then there is the ritual element, that which passes under the name of service, prayer, processions, baptism, the Lord's supper, or what corresponds to these in any religion, sacrifice, temples, architecture,—the whole outward embodiment of the religion. This is the ritual. Of course, it will be in accordance with the thought, and will endeavor to express

the appropriate feelings that correspond with that thought. If, then, the thought changes, the method of service will also change, and become correlated with the new and higher thought. The creed, then, or the thought element; the emotional, or feeling, element; the ritual, or external manifestation of the thought and the feeling,—all change and pass away. They must change and pass away, if the world grows and becomes wiser. The process may be slow; but, so surely as the world grows, so surely will the thought, the feeling, and the ritual change.

But what abides? The heart, the soul, the purpose, this eternal search for the secret of life, this eternal endeavor to become adjusted to the environment, this eternal desire to become reconciled to God, to be adapted to the mental, moral, spiritual conditions of life,—these remain. These grow finer, sweeter, better, age after age; and this purpose, this search, is the soul of religion. The change of thought, of feeling, of ritual, has no more relation to the life or the death of the soul than the change of a child's garments, as he grows from an infant in his mother's arms to a strong man, is an index that his life, instead of growing larger and deeper, is passing away. All these are only the clothing of religion. This purpose, this inspiration, this endeavor,—these are the heart and the soul.

Let me sum up this morning's discussion in a few brief and numbered points:—

1. Religion is not passing away and is not going to pass away.
2. If any man thinks it is, that simply means that he has misconceived the course of human history, has used false definitions, or else that he is incompetent to comprehend the forces at work and the direction in which they tend.
3. A change in the thought of the world, increasing intelli-

gence, can only, in the nature of things, give us a higher and nobler religious creed.

4. A change in the emotions and feelings that accompany religion and give expression to its life, as the world grows wiser and better, can, in the nature of things, only become higher, finer, nobler, sweeter, and more humane.

5. These changes that are going on can only ultimate in the enrichment of the ritual manifestation of religious life. It took some hundreds of years after Christianity was born before the great chants, the rich rituals and services of the Church came into existence. You must not wonder if the child is born without clothes. You must give it time to become clothed. A new religious development must have time to clothe itself with its appropriate ritual life.

6. This religious purpose, this aim and effort, remain the same age after age, only ennobled by the uplifting thought and feeling of man.

7. Religion, as in the past, must also be in all coming time, not only an organized manifestation of human life, but the most inclusive of all organizations. Since it is the search for the secret of life, it must subordinate and include all other organizations, all other forms of human thought, feeling, and activity. When men think they are leaving religion and the divine, they would do well to remember the lines which Emerson puts into the mouth of his Brahma,—

“They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings.”

COMFORT AND HOPE.

My theme is "Comfort and Hope" as related to modern thought, and as to whether we are in danger of losing them. Men and women naturally desire comfort and seek for it; and they wish to keep hopes at least as fair and bright as those of their youth and as those that have cheered them in the past. But there are thousands in Europe and America to-day who are at least afraid that the progress of human thought is seriously to interfere with their comfort, and that it threatens to diminish the brightness of their hope.

Now, I believe that this search for comfort is not only instinctive and natural, but that it is altogether right, capable of being defended in the severest court of thought and investigation. Men not only desire comfort, but they rightly desire it. They not only seek it, but, in so doing, whether they know it or not, they are seeking that which is essential as conditions of the highest and noblest human life. Men seek for physical comfort. Even inanimate things, if you disturb them, keep on moving along what philosophers call the line of least resistance, until they come to a place of ease, of poise, once more. Let a person enter a room, and he will instinctively seek out the easiest chair in which to seat himself; and, when he is seated, he will, without giving it a thought, assume the most restful position,—a position in which the blood can freely flow through the veins and arteries, in which the process of breathing is unimpeded, a

position that does not disturb or interfere with any of the automatic functions of the physical life ; and, in so doing, he is doing what he ought to do,—that which accords with the best conditions of physical life and health.

So we naturally seek intellectual comfort. What is the object of all study, of all science and philosophy ? It is only to furnish us with satisfactory opinions, with satisfactory theories of God, of man, of destiny, in the midst of which we may in the easiest way lead our practical and successful lives. We instinctively seek for mental rest. If something occurs that a man cannot readily explain, he says, "I do not understand that"; and, straightway, he is disturbed and troubled, and goes to work to find some explanation. And there is no mental rest for him until he finds it. It may not be the true one ; but it must appeal to what he thinks is common sense to be for the time satisfactory to him. Perhaps he will not even stop to see if he understands the explanation ; but, if he finds something that is satisfactory to his present state of mind, he has mental rest. To illustrate what I mean : The astronomers and scientists told us, a year ago, that those marvellous sunsets were caused by volcanic dust in the air. I suppose there was hardly one person in ten thousand who had the slightest idea of how the presence of volcanic dust in the air could produce such results ; but they accepted the explanation, and found a certain sort of mental peace in it, comfort in knowing that, at last, the great mystery of the evening heavens was explained.

And, just as they seek physical and mental comfort, so they seek comfort in their moral and spiritual nature, a place of rest, a basis for trust, an outlook for hope. This, too, is natural ; and I am ready to say, further, that, if it be true that the discoveries of the modern world are, in the long run and on the whole, to take away that comfort from the highest

thinkers and the noblest men and women, then this modern theory of things is doomed to fail. It can never take a permanent hold on human thought or the human heart. We not only desire comfort in this respect, but we ought to desire it; and no religious theory that does not furnish it can permanently maintain its sway over human life.

But there is an important proviso to be considered just here. Let me talk for a while with a Catholic servant girl, who has no conception of the modern scientific theory of the universe, no conception of any modern thought about God or man or human destiny, who finds comfort only in the service of her Church, in the worship of the saints and of the Virgin, who finds rest from her petty daily trials and toils in going to the divine Mother, as she thinks, and laying her burdens at her feet. She would find no comfort in that which to me seems so unspeakably grander and nobler. Restless, homesick, dreary would all this world seem to her, in which I live with daily comfort and unutterable hope. What does this mean? It means that there are lower and higher grades of thought, stages of progress, in the world; and that those in the lower must inevitably fail to see the grounds of comfort and the basis of rest and peace in the higher, until they are developed out of this lower condition into an apprehension of the higher, and have become intellectually, morally, and spiritually adjusted to this new and higher environment.

These transition times are not comfortable. It is not pleasant to be driven out of a cosey place of rest and compelled to search for a new one, even though the new one, when found, be larger and finer and better in every way. The process of leaving the old and finding the new is not one of comfort. But the very desire for comfort, the very search for it, intelligently comprehended and held, may

become a motive force for the endurance of the temporary discomfort for the sake of the other and better comfort to be attained. It is out of this consideration that springs, it seems to me, the common misconception concerning the nature of comfort and its relation to the truest human life. Many persons are ready to tell us that we have no right to seek comfort; that there is something nobler than that to search for; that "necessity is the mother of invention"; and that, had not this human race been pursued by a hard and relentless necessity through all the ages of the past, we should never have attained the grand things that constitute our modern civilization. All this is true; but what is the interpretation of it? It entirely concurs with the position we have taken. Necessity *is* the mother of invention. Make people uncomfortable in a certain set of circumstances, and this discomfort becomes the motive force of a struggle for better things. The effort is not for the sake of effort, but for the sake of comfort; and the result is a nobler, deeper, higher life, a grander peace, a better joy. If the necessity did not issue in a grander thing, it would be condemned as not only unavailing, but destructive. If unrest and discomfort issued in nothing higher and better, but became permanent, it would mean destruction to the entire race. We need comfort, then; and we have a right to seek for it; only we have no right to be contented with the lower forms of comfort, with a partial comfort, a comfort for the lower side of our being, when there is something higher and better to be attained by temporary discomfort, something that can be secured not only for ourselves, as though it were a personal thing, but something that can be attained for the race.

Now, then, let us look at this problem of the relation of the comfort and hope of the old thought to the new. We

have said that thousands of men and women in Europe and America are disturbed with the fear that the progress of the modern world means destruction of their comfort and taking away of their hope. Let us, then, look for a little at the old comfort and the old hope in connection with the inevitable conditions attached to them. Let us get the price that an intelligent man would be obliged to pay for the old comfort and the old hope. Let us see if he would be even willing to take these, if he could, on the necessary conditions attached to them. Let us see if he could find real comfort in the old comfort and real hope in the old hope.

The comfort and hope of the old theology grouped themselves mainly around two beliefs: a belief in the conception of God, which was held for ages, and that is outlined in all the old orthodox theology; and the hope of a future life, as it was also outlined in this old theology. Let us see what these two beliefs were. Let us see the price that modern man would have to pay for holding them,—the price of character, the price of intelligence,—and see if he would be willing to take the comfort and the hope on the inexorable and inevitable terms.

What about God? I grant you that there was, on one side of it, great comfort and peace in the thought that men used to hold concerning the nature and character of God. He was a being individualized, comprehensible, of whom a picture—mental, at least—might be drawn. He was a being so much like a man that men and women could think of him under the form of human nature. They could think of him as so much like themselves that there was natural and inevitable sympathy between him and themselves. They could go to him, tell him their wants, talk about their sorrows, lay down their burdens for a little while at his feet; and, even if he bade them take them up again and carry them, they could

believe that he knew and understood about them, and pitied them and would help them. All this is sweet and grand and noble. But let us glance at the character of this God as he is drawn in these theologies, which their makers claim to be transcripts of the revelation of God.

According to them, he made this world a few thousand years ago ; he made a man and woman in his own likeness to be the progenitors of the human race, placed them in conditions where he not only knew that they would sin and fall, but he intended they should. It was foreordained from the foundation of the world. And then what? He was angry with them for doing what he had made them to do. He drove them out with the curse on them that they should bear sorrow and till the ground in the sweat of their brow ; that they should wander, fearing and struggling in poverty and disease and pain through all their life, and become the progenitors of a race such as ours has been.

And then what? He left the great masses of humanity to wander in darkness without a ray of light or guidance from heaven, only sending his word and his help to one family selected from the rest by an arbitrary choice. And all through the ages there has been only this one little ray of light shining along the pathway of one family, of one people, of one religion ; while the great masses have been left to wander, to stumble and perish.

And what else? I have said that people supposed they could go to this God for comfort and help, tell him what they wanted, and get it. Yes, on one condition. Is this condition intellectually defensible? Is it morally honorable? This God had made no provision for anybody to come to him except a very few ; and on what terms could they come? They could come with hope, only if they happened to have been foreordained to be saved, only if they were of the num-

ber of the elect, only if they had been converted, only if they felt the movement of the spirit in their souls. They could come even then, not because God was good simply, not because man's need was exigent simply: they could come only through the mediation of another. This picture of God represents him as an Oriental sultan, to be approached by grace of a court favorite; as though our rulers at Washington could not be touched by distress, could not be touched by the needs of the people, their ignorance or want, but only through the influences of the lobby.

Can we take comfort in going to a God like that and on such terms as that? I, for one, cannot. By as much as the world is developed intellectually, it cannot believe a theory like that. By as much as it is developed morally, it could not accept comfort and help on what I must pronounce immoral and dishonorable terms.

Take now the hope of a future life. It used to be very dear and precious to me,—that dream that we read of in the marvellous Revelation of John, that beautiful city of God above the clouds, with its gates of pearls, its pavements of gold, its inhabitants always happy, their lips running over with song; the streets of the city lined with the trees of life, bearing their fadeless leaves and fruit. And I used to dream of that city, and look forward to the time when I should go and join my friends therein. But as I have grown older, as I have thought of the conditions of that hope, as I have thought of the other side of that eternal life, I have felt that I could not accept the invitation, even though I stood on the threshold and God himself beckoned me in. For off yonder, under a cloud that never lifts, never shot through with a ray of the sunshine of hope, I am haunted with those white, pitiful faces, with pleading in their eyes and words of despair on their lips, their hands uplifted, but never meeting

any response ; their lips parched with a thirst that shall never know a cooling drop of water ; their nerves thrilling with an agony, only to be increased age after age, filling up the whole measure of their capacity of pain. Can I take heaven on such terms as that? No : I turn my back on the throne ; and, if I may, go down and help them bear their sorrows, if I may not free them from them. And can the developed heart of man, the high moral sense of the world, permanently take a hope of the future like that, and on such terms as that? Can they find comfort in the hope of a future life for themselves, even though it be in heaven, on such terms as these? If they become clear in their thought, they cannot believe it. If they become noble and unselfish in their hearts, they would reject it with scorn. By as much, then, as the world grows nobler and better, by so much must it surrender comfort and hope, if offered on terms like these.

I, for one, am ready to say, weighing well my words, that I should consider that I had a thousand-fold more comfort and a nobler hope for a man to cherish, if I believed the universe was only dust blown through space by an aimless wind, and that the end was sleep. I find more comfort for a man, a nobler hope for a man, in these things than in the old comfort and hope as they were preached to us in the past. Nay, as they are preached to us to-day; for the very last number of the *North American Review* has a defence of this scheme of things by one of the leading theologians of America.

What is the reason why we cannot hold this comfort and this hope? How is it that they are slipping through our fingers? It is worth your while to note the cause. If we were losing comfort and hope because the world was growing more ignorant and less moral, we might think that there was something wrong at the heart of what we dare to call

modern progress. But, as a matter of fact, is it? We are losing this old comfort and this old hope, because the world is growing wiser and better. The wiser and the better men cannot keep them on these terms.

Now consider for a moment. Can you believe that a truer knowledge of the universe is to issue in something poorer, less valuable, than the race possessed in its past of ignorance and in the days of its moral feebleness? I cannot. If a truer knowledge of the universe means something poorer than we have had in the olden time, it can only be because the universe at heart is a delusion and a sham, a very apple of Sodom, looking fair and attractive and beautiful on the outside, but turning to ashes when you have bitten through the rind. Do you really believe that the universe will not bear examination; that, if you get below the surface, you will find it a sham,—that it is worse than you thought it was? I cannot. In every other department of life save this one, increased knowledge has meant a better condition of things for man, better physical surroundings, better health, increased longevity for the race, better shelter, better homes, better social conditions, better government, a higher ideal of justice, more of tenderness, more of everything that makes life sweet and pleasant. These are the results of a wider knowledge of the world in other departments of life. Does it seem credible, then, that this same universe, a knowledge of which gives us better things in other directions, is going to give us, in the outcome of its religious department, nothing better? I cannot believe it. I do not believe that the universe is self-contradictory, that it is at odds with itself in this fashion. To doubt that knowledge of the world and increased intellectual power mean something better for man,—that is the only infidelity of which we need to be afraid. Trust in the integrity of this

universe, faith in the integrity of the human mind,—these are essential to sanity, the essential ground for any true and noble life. If the universe will not bear examination, if we may not keep this faith in ourselves as competent to study and understand it, then it is all one wild chaos, one universal mad-house. But, if we may keep it, and if we may reason as we do in other departments, we have scientific ground for believing that there shall be more of hope and comfort than there have been in the past.

Let us, then, consider two or three points in connection with this new knowledge of the world and of man:—

1. Everywhere else, in every other department of human life and thought, if we find a hunger, a real want, we feel perfectly certain that that indicates that there is somewhere an adequate source of supply. We never think of doubting this in any other department of life. We say, and we say rightly, that the eye is proof of the existence of light. If the human eye could be carried into a world where a ray of light from the sun had never shone, and there were a race of intelligent beings there who had never seen light, if they were capable of solving the problem, they would know that there must have been light somewhere to have created and answered to the eye. So with hearing. It is proof positive of those movements in the external world which become transmuted by some wondrous process, we know not what, into consciousness of sound. The mariner's compass points to the north. We have not explained it yet; but we know that there is some adequate reason in this wonderful world for this truth of the needle to the pole. We know it means something outside the needle, and that is a part of the nature and constitution of things.

What shall we say, then, of these great primal, eternal, and universal hungers of human thought and the human

heart? Is there no source of supply for them? Are they meaningless? Do they not stand related to any reality in the nature of things? Let us turn to our second point, and see what bearing it has in answer to this question.

2. I am going to ask you, for a moment, to go down with me to the very lowest theory of this universe that it is possible to hold. You will understand that the theory I am to outline I do not believe in at all. I only take it as a basis for an argument.

Suppose, then, that the theory of materialism is true,—that the dust which is blown by the winds in our streets is the eternal stuff out of which everything has come; that there is no God; that there is only dirt; and that that is the original material of the universe. This that we see in the brick, and that flies in our faces when the wind blows,—this is all. But this humanity of ours is a reality. What is it, with all its constituent elements of consciousness, of hope, fear, love, tenderness, mercy, with its gleams of ideal visions that flit and pass, with its rays of that “light that never was on sea or land,” with its “thoughts that wander through eternity,”—this human race of ours, that has produced Socrates and Jesus and Shakspere? This race is a fact. Now, on any theory of the universe, no matter whether high or low, this human race stands in the relation to the universe of a newspaper to the form of type, or of a coin or medal to the die. Whatever there is on the newspaper or on the medal or coin indicates a reality in the type or the die. Something or somebody has made it what it is. On any theory of this universe, this human race of ours is the product of the universe; and here, in this marvellous dirt, if this theory be true, or on any other theory, there must have been the potency of Hamlet and the Sermon on the Mount. These have come out of it. Is it not one of the fundamental

principles of sane thinking for us to assume that a stream cannot rise higher than its source? Must we not assume as a further principle of all rational thought that nothing can be *evolved* which was not first *involved*? And, since this human race does not appear to have got through its progress, but is reaching on to something better and higher still, do we not know with absolute certainty that there is something in this universe, outside of us, at least as high as the highest thought, at least as true as the grandest truth, at least as tender as the finest tenderness, and as noble as the grandest nobility, as sweet as the sweetest hope? Where else have they come from? We are the product of this universe on any theory we choose to hold. This universe must be adequate, then, to as much as shows itself in humanity. And, since the progress is not complete, we know that the universe must be something more than is yet developed in human nature or human life.

3. Let us consider one more point. As the result of all the deepest study of man and the world, I feel that I am justified in saying to you that there is no longer any room for rational discussion on the question as to whether the theory of materialism is or is not true: it is condemned finally, and put out of court as irrational and absurd. By the finest test that can be applied to it, it has utterly failed to account for two things,—for consciousness and for thought. Suppose there was a theory of the solar system that gave some rational account of certain phases of the moon, some little information about the asteroids or the meteoric stones that fall to the earth, but that should be entirely incompetent to explain the movements of the earth and the sun. Should we consider it a reliable theory? Now, then, the theory of materialism, whatever it may account for with reference to some physical matters, utterly fails when we

seek to account for consciousness and thought, those two things which are the most important in all the world. It breaks down utterly in the presence of these problems that most need to be solved. So we are sure that there is in this universe something more and higher than dust.

4. As the result of human study and thought and progress up to this hour, what are we prepared to say concerning the relative amount of comfort and hope that humanity has enjoyed? Is it not true that I am almost justified in summing up all progress of civilization by saying that, as the result of it, there is more comfort and less discomfort in the world, physically, mentally, and morally; that there is less of fear and despair, more of trust and of hope, less of hatred and cruelty, more of tenderness and love? The progress of the world up to this hour, then, means through all its phases an increase of comfort and hope and joy and peace, and of those things that are sweetest and finest and highest in human nature and human life. That is what we mean by saying that the world is civilized.

Is it rational, then, for us to suppose that this process has been going on up to this hour, and now that it is suddenly to be reversed? There is certainly no ground for so strange, so unnatural a belief. Here, then, in the facts of human progress up to the present time, we have an impregnable basis for faith,—faith in the universe, faith in man, faith in the surety of those things that are most essential to our comfort and our peace. Faith is no faith, if it have not a basis of fact, if it have not a background of human experience; but this faith of which I speak has this basis of fact, has this background of human experience, and, in the light of it, we see the trend of human progress from the beginning till to-day. It looks out toward the future, and sees which way humanity is moving. There is then ground for the

truest trust ; there is reason for our singing our faith in such words as these :—

He kept his faith. If Doubt e'er said,
“I wonder if”—he cried :
“There is no if ! The eternal One
Is changeless, true, and tried.”

When passing mists and shadows hide
The mountain from our view,
The mountain changes not, and still
The sky beyond is blue.

When sweeps the rising tide above
The headlands of the shore,
The rocks their rooted place maintain
Through all the threatening roar.

When feelings, fancies, like the mists,
Our guiding stars blot out ;
When tides of vague and dark unrest
Make all one sea of doubt,—

Then know, O dear and troubled heart,
The mists and tides will pass ;
While stars and rocks shall show again
Clear in the sea of glass.

The One ye trust shall know no change ;
Then let your fancies fly
Like clouds that come and go again
Across *the changeless sky.*

The outcome, then, of this discussion I may put in a few words. Take the lowest theory of the universe that you can hold, and even if it come to pass that the old comfort and the old hope must be given up, even then modern

thought is an unspeakable gain ; while on the highest theory of the universe and of man, the one that I believe that we have rational and scientific grounds for holding, there is a grand basis on which to rest new evidence that there will be a larger and sweeter and nobler comfort than the past has ever known, and room also for an endless and unspeakable hope.

RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL SANCTIONS.

My purpose is to discuss the relation between moral sanctions, the sanctions of conduct and character, and religious and theological beliefs; as to whether there is any necessary relation between the two, what that relation is, and whether there is any danger to morals springing out of theological and religious changes and transitions.

The old Hindu priests used to teach the people, what perhaps they believed themselves, that the earth was supported on immense pillars. It is of no consequence, for our purpose, what they thought these pillars rested on or how far down the different supports may have reached into the abyss. It is enough for us that they believed that this earth rested on these pillars, the earth being figured in their minds as an immense flat plain. It was perfectly natural that they should hold such ideas at that time, because they had not learned to see the world in any truer light. But—and this is the point I have in mind—they were accustomed not only to teach that the earth was thus supported, but that the stability of these supports depended upon the fulfilment of their religious duties on the part of the people. They said, Pay your religious dues, bring your tithes, your offerings, present the regular sacrifices, maintain all the ritual of your religion, and these pillars will remain stable and firm. But, if you fail in any of these particulars, if you

relax your religious ideas, if you are false to us,—the representatives of the gods,—then these pillars, the supports of the earth, will give way, and the world will be precipitated into irretrievable ruin. They taught that the very stability, not of society alone, but of the earth, depended upon the fulfilment of supposed religious obligations.

A similar idea to this—similar, at least, in some respects and to some extent—has been held by the strict adherents of every religion in all time. We have had a striking example of it, lately, in an article by a Presbyterian, Prof. W. G. T. Shedd, in the last *North American Review*, who has come to the defence of the doctrine of everlasting punishment. In the course of that defence, he has announced his belief that the stability of society, moral principles, moral character, moral conduct, depends entirely upon the permanence of the people's belief in religious ideas as he understands them. He says that when people lose their faith in certain doctrines, then society is in danger of being precipitated into chaos: moral stability depends upon a certain set of theological beliefs. This, you see, is of the same kind as that conviction of the Hindu priests; for, if society is really to be plunged into chaos, it does not much matter what becomes of the world, on which society simply finds a field for the display of its activities. The world, then, according to Prof. Shedd, is quite as dependent on certain theological and religious beliefs as it was in the opinion of the old Hindu priests.

Three or four years ago, I think it was, Prof. Goldwin Smith, himself a Liberal in belief and thoroughly in sympathy with the progress of modern ideas, proclaimed his fear that, in the breaking down of the old sanctions of belief, we were in danger of what he called a “moral interregnum,”—of a period, at least, when there should be recog-

nized no supreme moral authority, when there should be no king in the moral world, when moral law should be disregarded. I trust that I shall make clear, in the course of this discussion, the extent and nature of this danger, if such there be.

I want to note, at the outset, one other thing. It has been reiterated so much and so long by the leaders of religious thought, the recognized teachers of the world, that it seems to have become a part of the instinctive thought and common belief of the great masses of men. So much is this so, that, if a person begins to doubt the reality of his old beliefs, begins to question the correctness of his former views, to wonder whether, after all, the Bible is infallible, whether everything taught by the old churches is true, he begins at the same time to fear, to wonder whether it is true that morality, character, and conduct do really depend on these old beliefs; whether it is safe to give up the old ideas, even if compelled to reject their truth. And I take it that something akin to this lies at the basis of the conduct of so many parents who have given up entirely their belief in the old theological ideas, who still not only permit their children to go to Sunday-school where they will learn them, but even urge them to, thinking that perhaps, after all, it is safer; or that there may be a certain degree of safety in a man or a woman learning the truth about God's universe, but that it may somehow be safer for the child to learn what is not true. I met, two or three weeks ago, an intelligent lady in just this state of mind. All her friends were in the old churches. She herself was beginning to doubt the reality of many of the old doctrines; and yet she hesitated, and hardly dared to take a step ahead, lest, by so doing, she should really be endangering in her own case, and by the force of example in the case of others, the stability of

certain moral principles, never having outgrown the idea that there is some necessary connection between a theological belief and a moral principle or sanction. It seemed to me, therefore, before we get on far enough to deal with that portion of our subject pertaining especially to the religious life of the individual as such, that it would be worth while for me to discuss some of these general questions, and so lay a broad foundation of thought, on which we may stand while we pursue our further and more special line of study.

My purpose, then, is to discuss the relation between religious beliefs and ethical sanctions; to find out how they are related to each other; how far one is dependent on the other, if it be so at all, and what the real relation ought to be. In following this line of thought, it will be necessary for me to go back and study for a little the origin of religion and the origin of ethics, that you may see the root out of which they spring, that you may see the natural line of their development, and so find out how far they are related, and to what degree they are independent and may be left to stand alone; and to find out the point at which they come to a place of meeting and reconciliation.

First, then, let us look, with this purpose in mind, at the origin of religious ideas and practices.

What does it mean that this race of ours has always been religious? How has it come to engage in these religious services, and what has it supposed it was all the while doing while engaging in them? Religion always takes its rise in the belief in a power, or powers, separate and distinct from humanity, ordinarily invisible, indefinitely great and mighty, — powers supposed to be able to control the destiny and welfare of men. At first, however, these powers are looked upon simply as invisible or heavenly despots, without any



regard to their moral character, without any regard to the relation in which they stand to the ordinary course of human conduct.

Let us take an illustration, and see how true this is. Here is a North American Indian. He is starting out in company with the fellows of his tribe on a hunting expedition, or on the war-path against some hostile tribe. He does not feel that he is powerful enough to carry out this purpose alone, or, at any rate, he wishes to get all the assistance that he possibly can so as to insure his success. He believes that there are certain invisible spiritual beings recognized as gods and patrons of his tribe; that they are able to do almost anything that they will, if he can only bring to bear upon them the necessary inducements. If he can only get their help, their alliance, then he will be certain to succeed in his hunting expedition, he will be certain to triumph over his enemies; unless, as it has sometimes happened, the god who is helping his enemies should be mightier than his own god. But, at any rate, he is safer to fight against his enemy, if he has his god as an ally, than to go against them without that help. So what does he do? He brings certain offerings, he enacts certain ceremonies or rites. The nature of the offering he will bring and of the rites and ceremonies will depend upon his thought concerning the character of the god. He will try to bring him what he supposes the god wants, and to do what he supposes the god wants him to do. Do you not see that in all this process there is no moral consideration whatever? No more moral consideration than there is when a man goes to Washington to try to bring influence to bear on his representative, and through him upon the higher officials, in order to get some piece of business carried through. He does not think of it as moral one way or the other, any more than transacting a piece of business

at his store. It is simply unmoral: he is merely dealing with these celestial powers.

Take a more imposing example. Go back to the time of the Trojan war. Here are the Greeks besieging year after year this city of Troy. Juno, the wife of Jupiter, the queen of heaven, is on the side of the Greeks: Venus, and the celestial powers that she can persuade to join her, are on the side of the Trojans. Both Greeks and Trojans bring offerings to their gods and goddesses. Did they have any thought whatever of there being any connection between these rites and offerings and their own moral characters? Not a whit. No more than they would have thought they were engaged in a moral action having any connection with virtue, honesty, truthfulness, or sincerity, when they were engaged in trying to get some neighboring king or potentate to send allies to join their army.

Not only were the religious services of these times entirely divorced from morality, but the gods and goddesses were looked upon as merely heavenly inhabitants, not unlike humanity, favored only by being immortal and endowed with certain characteristics greater than human. Take Venus. She wishes to favor the Trojans. *Æneas*,—this is related in the *Aeneid* of Virgil,—*Æneas* with a certain number of followers sets off to found a colony. Juno wishes to bring disaster upon them on the sea in the interest of the Greeks, their hereditary enemies. What does she do? She goes to *Æolus*, and offers him an immense bribe, if he will let all his winds loose and stir up a tempest in which the ships shall be wrecked and sunk, and the voyage thus be brought to a disastrous end. He accepts the bribe, and does his best to wreck the voyagers, and would have succeeded, only Neptune, not quite liking this unwarranted invasion of his realm, comes to the rescue, and produces a calm on the sea. Is

there anything moral entering into the conception of a religion like this? But you must not think that these were exceptions. These were the universal ideas of the ancient world.

Take it in regard to the Jews at a similar time. In the very last book of the Old Testament, the prophet Malachi says to the people: If you want to prosper, if you want to get rich, if you want your children to be well,—what? Why, bring all your tithes, all your offerings, to the temple, maintain the recognized ritual and worship of Jehovah, and all those good things shall be yours. If you do not, Jehovah will be angry and punishment will fall upon you.

Religion, then, in the old world at its best, was simply unmoral: it was a transaction between man and his deity, an attempt to get his deity to do something for him, or an attempt to ward off the supposed anger of his deity. And there was reason enough in the popular belief. If a pestilence came, the priests always interpreted it as the anger of God, and not as having anything to do with sanitary matters. It was the anger of the deity because the service of the temple had not been properly supported. So they were trained to believe in these ideas as to the religious life.

Not only this: the ancient religions were not only unmoral, but, many and many a time, they were positively immoral. The religious worship of Venus, the worship of many of the Babylonian goddesses and gods, the religious worship of Bacchus, the god of wine and drunkenness,—why, the very rites and services, the religious duties that men and women were called upon to perform in the service of these deities, from the stand-point of modern morals, were vices and crimes. There has never been a vice nor a crime, not one, that at some time and on some occasion, in the service of some religion, has not been a religious duty. Why did the

Pocasset murder shock the moral sense of New England as it did? For no other reason than that it was the moral sense of New England instead of the moral sense of two thousand years ago. The moral ideal of the world has changed and grown as the ages have passed by, and that is why people are shocked at the murder of a child at Pocasset at the supposed command of God, who are not shocked at all at reading the same thing about Abraham in the Old Testament. One was regarded with horror, the other as a sublime religious sacrifice. This simply measures the difference between the moral sense of the time of Abraham and the moral sense of New England to-day,—that one was looked upon as heroism and beauty and glory and religion, and the other as murder or insanity. The acts were precisely the same.

Religion, however, as humanity develops, comes to be moral. The Eternal is looked upon as desiring and demanding righteousness on the part of the people. The Jews, at their best, had a glimpse of this in the Old Testament, so that their prophets cried out, uttering, as they supposed, the ideas of Jehovah: I am weary of the blood of bulls and goats: bring me no more offerings. Bring me only righteousness, truth, justice, and mercy; for these are the things that now and hereafter I demand.

How is it that religion comes to be moral? I shall have occasion to answer that question in a moment.

Let us turn now from these ideas in regard to the origin and nature of religion, and let us glance at the origin and nature of morality. What do people mean by morality, and how is it that they have come to be moral? Did morality spring out of religion? You can judge for yourselves from the character of the ancient religions that I have described to you. You can judge, in the light of the ideas and charac-

ters of their advocates themselves, as to whether goodness and mercy and tenderness, manhood and truth, these moral principles, would be likely to spring out of religions such as I have outlined. Men became moral by the most natural process in the world,—as the result of experience in living together. They have found out that certain courses of conduct are good for them, and that certain other courses of conduct are not good for them,—that is all there is to it.

How did people come to condemn murder as an evil? On account of their religious ideas? No. How is it to-day? How would it be if the Bible were suddenly blotted out of existence, and the command supposed to have been uttered on Sinai were no more remembered? Murder came to be recognized as a crime because people wanted to live, because they loved life and were not willing to be killed; because, though they might be angry with some one man and wish him out of the way, public sentiment was against taking life for such cause. If it were allowed in one case, it would endanger, necessarily, the "safety and welfare of every other individual in the community and nation. When did people learn that lying was wrong? Just as soon as they learned that, in order to carry on human intercourse at all, they must be able to trust each other, they must be able to rely on what was told them as true. If lying were universal, society would cease to exist. There could be no possibility of human intercourse or human relationship, no possibility of carrying on trade or commerce. Modern society rests on mutual confidence as its foundation and corner-stone; and the man who tells a lie or is false in any particular does what he can to crumble the very corner-stone of human society. This is recognized and incorporated and incarnated in the public sentiment against lying. Although an individual may like to lie to carry out some purpose of his own, he

himself in other cases hates and detests lying as injurious, and because he knows that the man who lies strikes at the very foundation of all that is valuable in the world. So in regard to the feelings with respect to every other vice and crime. They are simply the result of human experience. Men found that they must observe these laws of conduct, if they were to live together. They were necessary to life, prosperity, and happiness. You may take up any virtue that is recognized as a virtue and analyze it, and you will find that it is a kind of feeling, or course of conduct, that experience has proved to be necessary to human welfare and happiness. Or, if you analyze any course of conduct that is recognized as evil, you will find that it is something that threatens the welfare of mankind, the happiness and prosperity of the race.

Morality began, then, in the experience of individuals living within the limits of their own family or tribe. And the laws of morality deepened and broadened and grew, as the world became more and more acquainted with itself, as human sympathies developed and human relationships extended. And I believe it to be a simple statement of the truth to say that religion owes a hundredfold more to morality than morality does to religion. How is it that men have come to recognize the principles of human brotherhood; to talk about the interests of mankind as a unit, as one; to talk about a federation of nations?

Let us see. Here is a little tribe, living within the limits of its own boundary lines and caring only for its own welfare. The members naturally condemn theft among themselves, but never think of condemning stealing from or murdering the members of another tribe. They have not learned to recognize that their own welfare is bound up with the welfare of other tribes. Take the case of the Six

Nations. Here are six tribes banded together. The limits of their interests would be coincident with the limits of the federation. The members of the federation might think it all right to steal from or murder the members of other tribes than those of the Six Nations ; but, among themselves, this course of conduct would be condemned, for their interests were identical. When steam-ships were invented, or, even before that, when sailing-ships were invented, when nations began to come into relation with each other, when sympathy broadened, and people began to recognize others and to trade with them, then they began to get a glimpse of that higher truth, that there was something larger than the nation, that humanity was something nobler than patriotism ; and, just as fast as the nations have come into this relation of mutual dependence upon each other, just so fast has this sympathy and sense of brotherhood broadened and deepened and grown. The sense of brotherhood that enables people to say "Our Father," to repeat the opening words of the Lord's Prayer with a meaning in them, owes more to commerce, to exploration, than to all the religions that ever were. Just as people get acquainted with each other and learn that they are dependent on each other, just so fast does this sense of brotherhood, this recognition of the principles of morality, grow and become real. We have not reached the limit of it yet. We are a great deal more indifferent when an Englishman is imposed on than when an American is. We can see a Chinaman abused in Central Africa ; but, if an American is abused in Central Africa, there is war. Suppose an Irishman is not naturalized, although he may have lived in this country for ten years and all his interests may be here. He goes to England, and is arrested for supposed complicity in some plot. He has not been naturalized. He is not an American citizen. We do not

trouble ourselves about him. Let England take care of her own. But suppose he becomes naturalized and a voter the day before he leaves. The whole government, then, is concerned in his welfare. He is an American; and we are anxious to secure the rights of all Americans, whatever becomes of the rest of the world. This is natural. I have no fault to find with it, only it shows our stage of growth in the development of moral principles. I simply point it out to indicate that we have not got our moral growth yet. When we have, we shall be as solicitous about the rights of an unnaturalized as about a naturalized individual. We shall be as solicitous to secure the rights of a Chinaman in Central Africa as though he were an American; and the whole world will be banded together in one league to see that justice and right are everywhere supreme.

This is the way morality has grown. And do you not see, is it not perfectly plain, that theological ideas, that what are called religious doctrines, had almost nothing to do with this development and growth of morality? People have been pious all through the ages, without thinking much about morality. It seems to us absurd,—that story that is told of the Italian bandit, who would rob and murder, but would not eat meat on a Friday. Yet he was perfectly logical. Suppose he did rob, and even murder a man in robbing him. He could go to the priest and pay for absolution, and still have something left over for his own use. But, if he ate meat on a Friday, he would be no richer than before, and would have nothing with which to buy absolution; and, really, this was a more serious complication, with his conception of God, than the other was. His action was perfectly logical, according to the religious teaching he had received.

Take the case of Charles II. of England or of a Louis of France. They were pious; and it was no sham or mockery,

no make-believe. We are accustomed to say to-day that, if a Sunday-school superintendent runs off with a lot of money, he is a hypocrite. Not necessarily. He may be perfectly devout and religious, according to his conception of religion; but his religion may have nothing to do with his moral character. In the case of Charles and Louis, the court circulars of the time—if there were such things—might have announced that the king went to mass in the morning, in the afternoon went out hunting; but any time through the day, morning, noon, or night, he may have been cruel, inhuman, licentious, breaking every law of human morality. It never occurs to him that this is inconsistent with going to mass in the morning. There is no connection in his mind between religion and morality. But it is no wonder. He is taught that the king can do no wrong. Even philosophers like Hobbes write whole treatises, showing that there is no morality apart from the will of the ruling power; and, since the king is supreme, he can do what he pleases. Even Luther carried his ideas so far as to say, concerning the licentiousness of the German princes, that we understood human nature and the fitness of things so well that we could overlook things like that in princes. These were the common ideas of the world. There was no necessary connection between pleasing this despot up in the sky and doing right by your neighbor.

The character of a religion would always be best determined by the character of the god, just as the character of the court of England is determined by the character of the king. The people, knowing that the king holds in his hands all the emoluments and all the honors, that he wields the power to banish them or take their lives even, if he does not like them, would naturally be ready to do anything to minister to the king and to win his favor. And, if they believe

with their whole heart that God up in heaven cares more for their reading the Bible, singing hymns, or praying, or going to church than for their behavior, and that their eternal welfare depends on their pleasing him, would it be strange if the masses of the people cared more for these things than for character and conduct? Mr. Moody denounces everything immoral and unjust, but in the same breath tells us that these things do not touch the question of salvation. This is the modern doctrine of the Church. We are not done with these things yet. But, if they do not touch the question of salvation, is it any wonder if a man cares more for the endless ages of eternity than he does for the uncertain years of time?

Now, we are ready, having seen the separate origin and the independent progress of religion and morals, to see how they come to coincide with each other. By what process can they unite? For I believe that, when religion and morality both have developed into the realization of their ideal, they will be recognized not any longer as separate from each other, but as one, the two sides of one great fact. Religion and morality are the two-sided shield, gold on the one side and silver on the other, but really one. Religion and morality, rightly conceived, I believe to be identically one at heart. Religion is only the cosmic side of morals, morals only the human side of religion.

But how are they going to be married and united indissolubly? In this way. When God ceases to be thought of as an irresponsible, arbitrary despot outside of the universe, imposing his laws upon the world and man; when men cease to think of him as having the ability to make a thing right or wrong by his will; when they cease to think of him as having the ability, if he choose, to supersede or override justice and mercy and truth and human obligations; when they

learn to think of him as he is, as the heart and soul of the universe ; when they learn to think of his laws as the laws of the universe, the laws of life, the laws of body, mind, and soul, the laws of the family, the laws of society, of business, of nations ; when they learn to think of God thus, as residing in the world and in man, the heart and soul of them all, and of his laws as the laws of prosperity, peace, and happiness,—then religion and morality will be seen to be one. It will be seen that religious motives coincide with and re-enforce moral motives, and there will be no conflict between them.

Undoubtedly there is some truth in the idea of Mr. Goldwin Smith as to the possibility of a moral interregnum on the breaking down of a man's old theological or religious notions, or the old reasons for his conduct, whether he calls them religious or moral. It of course leaves him for a time all at sea. How would it work in any other direction ? Suppose a community of people had been trained from their childhood to an implicit and unquestioning belief in a certain medical treatise or a treatise on hygiene ; that this book undertook to set forth explicitly just what they should eat or not eat, how many times a day they should eat and how long they should refrain from eating ; that it should regulate the treatment of their bodies in all particulars ; and they believed it to be infallible. They believe that obedience to its laws will bring certain tremendous rewards, and disobedience tremendous punishments. They have never waked up to the fact that there are any other reasons why they should do so and so, except the reason, written down in the book.

Suppose for generations they had been trained like this, and that you should suddenly impeach the truthfulness of that book, and get many to doubt its infallibility, to disbelieve in the threatened penalties and the arbitrary rewards

that had been attached to them, what would be the result? At first, people would have no reasons left them for treating their bodies one way rather than another. There would be no reason for doing this thing or that, and they would make all sorts of mistakes under the impulse of appetite and taste. They would feel that they had perfect liberty to do as they pleased. How long would they be in that state of mind? No longer than the time necessary for them to try and find out laws for themselves. If they ate something unhealthy for them, they would be likely to know it. If they pursued courses of conduct in sanitary matters that threatened their life and health, do you think they would remain ignorant of it many months? They would find that the old laws were only partial transcripts of those which are real, and that with these laws they must reckon, and that to these laws they must be obedient at the peril of their life. If they chose to follow their own way and die, perhaps no one would hinder them; but most people would prefer to recognize the forces with which they have to deal and live. They would find, in other words, that they were not free to do as they pleased, but only free to do right; which is the only freedom any man ever had or ever will have.

Now, what is the condition of things religiously and morally in the world? The whole world, almost from the beginning down to these modern times, has been taught a similar thing. It has been taught that a book or a priesthood or a church was the only recognized authority for character, for conduct; that there was not a real reason why they should do this or refrain from that, except that the book or priest had said so. That is just the state of mind of the friend of mine out West who said there would not be many Christians, if there were no devil. He had been trained to look forward to the devil and future punishment as the reason for any kind of moral

action,—for kindness to his family, for telling the truth. But suppose they were taken away. Break down your church, burn up all the Bibles, and would the reason for a man's taking good care of his family be taken away? Take away the doctrine of the Trinity, and would there be no reason for telling the truth? Take away foreordination, would there be no reason left why a man should not commit adultery? Are not these laws inherent in the nature of things? Are they not a part of the very constitution of the universe? And would not men, in a little while, learn that they are a part of the condition of life, of welfare, of health, happiness, and prosperity? Is it not that which we mean when we talk about moral laws at all?

It seems to me, then, that there is some danger of a moral interregnum; but it is not the fault of the new and larger truth. It is the fault of the false teachings of the past, which have led men to look at unreal reasons for character and conduct instead of those which are a part of the nature of things. It is not possible that a truer knowledge of this nature of things shall take them away. It will only enlarge, deepen, broaden, lift up, and make supreme the higher, finer, truer moral sanctions of the natural world. Just as long as flowers are beautiful and fragrant, just so long will men believe in the beauty of human character, of human love, of human tenderness, of mercy. Just as long as the stars above us hold their courses, circling in their spheres, governed by the relation in which they stand to each other, their masses and distances, just so long will the units of human society circle in their natural spheres, being regulated by the realities of the relationships in which they stand to each other. Just as long as it is true that the scales, the symbol of justice, need equal weights on each side to establish an equation between them, just so long it

will be true that there must be established an equation of rights and duties, in order to fulfil the ideals of human justice.

These moral laws, then, are a part of the nature of things ; and no possible changes in theological ideas, or the dissolution of theology altogether, if it were possible, could permanently touch or weaken a single moral law by a feather's weight. If you cease to believe in any future life, would it still be right to steal? Or suppose it were possible for the belief in God himself to fade completely out of the human mind. Humanity would still exist. We would still stand in relations to each other, and be able to hurt or help each other. All the moral laws and forces would continue in their integrity just the same.

Now let us sum up the results of our discussion :—

1. Religion started in entire independence of morality.
2. Religion has many times been not only unmoral, but immoral.
3. Religion becomes moral only when the laws of God are recognized as identical with the laws of the universe and of human life.
4. Morality started with the facts and experiences of human relationship, without any necessary relation to religion.
5. Morality has progressed through the ages largely independent of religion ; and it has done more for religion than religion has done for it.
6. Morality becomes a part of religion just as religion becomes a part of morality, when the laws of human life, the laws of the universe, are recognized at last as the laws of God.
7. There is danger, for the time, of the loosening of moral principles, of people's losing the reasons for character and

conduct through the process of the breaking down of the old and false standards of conduct, which have been connected with supernatural ideas.

8. But progress in thought, as it deepens and broadens, can only at last result in a higher and grander ethical thought and in a nobler religious ideal.

PERSONAL RELIGION.

I do not know that I shall be able to make you all feel and think as I do this morning concerning the subject about which I am to speak. But, whether I shall thus be able or not, I am myself most thoroughly convinced that there is no theme in all the world comparable to this in dignity and importance. That I may make it clear in its treatment and easily comprehensible, it is a part of my plan, in the first place, to outline as simply as I may this matter of personal religion as it has been held and taught in the old theology. I shall not do this in any spirit of antagonism or criticism or opposition of any kind. I wish to look at it and have you look at it, to define it so that you may see clearly what the holders of this old theology mean and what their purpose is, that, thus, you may be in a state of mind that shall enable you to lay alongside of the old theory the new one that I shall present to you. So you may compare the two together and see their relative truth, beauty, and importance.

In the first place, then, what do those who believe in the old theology mean by personal religion? What would be the beginning and the growth, the general outline and termination of such a religious life, if it were logically and consistently followed out?

At the outset, we must note the fact that they believe that every child of man is conceived in sin and born in a state of total alienation from God. This is sometimes

spoken of as total depravity. They tell us that, so long as man continues in this state, he is unable to think or speak or do anything that is pleasing to God. It is very easy and it is somewhat cheap to hold these ideas up to indiscriminate ridicule. They are perfectly logical and consistent on the basis of the old conception of the universe, of God, and of man.

Let us look for a moment at total depravity, and see what was meant by it. The first illustration that I shall use is one that was given me by my much loved and much respected theological professor in the Seminary. He said: Here are two goblets of water. I may pour in poison or filthiness of some kind into one, until it will contain no more, till I have put in as much as it is capable of holding in solution. Into the other, I may put a single drop of poison or pollution of any kind; but it will permeate, color, touch, and taint every single drop, so that you may rightly say in the case of these two, whatever degrees of difference there are, both are totally polluted or soiled. That is, they are tainted all the way through. These foreign influences have taken away their purity. So they would say of men: not that one man is just as bad as another, or that any single man in all the world is just as bad as he can be; only that he is wrong, some way, all through, in thought and word and deed. That is what they mean by total depravity.

Now take another illustration, and see how perfectly logical and natural this is. They looked upon God as primarily the governor of the universe; and the religious life was figured forth to their thought under the ideal of a kingdom. This world they regarded as in rebellion, *disloyal*; so that every single person born into it was born *disloyal*, being thus in a state of rebellion or alienation from God.

Now take this figure of rebellion, and let us see how it looks. Suppose that one of the counties or provinces of England were in rebellion to-day against the central power. So far as the government is concerned, it would make no difference whether any particular individual in that province was an honest man in his business, true to his wife and kind to his children, a good neighbor, a faithful friend. In spite of all these virtues, he is a rebel. Consequently, so long as he continues such, no matter how good or noble or true he may be in other relations, it is impossible for him, in thought or word or deed, to please the king. The very first duty, that takes precedence of all others, is to surrender up the arms of his rebellion and become loyal to his king. That is the way in which they look at the relation in which we stand to God; and that is their meaning, when they say that morality cannot save a man, when they say that you may be honorable in business, true in your family relations, noble in every direction, and yet be alienated from God and his love. If that theory of the universe is true, that is all logical and natural enough. It might be — we can conceive such a case — the duty of a noble, tender-hearted king to sign the death-warrant of the noblest and tenderest-hearted man in all his realm, for the public welfare, or because he continued contumacious against the laws. This is what they meant by total depravity, by being out of right relation with God.

Now let us take a step further, and see how conviction, repentance, and conversion come in, what part they play.

All the while that these men are in rebellion against God, he, according to the old theory, is really their rightful sovereign and their best friend, desiring, above all things, if he may consistently with what they call justice and the welfare of the universe, to be kind and tender and helpful

toward men, but held bound by the laws and by the exigences of public affairs. All the while, this king in heaven is their truest and best friend and, of right, their ruler. Such being the condition of affairs, God sends abroad his spirit all over the earth, and influences men's hearts, their thoughts and feelings, and opens their eyes to the truth. According to some of the old theories, this spirit is only sent to a few people,—the elect; according to others, it is sent to all. But, in any case, the upshot of it was that he produced a desire, effective in the hearts of only a part of mankind. But those that he did reach were affected in this manner,—and you see how natural it is—they waked up to the fact at last that they owed their allegiance to God, that they ought to love him, that they ought to serve him, that they ought to worship him, that he was worthy of all the devotion of hand and brain and heart. And, when they fairly realized at last what sort of a being God was, how kind, how tender, how loving, that he was their father, and that they had been for years in open opposition to him, whether conscious of it or not,—when, at last, they realized this, then a flood of emotional sorrow swept over them; and this they call repentance. They were sad, heart-broken, to find the position that they had been occupying; and, as a natural result of this, there came what they called conversion, a change of heart, to be gradually followed by a change of life. So the outcome of it was that they came to love what they had hated and to hate that which they had loved. They were totally changed. They had become loyal subjects.

Now you will see clearly in the light of these theories another distinction that ought to be borne in mind. Suppose a person who had been in rebellion against our government during the late war should see the position he ought to occupy and lay down his arms, and should accept the

pardon of the executive, he would naturally be rewarded and looked on with favor, though his private character may not have been, and may not have become, what it ought. He would be treated with more favor than the noblest of those who still continued rebels, and rightly so.

Then, after the man or woman had become convinced of sin, had repented and been converted, and had become a loyal subject of heaven again,—then what?

There began a life of conscious relationship toward God; a life lived in the thought of him as father, friend, king; a life of trust, devotion; a life of service, obedience. They did not claim that a man became suddenly good all at once and all through. He had turned about and was going the other way. He was being gradually wrought over into the likeness of the new ideal which he had accepted as the object of his worship and as the rightful lord of his life.

Now let us see what the personal life of the man who should accept and consistently carry out these ideas should be. It would become, in the first place, his daily duty to read the word of God; for he believes that the Bible is not only a real revelation from God, but the only and the all-sufficient one, that it contains all truth necessary for human conduct here and salvation hereafter. Do you not see that it would become his prime duty to make himself acquainted with the will of God as he understood it, to study the Bible to find out what he ought to do, to learn the laws of the kingdom of which he has become a citizen?

And then, in the next place, do you not see how natural it would be for a man under these ideas to feel his life somehow lifted up into a higher range, thrilled by a purpose that did not exist before,—a purpose giving dignity and grandeur to it; and, if he thoroughly believed it, what matter how other people treated the question? Let them

scoff if they will, let them find fault if they will, let them sneer if they will: he is conscious of standing in a relationship with the great universal Power that gives his life dignity and meaning.

Suppose, during the war, we had sent an ambassador south under pledge of safe conduct and safe return. He goes there as the representative of the United States. What would he care for the howling of the rebel mob? What would he care for the scorn and contempt of those who stood in opposition to that power that he believed had rightful authority over all the land? The fact that he stood as representing that power would give him dignity, self-confidence, rest, and trust, a purpose to his life that he could not otherwise have had.

Then, it had another element, which is important on any theory of human life. It gave him trust in the midst of failure, confidence in the face of adversity. If he really believed it with his whole soul, it would not trouble him much, though even kingdoms rose and fell. He believed that his Father was God and King over all the universe, of which this earth was only one little province, and the cause with which he had allied himself was supreme and eternal. He would feel very much as the Duke of Wellington did. It is said that a missionary from some part of the world had returned to England discouraged, disheartened, feeling that nothing could be accomplished. He was a personal friend of the Duke of Wellington, a younger man. Meeting him after his return, the duke asked him about his experience; and he told him. The duke said: Do you believe in the God that you claim to believe in? Do you believe that he has undertaken to convert the world sometime? Do you believe that he is able to carry out his plans? Do you believe that he has appointed you to do any definite work?

And, when the missionary had given an affirmative answer to all these questions, he said: Is it not, then, your clear duty to stand at your appointed post, no matter what happens, whether the cause seems to go up or down? That is the soldier's duty. This fortress or that may be captured, this army or that may be defeated or wasted, or it may succeed; but the cause, supreme above all, moves on in triumph.

Then, lastly, a person believing in this theory and living it out consistently will face even death without any fear. There are very few in the modern world, so far as my observation is able to inform me, who really do consistently and logically *believe*; and that is the reason that there is so little of this logical and grand *living*, even on any theory. But he that does believe this has no fear of death. Let death come when it will, he dies happy. So must it be, if he is consistent. He is in the state of mind of General Wolfe at the siege of Quebec. You remember how he lay mortally wounded in the arms of his attendants, and, as he heard the cry, "They flee! they flee!" he raised himself, and asked feebly, "Who flee?" And when they told him, "The French," "Then," said he, "I die happy!" The cause was supreme in his thought. Sure of its final victory, nothing else mattered. This I believe to be the grandest conception possible to give to the religious life as lived under the old theory of the universe.

Now, our question is: Is there any chance for anything like that, or as noble as that, on the modern theory of the world? Is there any power to trust in? Is there any ground for allegiance? Is there any possibility of conscious alliance with a cause that shall lift up and dignify human life after this fashion, and make it seem worth while to live?

I believe, in the first place, that we have a God unspeakably

grander than the old. Indeed, he is so vast, so grand, that thousands of people in the modern world entirely lose sight of him. They label one manifestation of his power by one name, and another manifestation of his presence by another name, until, bewildered by the infinity of detail, they lose hold entirely of the sense of that unity that is in and above all, and of which these are only glimpses and outshining rays.

Suppose, on a visit to Rome, you should go to St. Peter's, and, standing without the cathedral, should go up until you stood within a foot of its walls: what would you see? St. Peter's would be there, so near that you could not see it. It would be above you, overshadowing and overwhelming. All around you in its magnificence, and, just because it was so close to you, it would seem only a little meaningless stone,—no plan, no purpose, no magnificence, no grandeur. Not because there is no St. Peter's, but because you stood in such relation to it that you could not comprehend it or take in its meaning.

I do not expect you to comprehend our God. One reason why I think we have lost him in this modern world is just because we have waked at last to the fact that he is infinite and that we are finite. He is so vast that we can find no name to cover him, no definition to outline him. And this, which is unspeakable gain, seems loss to us, because we are bewildered and overwhelmed by the sense of immensity. People say to me sometimes, "I cannot grasp the idea of God; I cannot picture him; I cannot think him." No, friends: you have no right to grasp him, to outline him. How can you, if he is infinite? And, if he be not infinite, he is no God. If you could reduce him to such proportions that you could draw a picture of him, either on canvas or in your mind, that very act would be the signing of your own moral

and spiritual death-warrant. If you could get to the end of God, if you could march to the limit and look over into the vast abyss of nothing where is no God, then you might come to a time when we should have gotten through, when there would be nothing more to hope, nothing more to live for.

And now, lest you should think I am coining ideas of my own, born of prejudice and bias, I am going to read to you two or three sentences from Mr. Herbert Spencer, a man whom I regard as the master of thought in the modern world, a man who for breadth and comprehensiveness of mind has never in the history of mankind had his equal, a man who comes nearer to grasping all knowledge than any other man who walks the earth. Let us see what he says: "Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that he [man] is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed." Again, "So far from regarding that which transcends phenomena as the all-nothingness, I regard it as the All-being."

Once more: "I held at the outset, and continue to hold that this Inscrutable Existence which science in the last resort is compelled to recognize as unreached by its deepest analyses of matter, motion, thought, and feeling, stands toward our general conception of things in substantially the same relation as does the Creative Power asserted by theology; and . . . this reality transcending appearance, . . . standing toward the universe and toward ourselves in the same relation as an anthropomorphic creator was supposed to stand, bears a like relation with it, not only to human thought, but to human feeling, . . . and there must ever survive those [sentiments] which are appropriate to a power that is omnipresent."

We are, then, in the presence of a Power not ourselves,

a Power that was here before we were born, a Power that will continue when we have passed away, a Power that would not be touched though the earth were ground to powder and strewn as dust through space. This Power, so far as we can think, is infinite, eternal, omnipresent. It is a Power that manifests itself as purpose. We can trace its path from the world's beginning on and up unto the present time ; and by a purely scientific faith see it reaching out toward some grand, far-off event. This Power is nearer to us than anything else that we can conceive. It is in the farthest star ; it is in the fragrance of the flower that you hold in your hand. It is the Power in all moral progress. It is the Power in all that material advance that constitutes civilization. It is the Power of all life, of all feeling, of all hope, of all aspiration. It is that which comes to consciousness in ourselves. It is that which throbs in my wrist. It is that which lifts me as I aspire. We may say in all literalness with the Psalmist : "Whither shall I flee from thy presence ? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there ; if I make my bed in the underworld, behold, thou art there ; if I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me."

We are in the presence, then, of this Infinite Eternal Energy from which all things proceed, in which all things consist.

Another step. On our knowledge of and obedience to this Power depends all human good. Every step that man has made in civilization, in invention, in control over the material world, has been just one new step in understanding and obeying this Infinite and Eternal Energy. Whatever power we have to-day over nature we have earned by learning a little about what we call the laws of this Power, and

obeying them. Every upward step of moral improvement, everything we have done in the way of political amelioration or toward just government, every step in the uplifting of religious thought and life, every step in the development of love and extirpation of fear, every step that means human progress, means just learning a little more about the ways of this Infinite Energy, and obeying a little better. And every hope for the future means simply learning still a little more and obeying a little better still.

Now, then, what? Is not here basis for religion, personal religion? It becomes your first duty and mine to read the word of God just as literally as under the old theory, only the word of our God is not bound in any book. It is as wide as the universe. It is written in the stars, written in the dust beneath our feet. Every word of truth and life is a part of its growing revelation. It becomes your first duty, then, and mine, to read God's book, every day to spell out some new syllable or word.

The next duty is that of obedience to his laws, the conditions of life and growth, just so fast and so far as we can discover them.

Now, I want you to turn with me for a moment and see how here, in the presence of this God, so much grander than the old, in the presence of this human destiny, so much more hopeful than the old, there still remain the possibility, the duty, and the privilege of personal, religious living. Let us note some few of the details of it.

How is it that we are born into this world? I said that, under the old theory, people were supposed to be born totally depraved. We do not think of ourselves as under any curse or wrath of God. We do not believe that he is at enmity with us or we with him. But we do come into this world ignorant, weak, the play of impulses and forces that

we do not comprehend, and that seem to have no object, no outcome. And thousands of men, the great majority perhaps, go through life without any leading, dominant purpose that is noble, that is worthy of man. They care simply to get rich. They care, perhaps, for literary fame. They care for power or social standing. They drift with the current; they creep; they plod. They are consecrated to no supreme ideal that gives unity and dignity to life, that makes them feel that they are a part of some purpose that is superior to all change or decay.

But, in the case of the noblest men,—I am not talking metaphysics or saying anything incapable of being comprehended,—you know how natural a life like this may be. They may not be distinguished, they may be leading an obscure life; but, at some definite time,—they can sometimes remember when it was,—they were convicted and self-condemned by the vision of a higher life. They gained a glimpse of some grand ideal; and they set that up as the finest image of God they could conceive in the inner sanctuary of their hearts. They bowed down before it. They measured their lives by it. They became restless and dissatisfied with the old life, with its lower purpose, made grand by no lofty aim.

Do you know, in the department of art, in the department of literature, of political ambition, it is just this distinction that I am trying to outline that makes all the difference between a grand life and a mean one?

What is the difference between a politician and a statesman? Take Sumner and some place-hunter. What is it that separates the two men? One has an ideal, a great thought as to the service he can render by being true to principle and seeking some high aim. The other simply cares for temporary expedients, for success to-day or to-

morrow, to reward his friends and punish his enemies. One worships and follows an ideal: the other is blown about by every changing wind of impulse, drifting on every current and tide. So it is in art, in literature. So it may be in every department of life.

We need this "conviction of sin." We need "repentance" and "conversion"; not after the old idea, but we need better things than those old terms embodied. There is place for this in modern thought as much as in the old.

Turning thus from our lower and selfish lives, it is possible for us consciously and purposely to ally ourselves with the God whose infinite life I have tried to suggest. Which way is it moving,—toward more knowledge, toward more justice, toward more love, toward more happiness, toward a better civilization? It is moving toward a better, not a poorer future. That is the track of God through the centuries.

We can consciously ally ourselves, then, with this supreme manifestation, this Eternal Energy that is moving through the ages. And think how a life is upheld by this thought! Think how much grander it becomes! We have a purpose now: business may fail, friends may sicken, the dearest even may die; but the light is not all gone out of the heavens, the purpose has not all faded out of life. We are a part of the army marching on toward a sure success. Comrades fall by our side, the detachment is beaten: no matter, we still trust and we still march on. Do only a few reach this ideal? It is a reality none the less.

Here, then, is dignity, here is purpose, here is meaning, here is grandeur in life. And there comes to us, from this conscious alliance with this Infinite and Eternal Power, this casting our influence in with the divine trend of things toward the good and the true, a consciousness of power, of trust, of peace, of rest. And there comes—or I believe

may come—an ability to face even the last enemy without either flinching or fear.

A man allied then with God, living for God, caring for this more than for anything else, conscious of the fact of this likeness of nature between that which is highest in him and that which is highest and dominant everywhere,—how can he fail to believe at the last that the same destiny awaits him as awaits this Eternal Power? He is swept on and borne along by an infinite current, to which he feels himself akin. And, at the last, I believe it to be a rational hope of such souls as these, when they trust that they shall share in that far-off, infinite triumph of the true, the beautiful, the good, which means the dominance of this Power which is working in and leading on mankind.

Let me close by summing up the points with which we have been dealing this morning:—

1. There is ground for a personal religious life.
2. There is ground for the thought side, there is ground for the emotional side, of religion,—not only equal to that which we have outgrown, but unspeakably grander.
3. There is ground for worship, reverence, aspiration, trust, hope.
4. It becomes our duty to study the laws of this Infinite Life and obey them, just as much as it was under the old theory.
5. We have a greater and nobler God than the old.
6. We have a grander man and a better outlook.

INNER LIFE AND OUTER.

I HAVE already made you familiar with one main characteristic of all the old religions,— the fact that almost the entire emphasis of their worship was laid on the outward ceremony. The acceptable worshipper was not necessarily a moral man; and no account whatever was taken of the disposition of his heart. The gods were beings whose good will it was important to gain and keep. They could confer favors; they could ward off impending calamities. Health, good harvests, prosperity in business, success in war, all the affairs of life, were, or at any time might be, at their mercy. To please them then, and keep them pleased, were the most important of all earthly concerns.

But how please them and keep them pleased? Not by character or good conduct, in the human sense of those terms, much less by the inner state or disposition of the heart. In the more elaborated and highly developed of these old religions, the form of the ritual was so definitely fixed that any, even the least, departure from it was supposed to vitiate the whole ceremony and make it fail of its purpose. The gods were not thought of as loving mankind; nor were their laws supposed to have anything to do with human goodness. Indeed, the gods were oftener represented as jealous of human happiness, or even as being inclined to cruelty. But they were capable of being influenced,

in some cases even coerced, into helping their worshippers, or, at least, not injuring them, if only the right means were employed. These right means had somehow been discovered, and were in the keeping of the priests. The sacrifice must be of just the specified kind, killed with just such a kind of knife, burnt on just such an altar, with just such wood for the fire. The bodily attitudes, genuflections, and gestures were all fixed. In the prayers, just such words must be used; while even the rhythm, the accent, the tones of voice were supposed to be of prime importance. When all the specified conditions were complied with, it was thought that somehow the gods were compelled to be favorable.

The tendency to these purely external and wholly superstitious whims is long-lived and hard to be outgrown. Even to-day, in certain High Church quarters, God is supposed to be particularly pleased when the priest in his prayer is facing toward the east. The point of the compass is more important than goodness of heart. A hundred other illustrations of similar import you can furnish for yourselves.

But what I wish you to bear in mind is the fact of this externality of all the old religions. It was not even an externality of conduct, but only of ceremonial. Character was neither a necessary cause nor a necessary result of worship. So long as the prescribed forms were observed in accord with the traditional methods, nothing more was expected.

Let us pass now to consider the position that Jesus held and taught. And right here, in justice to Jesus as well as for the clearness of your own thought, keep one thing ever in mind. Jesus is not to be held responsible for the fact that the Church has so often put ceremony above character, or made it the condition of supposed divine favor and human welfare. He himself was never guilty of this confusion. Indeed, a large part of the offence for which he was held to

be worthy of death was just this supposed impiety of teaching that the popular view of religion was wrong. They had their temple, their sacrifices, their ritual, which they regarded as of divine appointment. But he disregarded the temple, slighted the sacrifices, and neglected the ritual. For these things, they not only supposed God's anger would rest upon him ; but even to permit it they thought might be regarded as complicity on their own part in a grievous wickedness. For he taught that an inner, spiritual worship was better than the temple, and that such a worship might be offered anywhere else as well as in Jerusalem. He even went so far as to say that, though the offering had been brought and laid upon the altar, the whole service might be made of no avail by the worshipper's being out of right relation to his fellow-men.

In contrast, then, with most of the old religions, Jesus laid the chief emphasis on the disposition of the heart. This is the significance of that scene where he discusses with his disciples the question—made so much of at the time—of washing the hands before eating. It is not what you eat or how you eat, he says, that is of importance,—not what goes into the stomach, but what comes out of the heart. The heart he declares to be the fountain of character. Here is found the reason why he places the Magdalen, who had learned to love the ideal of a better life, above the Pharisee, who, while ceremonially perfect, was hard, selfishly proud, and uncharitable. The disposition being right, all the rest would naturally follow. But let that be wrong, and ultimately the outer life is sure to be vitiated by it. If one is facing toward Boston, though a thousand miles away, he is more likely to reach it some time than one who, ever so close to its borders, keeps on walking in a direction that in the slightest degree diverges from its boundary line. Do you

not look more complacently upon a faulty child that loves you than you do upon the most ceremoniously dutiful one whose heart is selfish and cold?

Whatever truth there is in the popular theory of conversion is to be looked for just here. This doctrine is only a distortion of the teaching of Jesus that the state of the heart is the all-important thing. Here, also, is to be found so much of reality as there is in the dogma of "justification by faith," as held by Paul and Luther. They did not mean justification by belief, though it has been often so misinterpreted. They only laid their emphasis on the attitude of the soul. They said this was more important than outward conduct, because ultimately, and in the long run, it would prove the fountain and cause of conduct.

It is a common saying in the modern world that, "if a man does what is about right, that is all there is to it. It is all that is required. He need not trouble himself about anything else." Yes, perhaps so, and in one sense. But I think there is a question deeper than that. "*If* he does what is about right!" But who is he that is likely to do "what is about right"? Of one person, you say, "I would trust that man anywhere." Of another, you say, "You can trust him as long as you keep your eye on him," or "as long as you make it for his interest to be honest." What is the difference between two such men? The conduct of the two, under certain circumstances, may be precisely the same. Yet you feel that one of them is honest, the other is not. Where is the difference? Is it not in the heart?

We are now ready to consider the relation between the inner life and the outer. It presents itself for our notice under several different aspects.

I remember that, some years ago, Mr. Beecher, speaking of certain places where Christians thought they ought not to

go, told his congregation that they might as well go as to stay at home, while all the time wishing they were there. This is the same as to say that the wish is as bad as the act, that whatever is in the heart might as well come out in the life. And Jesus, perhaps in his anxiety to emphasize a point so generally overlooked, appears to go to the same extreme; for he seems to teach that anger, which might lead to murder, is as bad as murder, and that inward lust is as bad as outward guilt. Is it, then, as bad to think evil as to do it? Suppose that only opportunity be lacking? Let a man hate another one, and let his hate take the form of wishing to burn his house down over his head: might he as well do it as wish it? In a certain sense, you may say that he is just as bad as though he did it. But even this admission must be modified; for a deed like that, accomplished and put beyond recall, would certainly react with more disastrous force on his own character than would merely the inner hate, that might die out and pass away. And, then, the stigma of an outward and accomplished deed of wrong abides with a man. It depresses and discourages him, and so stands in the way of moral recovery. The social disgrace and the distrust of his fellow-men also make more difficult his return. He is apt to think that there is no use in trying, since people will put no faith in his professions.

And, then, however it may be for the man himself, it is certainly not so bad for society to have a man harbor an evil purpose as it would be to have him do an evil deed. I feel quite sure that I should rather have a man wish a hundred times to burn down my house than that he should do it once. He may hate me ever so much; but, so long as he does not murder me, it is most assuredly quite a different thing so far as I am concerned. It may be as bad for him, but it is a good deal better for me.

Organized society, then, and government as such are chiefly concerned — and rightly so — with the outer lives of men and women. In a certain and a very important sense, it is none of their business what I think or how I feel, so long as my outer conduct is not injurious to my fellow-men. This does not mean that my thought and feeling are not of immense importance, nor that they are not the fountains out of which all my good or bad actions flow. But they have no jurisdiction over my motives. They can take account only of the conduct that springs from them. And this limitation of their authority is found in the fact that they have no means for getting at or deciding upon the quality of my inner life. Suppose a man has committed a crime. What judge, what jury, is wise enough to take the measure of his soul and estimate the degree of his personal guilt? Society has a right to protect itself from evil-doers, but is not able to pass upon the motives that lead to the evil deeds.

And so, in the sphere of religion, it is of immense importance what a man thinks and how he feels. These are even the matters of prime importance; for, ultimately, thought and feeling determine all conduct. But, in all ages, government has made its most disastrous and cruel mistakes in attempting to deal with the thought and feeling of individuals. For, in the first place, no government is wise enough to decide as to the right or the wrong of religious beliefs and emotions. And, in the second place, it is none of the government's concern as to whether a man's soul is saved or not in some other world. Its authority is limited to the matter of his conduct as a citizen in this world.

And herein is seen the weakness of society in its great movements of reform. It cannot get at the hearts of individuals and make them right. The most it can do is to im-

prove the external conditions a little, and make it somewhat easier for people to do right, provided they are so inclined. In the light of this consideration, we ought to be able to see the folly of trying to legislate people into goodness, or to make them moral by wholesale. Fence them in by laws, and still their hearts are just where they were before. Government, then, can only deal with the externals, the actions of men.

But, if we only could, how much more might be accomplished! The philosophers tell us that all motion is rhythmic. The tidal ebb and flow, the backward and forward swing of the pendulum,—these are symbolic of all movement. It is thus that human progress goes on. One age is introspective, mystic, transcendental. The best people flee from the world, and try to live in the inner realm of contemplation, thought, and feeling. The tendency of the present age is all the other way. The outer condition with us is everything. The immensity of modern physical discovery; the wondrous inventions by means of which we are making our conquests over natural conditions and forces; the enormous increase of wealth; the extent and variety of our products and manufactures,—all these stir the ambition and stimulate the imagination of men. We are looking for an earthly Utopia. And, since it does not come fast enough to suit the hurry of the age, we find restlessness and growing dissatisfaction everywhere. Thefts on the part of clerks who cannot get money fast enough; defalcations by trustees and treasurers; unreasoning strikes, when factories cannot run except at a loss; wild, communistic theories as to the division of property; the general thirst for outward display; the grasping and clutching after the external conditions of happiness,—these all indicate an excessive emphasis placed by the present age on the outer life. If a rich man appears to care only

for money, he must not wonder that his workmen are infected by the same spirit. When the house counts for more than the man, it is not very strange that everybody wants the house. And if, when it is obtained, the means of getting it are forgotten in the fact of possession, why be so scrupulous about the means? So will people reason.

Now, this desire for the external is natural; and, to a certain extent, it is a sign of healthy life. It is not well to be content with poor outward conditions, when better ones are possible. For as the inner condition reacts on the outer life, so does the outer condition react in its turn on the inner life. Good houses, pleasant surroundings, healthy sanitary arrangements,—these help produce, not only happiness, but morals. But when carried too far, and used merely for luxury and display, they demoralize instead of lifting up.

Once in a while, something happens to wake us up to the fact that, of the two, the inner life is the more important. We see a man like Thoreau in his cabin by Walden Pond, and discover that he is not only leading a manlier, but a happier life than many a millionaire. We are startled in our race for money by hearing Agassiz say, in the midst of his fishes, that he is employed about matters so much more important that he "cannot stop to make money." Or down from the far-off ages comes the cynic word of Diogenes, telling Alexander the Great that he knows of nothing the world-conqueror can do for him except to stand out of his sunlight. Or we see Palissy the potter, or Elias Howe, spending his whole life to bless the world with a new invention. Or the haloed head of some teacher, martyr, leader of thought, shines down on us out of their sky of noble achievement. Or Jesus, having "not where to lay his head," talks to us of having "meat to eat that" we "know not of" and of a "treasure" different from that on which we draw checks

at a bank. Some of us learn at last that there is really a world of great satisfaction in which the poets, the philosophers, the artists, the men of thought, live; and that thoughtful sympathy is the key by which any one, though not himself a creator, may enter in. We find that those who are devoted to making the world happier and better think they have found something more satisfying than getting things for themselves. We find a man niggard and narrow and mean, burdened by wealth that he does not know how to use. And we find broad-minded and happy lives in the midst of only ordinary comforts. Then, perhaps, we get an occasional glimpse of what the poet meant when he sung,—

“My mind to me a kingdom is.”

And then, perhaps, we are ready to say: “Maybe, after all, these men are right. They are the wisest and best of the world, and they really say—and seem to prove it—that the inner life of thought and feeling is higher and more important than the outer one of furniture and parties and equipages.”

If only the leaders, the successful men of the world, would see this, accept it, and act upon it, it would be the readiest solution of all our problems of socialism, of capital and labor, of overbearing nabobs and restless masses. If the leaders would show that they understood the fact that the inner world of thought and feeling was the highest, and that the outer world was of value only as it made the other possible and helped it on, they could thus turn all the restless energy of the age into the channels of manly endeavor after manly things; and, since this inner good might be open to all, something like our dream of a contented human progress might be attained. There can never be an equality of wealth; for there is not wealth

enough in all the world to "go around." But the riches of the inner world might be lavishly given to all comers, and no one be the poorer for the distribution. And, in any case, however much a man may grasp and hold with his hands, he only is rich, as a man, who has the inner possessions of a contented and hopeful soul.

Suppose, then, that religion were able to reach men's hearts, their dispositions and desires, and make them what they ought to be! Would not the solution of most of earth's problems be so attained? No longer would there be any need of all the elaborate and expensive arrangements of check and coercion, by which men are compelled from without into right paths of action,—no more armies, no more prisons, no more courts or police. And all the expense of these might be used in building up that kind of external civilization which should be a support and staging for the inner, for that which is real in the manly and womanly sense.

Jesus, then, was right in his diagnosis of the disease of human sorrow and wrong. When he put his physician's finger on the heart, he touched the seat of all the difficulty. The heart is the mainspring and motive force of all the outward activities of the world. If you are sure that a fig-tree is a fig-tree,—fig in core and sap,—you need not stand and watch it. You need not bring to bear upon it any form of external coercion. It will bear figs of itself. You can count upon the harvest. But, if it is a thistle, all your external arrangements will not make it bear a single fig. Such is Jesus' teaching. Is he not right?

And, on the other hand, we may find here an easy solution of many of the troubles of those who still adhere to the old faith. I used to wonder whether or not I was converted; and I have seen ministers and others worrying about the

conversion of some of the noblest people I have ever known. They have been very anxious to get at the heart, to see if they could find the seeds of salvation there. But, in the light of Jesus' illustration, look at the fig-tree again. If a tree is really bearing figs, you need not dissect it, take it to pieces, to find out if it is a fig-tree in reality or only in appearance. The fruit, the external life, if left free to develop after its real nature, will decide that point. Whether or not you can find out when it became right or how, if the heart is right as shown by the outer life, you need not look any further.

And here, also, is a sure test by which you may decide as to the value of external religion,—its rites and forms. They are of no value in themselves or as being directly pleasing to God. In the old days, they fancied that God sat just a little way up in the sky, and that he smiled with pleasure when he smelt the odor of burning beef rising up to his nostrils from the sacrifice on the altar. But that was hardly more childish than much of our modern thought concerning our forms of worship. I cannot help thinking sometimes that if God were really what we often suppose him to be, a great, non-natural man on a throne above the visible sky, looking down and listening to what is going on here, he must get even dreadfully tired of what we call "divine service." Can it be that he likes to listen to our often foolish and contradictory prayers? Does he really like to sit up there and listen to a style of repetitious and fulsome flattery —be told over and over again how good he is and how great he is—that would weary and disgust a really noble man? Does he care for our hymns, our robes, our processions, our solemn faces that might make one think the most dismal thing in life was our thinking of him?

To what end, then, is our worship? It has been said that

"the truest flattery is imitation." I take it then that, if we ever really please God, it is when we are like him. Being like God can only be a thing of the heart,—cherishing feelings of love and good-will that issue in acts of kindness and help. Our external religion, then,—our ceremonies, our forms, our worships,—can avail only as it affects us, not as it affects God. Does this turn it all into what some have sneeringly called "spiritual gymnastics," so taking out of it the heart and meaning? Let us take an illustration and see. An artist spends hours and days in the Louvre or the Pitti Palace in Florence. He bows down before the masterpieces of the great of old; he worships these embodied ideals of beauty; he breathes their air until their power and loveliness have moulded his taste and aspiration into a likeness that it becomes the life-long work of his hand to reproduce. Or he goes through a similar process of growth and transformation through worship of the beauty and glory of nature by the sea or under the shadows of the mountains. This is all natural and real, is it not? Anything that he does that helps on this development and transformation of his own brain and soul and hand is rational and noble. Anything he does that fails of this is thrown away. So our worship of the divine—the true, the beautiful, the good—is of value just in so far as it transforms us into its likeness, puts these things into our hearts, and makes them thus a power to mould and shape our outward lives. Any form, then, is good that helps this. Any form is useless that does not. Any form that becomes a substitute for it or stands in its way is an injury. Test then your worship by this standard, and you need not go astray.

But now one point more remains to be considered. Is this theory of religion a practical one? Is there any way by which the hearts of men may be reached, and these changes

of feeling wrought which are to issue in the better outward life? The old churches have their ready reply. Some will tell you that this, which they call the "new birth," can be at any time brought about by the prescribed use of the sacraments. Others will tell you it may be expected as the sudden, miraculous result of a special influence of the Holy Spirit. We need not stop to argue about these theories further than to say that they belong to a world of thought in which we do not live any longer. They seem to us small and partial, a part of the "childish things" which the grown-up world is gradually putting away. But a larger and better fact remains. And, when we see a man of a loving spirit, a lofty temper, a noble soul, a heart out of which deeds of goodness and help spring as naturally as roses bud and blossom on their parent bush, we need not trouble to find out whether he has been born again, or when, or how. Perhaps, being born right in the first place, he has never needed it. At any rate, if he ever did need it, the result somehow has come. He has a right heart.

But what has the modern world to say concerning the production of such results?

In the first place, we need to fix and keep our attention on the fact that the heart is the fountain and source of conduct. A man is not what he ought to be, until he chooses the good. When he does that, action may be left to take care of itself. The work of a true religion, then, ought to be directed toward the heart. If a watch does not keep correct time, the watch-maker does not think it his business to forever meddle with the hands or the dial. He knows the difficulty is inside, and he seeks to put that right. Keep to this idea, then, as fundamental.

In the second place, we know that there is a natural law of moral reproduction universally at work in the world.

People naturally grow into the likeness of those ideas or those ideals whose company they keep. And, since we have the power of choosing the ideas and the ideals that the experience of the world has proved to be noblest, we may put ourselves under their influence. Criminals can be made by criminal examples, either in life or in literature. How many sailors have been made by stories of the sea! How many warriors by the fascinating descriptions of conquest! The stories of heroism reproduce heroes. The records of the saints who have served mankind are like banyan trees, whose branches strike down and become roots of other trees.

Herein lies the significance of noble religious teaching, preaching, and worship. They plant the seeds, prepare the soil, and create the atmosphere that lead to the growth of noble lives.

Now, all this is just as natural and reasonable in religion as are the methods by which art or science or literature is made to become a power in the hearts and lives of men. No man ever became a great artist in whose heart the love of his ideal had not been made dominant. But this love can be fostered, trained, and developed. So must the student embrace his truth, the writer his ideal.

How many of you have some precious portrait on the wall of your chamber,—the face of some one, living or dead, who is to you a living presence and inspiration? When its eyes seem to look at you, they have power to burn and shame out of your soul all evil thoughts or purposes. You worship their ideals as a devotee might a saint. They mould your thought. They shape your life. They creep even into your dreams. Do you not, then, see how natural it all is, and how mighty?

Suppose, then, you take home to your hearts an ideal of

the divine. Let it be to you the embodiment of all truth, all beauty, all good. Let it be like a living presence. Learn that through these qualities have come all the good, the glory, the happiness that man has ever attained ; that this way lies all the hope of the future ; that here is the open secret of all peace and joy and rest for your own life ; that other things pass, while these remain. Learn to worship, reverence, love this thought of God. Do you not see that an inward leading like this would supersede the necessity for all outward calculations and motives, and thus your lives would flow Godward as naturally and beautifully as a river runs between its verdant banks ?

Such is the work of true religion. Natural, divine, it cleanses the fountains of the heart, and so makes clear and life-giving all the streams of daily life.

EVIL AND GROWTH.

EVERY man and woman must, after some fashion, deal with religion. Religion is so essential, so pervasive a fact, that we can no more escape it than we can escape the atmosphere. A man's lungs may be disordered, he may breathe bad air, he may not breathe enough; but, in some fashion, he must deal with the atmosphere. Every man must deal with questions of health. If he be ignorant of the laws of life, if he be careless concerning them, if he be willing to defy them even, still he deals with them, and deals with them in the most vital way. So, whatever your theory about religion, or whatever your lack of theory, whatever your belief or disbelief, you can no more escape it than you can travel outside and beyond the boundary line of the world's horizon.

If a man declares himself an atheist, atheism is a religious theory. It is only the obverse side of the current coin of belief. So, however you put it, you must deal with it, and it will deal with you; and your success or failure in life will very largely depend upon your theory or lack of theory, on the correctness or lack of correctness of your religious belief. He who will deal with it in any intelligent fashion must have a working theory, at least, of life. He must have some belief concerning the great problems of the world,—the problem of sin, the problem of pain, the problem of death. He must be able to give, if not some account of

them, at least some theory concerning them, that will enable him practically to deal with them day by day. He must face them; for they are a part of our human experience. And, if he is to be intelligently religious, he must have some belief that shall enable him to bear that which is inevitable, that shall enable him to escape that which may be escaped, that shall enable him to do something, in his own case and in the case of others, to help the deliverance of the great world from its heavy burdens. In order to do this, he must have some belief in an outcome that shall by and by justify the process,—a religion or a theory of some kind that shall be an inspiration to him, that shall help him to bear what must be borne, and that shall enable him to do what he can. He must have some hope in his heart that shall sustain him in the midst of the practical difficulties of life. Men have always felt, from the beginning of time, that pain and sin and death were, somehow, unnatural. They have not submitted to them willingly. They have felt that they ought not to exist, and that the great work of humanity was, in some way, to escape from them. Yet, if by the word "natural" we mean that which is a part of the observed facts of nature, then there is nothing more natural in the world than pain and sin and death. It seems to me a very significant and hopeful fact that men have thus revolted against them,—that they feel that, if the world were what it ought to be, they would not exist. They have felt that, somewhere in the past, there must have been an ideal world where they did not exist; and that, somewhere in the future, there should be created an ideal world in which they should no longer exist. And this glimpse of the ideal, this feeling that there is something better, seems to me one of the most significant, one of the most hopeful facts in human life.

What is this problem? Let us glance at it under two or three phases.

Take the fact of pain. Are we not all the time asking: Why do we need to suffer? Why does this pain exist? Why is there so much of it in the world? Why is there so little apparent connection between suffering and the moral character of those who suffer? For, sometimes, we see some sturdy, healthy, indifferent wrong-doer defying all the moral laws and yet going through life in the main free from suffering; while some other person, his conscience keyed to the highest ideal of life and truth, is so organized that life is one long, tremulous pain. Why is this?

Take the fact of death. Why do we need to die, if there is a future life? Why not some other method of transition from this life to that? Why need this new birth be accompanied by so much of sorrow, of horror, from which we shrink abashed and appalled? And then, even if death need exist at all, why need it be accompanied with so much of pain? Why need it come before the term of life is lived out? Why are we not permitted to go through this school, to finish this earthly education? Why does death take some man in the prime of life, on whom are dependent a wife and little children, and leave them to suffer and struggle, perhaps to perish, in the midst of untoward circumstances? Why does death take a mother away from her little children, just at the time when they seem to need her most? Why does death take one-half the human race before the little feet are fairly across the threshold of earthly existence? Why are these little buds here, if they are never to bloom? Why are they permitted to wither before they have unfolded a single petal?

Then, why is sin here? Why this struggle between the impulses that would lead us astray and the clear perception

that tells us what we ought to do? Why this battle between the lower and the higher? What is the need of it? What is the origin of it? How did it come into the world? Why need it have come in? Did it come from the sin of one ancestor, or have we all sinned in some pre-existent state? What is sin? What led the first person to commit the first sin? Did he do it wilfully, understanding what he was doing? Was he overpowered by temptation in the form of some person or some wicked devil? Why did the devil wish to tempt him? Why was there any devil? How did he happen to sin in the first place? All these questions throng upon us, and, if we do not ignore them, demand an answer. No man can live for forty, fifty, or seventy years, without taking account of them, without dealing with them, without trying to make the evil less, or being willing to make it more, or in some way becoming involved as a part of the great mystery.

I propose, then, for my task this morning, to ask how these questions are ordinarily explained, to examine that explanation a little, and then to see if there is any other explanation which shall help us to a more rational and more hopeful theory of life.

You know, in the main, the explanation which Christendom has offered us. It has given us but one. That one has dominated the intelligent world, the majority of it, for nearly eighteen hundred years. And, though it be modified very largely in the thought of many, yet still, in some phase, it forms part of the creed of Christendom. What is this explanation?

You know the familiar story. I need only hint its outline, not for the sake of telling you what it is, but for the sake of some comments that I wish to make.

The human race, it explains, was created originally in the

persons of one man and one woman, who were naturally endowed with innocence and immortality. There was no pain, no sorrow, no death in the Garden of Eden. How did they come there? God laid upon this man and woman a command, which they voluntarily broke ; and, as a result, he laid upon them as a penalty pain and death. They committed the sin ; and this mysterious penalty came from their voluntary transgression. Thus, all the evil of the world came into existence.

Now let us look at this a moment. In the first place, we know that it is not true. We know, as the result of scientific investigation, that pain and death were on this planet unnumbered ages before humanity began to be. We know, again, that these bodies of ours — the body of the first man as well as of the last one born — are so constituted that death is just as natural as life. They bear in themselves the limitation of their own continuance. A clock, when it is wound up, will run just so long, according to its structure ; and then it will run down. Wind it up as many times as you please, according to the way in which it is made, and the constitution of the materials out of which it is made will be its power of endurance. It will wear just so long, and then wear out. It will keep time just so long and no longer. So these bodies of ours, constructed as they are,— and as the first man must have been ; for no one claims any difference in the physical constitution,— these bodies must die. Death is just as natural as life.

Then, we know that, were these things not so, we could not to-day accept it as true, for the simple reason that it seems to us so unjust. We could not believe that any God, worthy of love or worship, could have attached such penalties to such an asserted sin.

Let us look at it. Here were Adam and Eve, ignorant.

They had had no experience. How should they know what death meant, what sin meant? How should they know what pain meant? How should they know what this threatened penalty attached to their supposed sin might mean, so as to be deterred from the commission of that sin? To go farther yet, how should they know that this power outside of them, who told them that he had created them, had any rightful authority over them? How should they understand that they were committing so great a crime, when they were doing simply what they pleased, instead of following the will of an outside power, whose nature they did not know nor comprehend?

If we analyze this a little, we shall see that there could have been no such deliberate wrong as would justify the attachment of any such penalty to the supposed sin. But suppose Adam had really understood what he was doing, where is the justice of your suffering for it thousands of years afterward? Where is the justice of my nerves tingling with pain or my heart being crushed with the loss of those I love or my being burdened with the sense of sin, because somebody else, ages ago, chose to disobey a supposed divine law?

I know it is sometimes said—I was taught it in the seminary—that the sin of Adam had so stupendous a penalty attached to it on account of the infinite dignity and majesty of the person against whom he sinned. That is the principle; and it is a necessary one, if you are going to support this theory. Sin is, according to that, not to be measured by the intelligence, not by the character of the person sinning, but by the dignity and greatness of the person against whom the sin is committed. Take a simple illustration. Suppose a little child of five years old, in the presence of Queen Victoria, should speak slightlyingly or contempt-

uously of her, or deliberately disobey her command. What would you think of the justice which should treat the little five-year-old child, not in the light of its innocence, ignorance, weakness, and childishness, but of the dignity and supposed greatness of the Queen of England and the Empress of India ; that they should measure out a punishment as large as the dignity of the queen instead of as small as the child ? We could not, then, accept this explanation of the origin of sin and pain and evil, even if we did not know, on the basis of modern science, that the facts were not as they were supposed to be.

Not only have those who were called heretics felt the seriousness of these objections, but some of the great leaders of thought who are still inside the ancient fold. As an illustration of an attempt to get over this difficulty, I shall call your attention to a work, famous in its day, by Dr. Edward Beecher, called *The Conflict of Ages*. The purpose of that book was to explain just this problem of sin and suffering, and to offer an explanation that might be accepted as just and reasonable in the modern world. Let us see the objections he urges against the common theory. He says this : If any man — Adam, for example — is to be held responsible for his actions, so as to be justly liable to punishment ; if he is to have a fair probation, a fair trial,—then it is necessary that certain conditions be observed. For example, he says : Take the case of Adam. He is placed as the head of the race at the beginning of earthly time, and his future and the future of the world are to depend on his choice. Then, says Dr. Beecher, in order to make this fair and just, he must have been endowed with a wisdom which would have enabled him to look all down the ages from that hour to the end of time, so as to comprehend all the significance of his action. He must have been able to say, If I follow this

road of right, such and such results will follow; if I take this pathway of wrong, such and such results will follow for myself and my posterity. He must have been able to comprehend in their entirety the results of his actions. Then something else. He must have been perfectly unbiassed, not inclined in any way, either to the right or to the wrong. Because, if he came with a bias, then that bias would be responsible, not he. He must have been able to stand and look down the ages, down these two pathways, to comprehend clearly the results of his choice, and to make that choice with perfect freedom. Dr. Beecher says that there is no evidence that Adam ever had such a trial, that nobody else ever had such a trial; and yet he must have had it, in order that the results to the race should be construed as just, in the light of reason.

Let us note one other fact. Suppose Adam did have that chance, there are two things I want to say about it. In the first place, it is utterly incomprehensible that any rational being, standing with these two pathways open before him, with a clear insight as to what they meant, and with an unbiassed will, should ever have chosen pain and sorrow and sin and death and everything evil and horrible instead of life and light and peace and joy and happiness and bliss unspeakable and everything desirable. It is utterly absurd and incredible that anybody should ever have made such a choice. In the next place, suppose he had made that choice, it does not follow that he had any right to involve me in the results of that choice. There is still a difficulty here that it is impossible to overcome.

How then does Dr. Beecher escape the difficulty? By the theory of the pre-existence of the soul. He says that, somewhere, in some previous life, either Adam for the race, or each member for himself, must have had this fair probation,

this opportunity for a perfectly free and intelligent choice, so that we here to-day may be looked upon as suffering the natural, necessary, legitimate results of our own actions.

You are aware of the fact that Dr. Beecher borrowed this theory of pre-existence from the East. Probably one-half of the human race to-day holds this theory as the very basis of religious life and thought. All the Hindus and Buddhists, and nearly all Orientals, hold firmly this theory of the pre-existence of the soul. They have been driven to it probably in very much the same way as Dr. Beecher was driven,—to find a rational way of explaining the facts of human life. Suppose you were in Hindustan to-day, and had lost some intimate friend or met some financial disaster or were suffering pain, what would they tell you? They would tell you that you are probably receiving the exact penalty that you deserve. No matter how true and lovely you may have been since you were born into this life, the life you are leading here, whether good or evil, is the exact measured result of your previous lives. You are bearing to-day just what you ought to bear. The moral of it with them is that, under the impulse of this thought, you are to live so nobly, so truly, so faithfully, in the midst of the difficulties that surround you, that the next time you are incarnated you may be born into a better condition. This is the theory of pre-existence.

We have two difficulties in accepting this theory. In the first place, we do not know of any adequate reason why we should believe any such theory. In the next place, it only pushes the difficulty one stage farther back. Suppose we skip a thousand or a million years, and go back uncounted ages, why did I sin then? Did I know what I was doing? If I did know, it seems absurd that I should have done it. The difficulty remains, only it is pushed farther back. We

shall find that the same questions arise, no matter how far back we go.

Now, then, I propose to offer you what seems to me, at any rate, a solution of these difficulties, in the light of the science of evolution, the modern theory of human development from lower forms of life. I do not undertake to say that I shall be able to clear up all the mystery, and answer all the questions, or to make it perfectly satisfactory to you any more than it is perfectly satisfactory to me. Only I do claim that it is the most rational theory I know of, and comes the nearest to explaining pain and sin and death. Let us see what this explanation is.

According to this doctrine, it is no longer a question, but a settled fact, that humanity started as the offspring of lower forms of life, having been developed from them, starting half animal, with only dawning humanity in heart and brain. It started weak, ignorant, in the midst of all that was mysterious, wonderful, and mighty; surrounded on every hand by forces not comprehended, forces with which it knew not how to deal. It began to live in circumstances like these. It must of necessity have progressed tentatively, through trials, through experiments. It must, of course, have made mistakes; and these mistakes, since the laws of nature are inexorable, would naturally and necessarily be followed by the results of pain, disease, suffering of every kind.

To illustrate: humanity had to learn by experience what was good to eat. Trying this and that, it would learn that some things were not only not wholesome, but poisonous, and would result in death; that others would bring disease; that other things were good for food, and so might be universally partaken of. How else could they learn what to eat? In this way, they learned how to deal with all the forms and forces of the universe.

There is only one other conceivable way. In order to have escaped these things, humanity must have been endowed from the start with infallible knowledge. But think what that means. When we talk about knowing anything, what do we mean? All knowledge, in the very nature of things, is the result of experience. It comes in no other way. We have, indeed, the knowledge that has been transmitted to us from the past; but that was the result of the experience of those who have lived before us. Not only knowledge, but the brain, the very organ of knowledge, is the result of life through experience. It is developed by experience. Was it possible for knowledge to be conferred upon us suddenly? Not omnipotence itself could have done it. In the very nature of the case, according to our definition of the term, any such supposition is absurd and impossible. You remember the two men, or two boys, who were discussing what God could do. One of them claimed that God could do everything, that there was no limit to his omnipotence, when the other asked, "Do you think that it would be possible for him to make a two-year old colt in fifteen minutes?" There are some things that are absurd in their very nature, that are not within the scope or the power of even omnipotence itself. Knowledge, then, being the result of human experience, cannot be suddenly given to man, any more than a plant that takes a week to grow could be created in an instant.

Again, humanity is constructed in such a way that the very capacity for pleasure implies a capacity for pain. There is no way by which any one can rise above the possibility of pain except by becoming insensible to any emotion. The only way, then, by which pain can be escaped is through that knowledge which enables us to choose or create the conditions of our life, out of which conditions shall be left those

things that tend to the production of pain. Humanity, then, starting where it did, could not escape pain, disease, death. For death to a race beginning life as this race began it, and constituted as this race is constituted, is just as natural as life; and it is as necessary as birth. The only real evil about death, to my mind, is the fact that it is so often premature, that it comes before we have learned the lessons of life, and that it is accompanied by so much suffering and horror. But this prematurity of death and this needless pain that accompanies it, these also can be cured through knowledge, and only through knowledge,—through learning how to take care of our bodies, how to adjust ourselves to the world about us, how to create conditions in which to live free from the evils of pain and disease. So much, then, for the explanation that the theory of evolution has to give us with reference to pain and death.

Let us now look at that apparently deeper problem still, the fact of sin.

What is sin? What do we mean by it? Is sin a mistake? A person does not feel remorse for a mistake. It is in its very essence a choice between following motives one of which is held to be right and the other wrong. It is the choice of the lower in us instead of the higher. It is the choice of that which we afterward feel has wrought evil in the world instead of good. This, so far as we are conscious of it, is the essence of sin. The fact of human development underlies this conflict of motives.

As leading the way to this, let me make this statement. If there were living on this earth or on any other planet a race of beings who had never made any progress, who were utterly incapable of progress, you would never find that they used the word "sin," or that they were conscious of the fact to which we have given that name. If they were never any

lower than they are to-day, if they were incapable of becoming any higher, if all their life of thought, of sensation, of action, were on one dead level, there would, in the nature of the case, be no choice between any higher and lower. The alternative of right and wrong would never be presented to them. There would be no sin. It seems to me, as carefully as I can analyze it, that sin necessarily springs out of the very fact of progress. We have come up from a lower condition, from the animal world. We have brought along with us animal propensities, passions, instincts, impulses, and desires. Up yonder, we get glimpses of heights to which we feel we are capable of climbing. We feel that we ought to attain those heights, because there is less of pain, of sorrow, of evil of every kind there. But there is this struggle between this lower life and the higher. We are blinded by impulses of passion. We see what we ought to do, but we do not do it. This, it seems to me, is the essence of sin. This is what we mean when we are talking about it. It is the age-long battle between the lower and the higher. It springs out of the fact that we are a progressive race; that we have come from beneath, and that our destiny is above and beyond; that we are only in transition, fighting along this road.

Now, what are some of the advantages of this explanation? I do not claim that evolution explains everything. I only claim that it offers us a more satisfactory theory of pain, of death, of sin, than is embodied in the popular creeds of Christendom. What are some of the advantages?

1. It teaches us that pain and death and sin are a part of the natural order of the world, instead of being something unnatural, injected into this order from without by an arbitrary will. If I interpret aright your consciousness by my own, I think you will agree with me, when I say I can bear

with patience that which is a part of the natural order of life, that which is inevitable, that which is a part of the process of growth, a good deal better than I can the infliction of an arbitrary will, when I have to feel all the time it might possibly have been just as well and even better otherwise. I do not like to feel that that which is inflicted upon me is a matter of pure caprice and wilfulness, even though I am told that that caprice, that wilfulness, are the caprices and wilfulness of a God. I can bear with patience and cheerfulness that which seems to me a part of the necessary order of the world.

2. This doctrine teaches us a hopeful theory of life instead of one of despair. I find the root of this in the fact of human growth. Evil is a natural and necessary part of a system of growth. I then feel hopeful instead of discouraged. The other theory teaches a downfall and ruin that, in large numbers of cases, is to be endless and hopeless. This teaches me a hopeful theory of life. I have learned to look upon pain and death and sin as signs of cheer instead of the opposite. They are a part of the necessary process of growth of a race that is developing, that is *en route* through this kind of experience to something higher and better. That does not make them good in themselves. But it does give us a grand trust that the good is stronger than the evil, and that the evil may thus be outgrown.

3. It suggests another thing that is to my mind marvellously full of hope. Teaching, as it does, that this is a part of the life process of every individual soul, it gives us the assurance that some time the process of education, by means of this human discipline, will end, and we shall have developed out of these evil conditions. I believe we may regard it as quite reasonable that pain and sin and death shall be somewhere eternal. That is, this process of development,

by means of pain and sorrow and death, may be going on in some planet of the universe forever. But it is not eternal in the case of any individual soul. They are eternal just as a primary school might be eternal, but new children forever entering and passing through and graduating from it into something higher and better. The outcome is deliverance, the grand result of the process of training.

4. This theory relieves God, to our thought, of that burden of inexplicable responsibility for what is in itself an essential evil. It relieves humanity of a great weight of degradation and despair. It crowns life with glory and hope and peace, and gives it an outlook and assurance of final triumph that may well make us all not only willing, but glad to fight through the battle for the sake of the victory at the end.

BELIEF AND TRUTH.

A PERFECT religious life would mean perfect righteousness. Or, to drop out the theological term, which, on account of its very familiarity, is apt to become trite, and so to convey to us no very definite mental picture, it would mean complete rightness in every relation of life,—internal rightness, external rightness, rightness of thought, feeling, will, word, deed. Or, to speak of the different groups of relationship into which the total life of man may logically and naturally be divided, it would be proper to say that the work of religion, rightly conceived, is to establish right relationships in all directions: first, reconciling, mediating, between the conflicting thoughts, feelings, passions of the individual, making us what we ought to be in our inner life; second, establishing right relationships between self and the neighbor, whether the neighbor be conceived of as standing at our elbow or at the antipodes; and, third, establishing right relationship between the individual and that Power, however we may conceive it, however we may name it, that is not ourselves,—that Power that was here before we were born, that will be here after we die, the Power from which we have come, on which we are dependent every moment of our lives,—the universe, God. A perfect religious life, then, would be perfectly true and right relationship in all these different directions.

If we study religion as it was developed in the early history of the world among the lower and less civilized tribes of men, we shall find—we already have found—that it concerns itself almost exclusively with that which I have just mentioned as the third relationship,—the relationship of man to the power or powers outside of him, leaving out of sight almost entirely social relationships and the internal condition of the heart. But, as our thought of the divine power, life, law, ever broadened, we have come to recognize that it is one law of the universe which is in the stars, which is in society, which is in the human heart,—one force, one power, one right, one justice everywhere. So, now, our conception of the religious life is broadened and more inclusive than it was in the earlier stages of human development, and covers the totality of human thought, human feeling, human action.

But, in order that we may live a perfect life, that we may be right in ourselves and rightly related to our neighbors and to the universe, we must first discover what this reality of things is of which I speak, and how we are to become adjusted to it. So we find ourselves at the very outset face to face with the problem, What is truth, and how are we to find it? Before I can perform a religious duty, I must know what a religious duty is. Before I can rightly adjust myself to my neighbors in society, I must know what that right adjustment means, I must know what the present relationship is, I must know the method by which I can become what I ought to be, how the change is to be brought about.

But this word "truth" is a word of several meanings; and, unless we stop just here for a moment to define ourselves, we may fall into more or less confusion on the subject.

When I say truth this morning, I am not talking about truth in the sense of veracity, as when I say, "I speak the truth," in talking with a friend or neighbor. I may, so far as my intention and purpose go, speak the truth every time I open my lips throughout my whole life, and yet have no sort of conception of truth in the sense in which I wish to use the word to-day. I may be perfectly veracious, and yet be utterly mistaken in regard to what my neighbor is and how I ought to live in relation to him. Neither, when I use the word "truth" this morning, am I thinking of that other definition of it, as faithfulness, as loyalty, as when we say such and such a man is true to his friends, to his convictions, true to a cause which he undertakes to serve, true or loyal to his country. A man may be all this, and yet be utterly mistaken as to just what kind of a being he is and as to how he ought to live. He may be true to his country, and yet be entirely wrong in his judgment as to what policy it would be best for that country to pursue. He may be true to his friend, and yet, with the best intentions, give him advice that shall lead him practically astray. I do not mean, then, truth in this sense.

The truth of which I am speaking is this: it is the question whether my thought concerning the reality of things outside of myself is an accurate reflection of that reality, as, when I hold a mirror up, I question whether its reflection is an accurate representative of that which is reflected, or when I hold a photograph in my hand and ask whether it is an accurate likeness of the person who sat for the portrait. So I wish to know, and must know, as preliminary to any intelligent religious life, whether the image of thought that I carry in my mind as to the realities of life with which I deal is an accurate image, a correct reflection,—whether, in other words, my thought is true. This is the sense in which I

wish to use the word "truth" while I am speaking concerning it to-day.

Not long ago, I was listening to an earnest and intelligent clergyman of another faith; and he was telling his people that the one, first great religious duty of man was the complete and unconditional surrender of the heart, the brain, and the conscience to God. I agreed with him. I believe that is the first great duty of man. But the question sprang immediately into my mind as to just what he meant. What is God? Who is God? Is the image that you are carrying in your mind while you are speaking an accurate representation of this great truth about which you speak? I go to hear another clergyman of another faith, who holds a position antagonistic to the first one; and he tells me the same,— that the first great duty of man is to submit unconditionally, heart, mind, conscience, to God. I believe what these words seem to import; but yet I wish to know what he means. I go to a third clergyman; and I hear him say the same. All these three are antagonistic to each other. I know that I might go to four or five, or I know not how many, and hear substantially the same thing uttered. Must I, then, not fall back upon my original question, and ask: What is truth? How shall we find it? How shall I be sure that I have it? How shall I regard my mental attitude toward this great problem? One tells me that faith is the first great religious duty of man, meaning by that an acceptance of his particular scheme or theory of things. I say that faith is the first great religious duty of man, meaning by it, however, an underlying trust and confidence in the integrity of things,— trust that there is reality, truth, somewhere, and that the human mind is capable of attaining it, that the human soul is capable of loving it, and that man is capable of living it out in actuality. But my faith is a hemisphere

apart from his. Infinity itself divides one from the other. We must go back, then, to our first question, What is truth, and how do faith and belief stand related to it?

Faith, as I have said, is the first great religious duty of man; but I also hold that, concerning any man's statement as to what may be true in any particular instance, that scepticism, doubt, is the first great religious duty of man. There is no antagonism between these two statements. I may have the utmost faith in the universe, in the integrity of things, in the integrity of the human mind and its capacity for discovering and verifying truth; and yet I may stand in an attitude of utter scepticism and doubt in the presence of the old statements as to what this reality may be. I may doubt every religious scheme or theory of things that has ever been thought out from the foundation of the world, and yet be a man of the profoundest and most earnest religious faith.

There are three great attitudes of the human mind possible toward this question of religious truth. I propose to consider these three so far as time will allow:—

I. Let us glance at what, perhaps, is commoner than either creed or faith,—credulity. Credulity is that which most men are cherishing, which they misname faith or creed. Credulity accepts unquestioning that which is offered. It has never waked up to the realization of the trouble and pain of independent thought. It does not comprehend what investigation means. It has no conception of how to verify a statement, and find out whether it is true or not. Credulity accepts those notions that float about in the air, that we breathe in as we do the motes that float in the sunbeam, that we inherit from our ancestors, that we take without question from the newspapers and magazines that we read, that we pick up as they drift over the surface

of society. What shall we say of this credulity as an attitude of mind? In a little child, prattling in its innocence, surrounded by those that love and care for and cherish it, this credulity is perfectly natural; and it is only beautiful. But it is one of those childish things, fitting and lovely in a child, that a man, if he ever becomes one, should honestly and earnestly put away with the things that he played with in his childhood. This is a world in which the wisest men may be mistaken. This is a world, alas! in which hundreds and thousands of people think it for their interest to deceive. It is a world in which there are institutions established that men have become connected with in such a way that it seems for their interest to maintain them as they are, unquestioned, unchanged. In order to do that, they must hold fast and unthinking allegiance to them, and do what they can to maintain an unquestioning adhesion to them on the part of others. What, then, is credulity in the face of facts like these? For a man capable of independent thought, study, investigation, this credulity, which they misname faith, and on which so many times they pride themselves, as though it were an indication of childlike trust toward the Omnipotent, is nothing short of folly and crime. Credulity has misled thousands and thousands of people in the past. Credulity has stood in the way of the development of the human mind; for the brain itself, the very capacity for thought and study, grows only, as the arm does, through exercise. And he who goes through life without thinking makes feeble and puny the very organ of thought that has been given him, by which to search out and investigate the truth. Credulity has stood in the way of the study and investigation of truth, persuading people that they were already in possession of it, and so making them feel that the search was not worth while.

This childlike credulity, this unquestioning faith, has been one of the most cruel forces that human history has ever known. What was it but credulity,—this unquestioning acceptance of what one rabbi said, as reported by some other rabbi, and so along the whole line of fallible rabbis until Moses,—what was it but this, taken without verification as the unquestioned word of God, that drove the nails into the hands and feet of the Nazarene and hung him to the cross, because he dared to hint a larger truth than that with which the people were familiar? What was it but credulity, the acceptance of the old, unverified Olympian tales and myths, that forced the cup of hemlock to the lips of Socrates, the noblest man of his times? What was it but credulity that burned Giordano Bruno, that stopped the lips of Galileo, that built the Inquisition and invented every one of its nameless tortures? It was credulity that wrung those shrieks and screams of pain from those of whom the world was not worthy. Is it, then, a virtue to accept unquestioningly that which passes as current coin of truth in the marts of the world? Is it an honor to the truth or an insult,—this ready acceptance? There are thousands of people who have been trained into the idea that, somehow, it was pleasing to God for them to close their eyes and open their mouths and swallow whatever was offered. Is it an honor to the Bank of England for a man to take anything that happens to be put into his hands as a genuine bank-note? Or would it not be more to its honor for them to have such faith in the real, genuine issues of the bank as to subject them to the severest test, knowing that what was genuine would not fail? Suppose some foreign kingdom or country was to send an ambassador to Washington, who was to come with certain credentials, which were to prove the genuineness of his mission and show beyond question the powers with

which he was clothed : would it be an honor to that country, that kingdom, that ambassador, to refuse to investigate the first man who came along or to ask for his credentials, to see whether we were giving honor to one who was worthy or to one who should be cast out with reproach? Whatever comes from God, whatever is true and real, can stand all the investigation that you can bring to bear upon it. It seems to me that it is higher honor for us to be perfectly sure that it is God and God's truth about which we are thinking and speaking and with which we are dealing than through a too easy credulity to pour out our love, to put forth our exertions, and offer freely of our services to that which is not God's truth at all. So much, then, for hints concerning this credulous attitude of mind in relation to truth.

II. Let us now turn to that other group of ideas comprehended under the word "creed," and see what relation this bears to the discovery of truth. The only thing we are after, remember, is truth ; and a creed is of value only as it helps us in the discovery of truth. There is no virtue in a creed, whether it have three articles or thirty-nine, so far as the creed itself is concerned. Truth is not for the sake of the creed, but the creed for the sake of the truth. It is the truth, and the truth alone, that we need to discover. There are three or four statements which I wish to make concerning this matter of the creed.

1. We all have a creed. There are only two classes of people that I can think of who can, by any possibility, fail to have one. One is composed of persons incapable of thought, and the other of persons too careless or too indifferent to use thought in any such way as to come into the possession of any distinct, definite ideas. Any man who has a capacity of thinking, and whoever does think, has a creed, and cannot possibly escape it. If you say you

do not believe in anything, you give expression there to a creed. If you say you do not know what you believe, that is your creed. If you say you do not believe it is possible for anybody to discover truth, that it is all a matter of speculation, that nothing can be fixed, defined, or certified as real, that is your creed. You cannot possibly escape having one, however great your effort may be.

2. There is no more shallow talk at the present time than that which is so common ; namely, that it does not make any difference what a man's creed is. It seems to be a sort of symptom of this uncertain, transitional epoch through which we are passing,—this foolish delusion, the expression of which is so often on the lips of those who ought to know better,—that it does not make any difference what a man or woman believes. It does not make any difference, provided the thing concerning which you have a belief is something utterly apart from all practical life. You may believe whatever you choose concerning the back side of the moon, and perhaps it will not be a very important matter. You may believe whatever you please concerning the method of house-keeping in castles in Spain. You may believe whatever you choose concerning how things would be, provided they were something else than what they are. In reference to those matters that by no possibility can touch practical life, it does not make any difference what you believe ; but any man would be considered foolish or insane, who should make a statement like this concerning any of the great affairs of human life. If you are out at sea, on board a steamer, it would make some difference as to what the captain believed concerning an appearance on the waters,—as to whether it was a bluff of land, dimly seen through the mist, or only a fog-bank, through which he should attempt to sail. If you are building a house, it would make some difference what

you believed concerning the strength of materials, concerning the law of gravitation, concerning the method in which the materials should be used. If you wish to reach a certain place, it would make some difference what you believed concerning the route supposed to lead there or the method by which you would attempt to reach it. Concerning anything that touches any human interest, your belief makes all the difference between success and failure. If, then, religion is not a matter of any practical concern to any human soul, then, perhaps, you may rationally settle down to the creed that it does not make any difference what a man believes. But, if it be something that underlies human life in every one of these departments, and that touches the individual and social life, in the light of which you can interpret the past, in the light of which you must attempt to create the future,—if it means anything like this, then it is the most important thing in the world what you believe in the department of religious thought and life.

3. We must get over another delusion that seems to me common. There are those who tell us, with great appearance of authority, that we do not make our own creeds. I sometimes hear a man argue the case and say: I am not responsible for my beliefs. I see things so and so, and I cannot see a fact to be other than a fact. It must weigh with me as a fact. My mind is only a pair of scales. I put a weight in here, and it weighs half a pound; and I put on the other side a pound weight, and, of course, the heavy one will go down and the light will come up. I am not responsible for it. If a man had no will, no choice, no power of investigation, all this might be true. But I dare assert that there is not a man on earth so impartial, so unprejudiced, who has looked all over the face of the earth, in search for truth, in such an earnest, simple, and

honest way as to make his mind only a pair of scales, in which the weights are put so that he does not care which goes up or which goes down. There is not a great religious or moral question, with which we must be brought face to face, concerning which we do not care. We are prejudiced in spite of ourselves. We desire this to be true; and we hope that that is not true. Is this not correct in regard to all, perhaps, but one in a hundred thousand? Is it not also partly true in the case of this one exception?

Again, is it not true that the most of us choose the materials out of which we will construct our creed? You choose what papers you will read, what magazines you will study, what theological and scientific works you will devote your leisure to, what persons you will hear lecture, what others you will not listen to. In other words, you choose the materials out of which you will construct your creed, and many times under bias of prejudice. You are influenced by your own moral character. You desire to find this true and that untrue. Here comes in the matter of responsibility. In so far as these things are so, in so far we are responsible for our creed. People say to me, on every hand: I have been trained so and so; and I love my church. My mother believes so and so; and her beliefs are sacred to me. My father held such ideas; and I am attached to them. And, therefore,—what? I choose to consider them true. Do not we, then, have some power over the manufacturing of our own creeds? We must remember that we are not honest, not real genuine truth-seekers, until we have trained ourselves into a willingness to look all over the world, and just as far as possible to discover all the materials that ought to enter into the making up of our opinions and of giving them their just weight. When we have done this, then we may talk about our minds being a pair of scales, but not before.

4. The real creed of any man or woman is not that which he writes down in a book, not that to which he subscribes when he becomes a member of a church or religious society: his real creed is the one that he lives by. You live out what you really care for, what you really believe. A man's true creed is only an accurate reflection of his character; and his character may have more to do with the making of his creed than all other things combined.

You will see from what I have already said in regard to it that creed may or may not be a help toward the discovery of the truth. Your creed does not necessarily represent the truth of things. You have no right to think that it does, unless you have made a comparison and tried to verify it. This creed which you have is yours; it represents that which you have learned to care for; it is the conventional representation of what you regard as proper ideas to be held. But this creed may stand squarely in the way of your discovering the real truth. You think you have it all: therefore, you are not willing to investigate, not willing that it should be tested, not willing to bring it out into the light and lay it alongside the standard of verifiable truth. A creed we cannot help having; but it should be made only a starting-point for investigation.

III. Now, let us turn to one other point, and see what we mean by faith in the religious sense. Faith, in any true sense of that word, is not credulity, it is not creed. Faith has no sort of necessary connection with that which you believe as an intellectual statement of a proposition. Faith is the underlying trust in the integrity of the universe and the integrity of the human mind. What is it based on? Is it something all in the air, something without reason beneath or behind it? Faith, in the true sense of that word, is the result of the experience of all the past. It is the belief

resulting from these ten thousand special experiences organized into an instinct that makes us trust in the reality of things; that makes us believe that there is truth somewhere, and that we can find it. It is the underlying basis of all rational thinking and all rational living. It has the grandest reason for existence of any persuasion of which we can come into possession. It is not confined to religion. People are accustomed to talk about faith as though it were set off in that airy part of our living which we label "religious."

A statesman, if he be a true statesman, lives by faith as much as does a prophet or a martyr. The statesman has never yet seen realized in the midst of human society his ideal condition of human affairs. But, as the result of the experience of all the past of humanity, noting where man began the processes by which he has come to the present moment, and what he has achieved, he holds firmly, he has a belief or faith in the possibility of realizing these grander, better ideals of human society that have never yet existed.

The artist lives by faith. He has never seen "the light that never was on sea or land." You ask him what beauty is. Perhaps he will not be able to define it for you; or, if you tell him you do not believe there is any beauty, he may not be able to demonstrate it as a fact. But, as the result of all the best experience of man, this instinct, this faith, is deep down in his soul; and, as he looks at his bit of marble, he believes that, whether he is capable of doing it or not, some artist, whose dream is perfect and whose hands are skilful, could work out of this intractable material a perfect expression of perfect beauty. He believes that on the rough canvas, with common pigments, some hand might outline the ideal of the perfect human face. It never yet has been on canvas; but he has this faith in his soul, born of the ex-

perience of the past, which is the inspiration and the motive force of all his attempts, the power of all his life.

There is not a man who lives and works more by faith than does the man of science. He knows only a little of this world around him. Yet he dares by faith to construct an invisible universe beyond the reach of the most powerful glass, and to tell you of suns and systems that no eye has ever seen. He dares to talk of laws in the distant stars, of forces and powers that control the movements of heavenly bodies that are unseen. And then, by this same process of faith, he reaches beyond the limits of the visible toward the littlenesses of infinity. Sure of his ground, at every step believing that the same laws, the same forces that he observes right here in this little spot with which he is familiar, reach out beyond the limits of the known, and would be found true in the atoms or the stars. This is not unreasonable. His brain, his power of thought, has been moulded by the experience of this same universe in the past; and he believes in the unity, in the power of life all through, and so trusts that the questions concerning these great problems of the human intellect may some time be reached, if it be not for a thousand years. Faith, then, is this underlying trust in the integrity of things.

Now let me recall your minds to a statement that I made at the outset,—that there is no sort of antagonism between this deepest, grandest faith of the human heart and the most outright blank scepticism of the intellect. I trust in the universe, in God, in the future: what has that to do with the question whether I believe that John wrote the Gospel that goes by his name? Yet, if I dare to doubt the latter, in the face of the great religious authorities of the world, they call me an infidel. An infidel is a man with no faith, not a man who dares to question whether a particular

scheme of things that you have wrought out is a perfect copy of the original truth or not. There is no sort of connection, then, necessarily between faith and scepticism or doubt. Doubt as much as you will these human schemes. Nay, it is your duty to doubt them until they are verified. There is more faith in this kind of doubt than there is in that credulity which accepts, that timidity which dares not question, lest it should find everything hollow and unreal.

Bask, then, in this credulity, if you will, if you enjoy it, in the presence of your little circle of friends. Be a child with one whom you have proved for years that you can trust. Do not insult him by asking proof for any common statements. Credulity is beautiful here. But do not let it dare to usurp a place to which it has no right. Let faith sink deeply into your hearts; let it furnish you a standing ground from which you may work from the known toward the unknown, always in accordance with the laws of things already discovered. Let your creed represent the highest thought of to-day, but do not dare to include in it anything that you have not tried or verified.

Do not be frightened because people tell you your creed is very brief. I remember the case of a clergyman who said once to a man who dared to be classified with doubters, "If you believe no more than you say you do, you could write your creed on your thumb-nail." So be it. If I do not know any more than I can write on my thumb-nail, I will not write any more. I will not lie. I will start with a creed that I can believe: I will start with that which I know is true, and reach out beyond that, however slowly.

Hold your creed as representing that which you know or have reason to believe is true. Keep it ever subject to revision. Accept whatever comes with the credentials of truth. But, above all, remember that this truth, after you

have attained it, is only the first step. You cannot take any step rightfully or hopefully, until you know the truth. But an intellectual knowledge of the truth is of no avail. Suppose the whole world knew the truth, and yet stood still with folded hands. What would it benefit any one? A knowledge of the truth is the first thing necessary; but religion is not something simply to have, it is something to be done. Find out the truth, then, concerning your inner life, concerning the relation in which you ought to stand to your fellow-men, concerning the relation in which you ought to stand toward the infinite Power that compasses us around; and then, when you have found out the truth, incarnate it. Do it. Work it into institutions and deeds. Suppose you know the truth concerning the perfect kingdom of God on earth, of what avail is that? Go on, and build that kingdom.

THE GROWTH OF SECULARISM.

IF you look out over our American Protestant world, you will observe that it is divided into two uneven, unequal parts. One part is called secular, and the other is called sacred. You will notice also, although this was not always the case in the history of the world, that the secular is by a good deal the larger part.

To illustrate what I mean, consider the fact that there are places sacred in the esteem of the Protestant world. There is one whole land that we are accustomed to speak of as the "Holy Land," because it is supposed that the people who resided there had been selected especially by God to be the channel of his divine revelation to man. Hence, the history of this people is a sacred history, the events in its career are sacred events, its prominent characters are sacred characters. But, besides this, there are in the Protestant world other sacred places, churches especially, that have been consecrated to God. Then there are not only sacred places, but sacred times,—certain days set apart and looked upon as being unlike other days, days in which it is not fitting to live as on ordinary days. In the Protestant world, these are reduced at the present time to very few,—practically, only one day in seven, our Sabbath, or Sunday. There are not only sacred times and places, but there are certain kinds of actions that are looked upon as sacred in a lesser way, such as church

attendance and attendance at prayer-meetings. Those which are regarded as specially sacred rites or actions are those that go by the name of the sacraments, two in particular,—baptism and the Lord's supper. Then there are sacred books, a certain number of them bound together in one volume,—the Old and New Testaments. There is no reason that we know why there should not be more than these; but, in the Protestant world, this one book stands in a class by itself. It is sacred. Other books that depend upon it, that treat of its doctrines and of the customs and ways of the people about which it is written, are looked at as half sacred. But all the rest of the literature of the world is regarded as profane,—that is, as common and unsacred; for that is the meaning of the word "profane" as thus used. Then there are also sacred persons, certain ones that are called saints. This word, among Protestants, is now ordinarily applied only to the apostles,—the immediate companions and followers of Jesus. These, then, are regarded as sacred,—things set apart, looked upon with peculiar reverence, as holy, as especially related to God and the religious life. All the rest of the world is common, human, profane.

There is one other aspect of this subject that we ought to look at, to note the tendency and drift of the modern world. If we go to those religious bodies that, from our stand-point, are the least progressive,—the ritualistic, the High Church, and the Catholic bodies,—those that represent more closely the thought of the past, that are less conformed to the present order of things, we find that the number of sacred places and times, of sacred actions and books and persons, is very much larger than in the ordinary Protestant world. On the other hand, if we come to those who call themselves rationalists or, still farther, to those who announce that they are simply secularists, we find that the

number of these sacred things is constantly diminishing, until the secularists proclaim that they hold nothing as sacred in this peculiar sense. The secularists have established themselves as a kind of religious body in England, organizing as a sect. They would not call themselves religionists; but they have a scheme of things, an outline of human life, that is a substitute for religion, even if it be not called by that name. We note, then, this thing: that, the nearer we get to the thought of the past, the larger the number of the places, the times, the actions, the books, the persons that are called sacred; and, the farther we come toward what promises to be, so far as we can see, the dominant thought of the future, the less of this we find,—that is, the domain of the sacred is becoming continually narrower, and the domain of the secular is on the increase.

Now, as we go back, we find the Catholic Church, through the Middle Ages, approximating to the condition of things in the pagan Roman world. In the latter, however, we shall find the number of sacred persons, places, things, books, persons, is larger still. Almost all life is covered by this conception of the interference, the activity of some divine agency. There is less of what we call natural and more and more of what we call supernatural.

Let us glance at two or three phases of Ancient Roman life as illustrating these.

When the city of Chicago was founded, it was connected with no religious idea. It simply grew, as we say, by natural causes, under purely natural influences. As population extended west, it was found that here was a proper place for a city; and, more and more, people took up land there, and built houses and stores and banks. It became a great railroad centre; and, in this way, it has grown as naturally as an oak-tree grows. There were no religious

services connected with its foundation, no divine religious idea connected with the city life. How different from all this was the foundation of the city of Rome! When Troy was destroyed, *Æneas* took the gods of Troy into his peculiar charge and keeping. Hector is said to have come to him in a vision, and told him that he was divinely appointed to take the gods and go in search of a new home for them. So he started on his voyage of wandering, and, as a sacred duty, selected the site of Rome to be the home of the gods of which, for the time, he was the guardian and protector.

So the city was founded with religious rites, its establishment was a religious act; and the sacred fire which had been brought from Troy, and which had never been quenched for a moment, was placed in the temple of Vesta,—a temple under the care of a set of priestesses that were looked upon with peculiar veneration. Every Roman believed that, if anything occurred to pollute this temple of Vesta, or if by any unforeseen accident the fire was allowed to go out, it would mean unspeakable calamity to the city and to the future of the Roman world. And not only the city, but every home that was established, was established as a religious act; and the hearth-fire was looked upon as a divinity, in the presence of which was carried on the household worship. And the wedding, and the birth of the child, and death were supposed to be under the care of some god or goddess whose duty it was to look after these great crisis periods of human life. The Romans never thought of beginning a great war except as a religious act. They must read the signs, so as to find out the will of the gods, before they could undertake a battle. The launching of a ship was accompanied by religious ceremonies, and religious services preceded every new voyage. So every one of the important acts of life was looked upon as in some way connected with

the mysterious personal interference, the supervision, of some one of the deities. Life then was sacred at every turn, all its great events sacred. Still, there was a certain area of life unconnected in their thought with the divine; and I suppose in that ancient world the division between the worldly and the religious was even sharper than it is to-day. Now and then, you will hear a man in the modern world excusing himself for questionable conduct, although he may be a professing Christian, with the words, "Religion is one thing, and business is another." In that old world, that was true in a more emphatic sense; for the gods, provided a man was faithful to the rites and ceremonies which they were supposed to have appointed, cared very little how he behaved. The deities took very little cognizance of personal morals. One was permitted to do about as he pleased, provided he were faithful in his religious rites.

Bring this home to Boston to-day. Suppose we had a god who was the patron of Boston. Suppose we set apart a certain number of our citizens, such as our aldermen, and made it a part of their duty, yea, even a chief part, to sacrifice at noon of each day, to eat together a common meal looked on as sacred as the Lord's Supper is in the Catholic Church; suppose that we believed that on the rigidity and regular performance of these duties the prosperity of our city depended, and that we must hold them to a rigorous performance of all these rites and ceremonies. If you can realize a condition of things like that, you will get a clear idea of how it was looked on in Rome, and in all the great cities of the ancient world. Each had its own god and ceremonies; and the division was hard and fast between the sacred and secular parts of their lives.

Now, I wish to note four or five points concerning that division; for its significance is very important:—

1. It goes along with, and is a necessary part of, that theory of things which looks upon God as being outside and separate from nature. If God is everywhere and in all things, then everything will be sacred, or it will be secular, whichever you choose to call it. God, then, in the ancient world, and down to recent times, was looked upon as entirely outside of what we call the natural world. Jupiter held a sort of court on the summit of Olympus, in Greece. He had nothing to do with the ordinary affairs of daily life, except as he chose arbitrarily to interfere with them. He had nothing to do with the growing of the crops, nothing to do with a storm at sea, nothing to do with the carrying out of any mercantile plan, or with daily life or life in the family. He was as much external to the life of Greece as the President of the United States is to our life in America, except so far as he chose to come in to interfere specially, to do some arbitrary act and attach to it some arbitrary penalty.

2. Since God, or the gods, have been looked upon as external to nature and the ordinary life of man, this ordinary life has been regarded as common and profane. It has had nothing divine, nothing essentially sacred or holy connected with it, because holiness and sacredness have been regarded as connected especially with the gods.

3. God has always been represented as a being who has come into the affairs of human life and selected certain places, certain days, certain actions, certain books, certain persons for himself, claiming them as his, demanding that they be used in certain ways for his own honor. These have been regarded as dedicated to him.

4. You will notice that it logically and necessarily follows from this that the divine, the sacred, in human life has always been looked upon as being the arbitrary, the occasional, the mysterious, the especial, not the regular, the or-

dinary. The ordinary on-going of the world was common, profane. God had nothing special or necessarily to do with this order. He might interfere here and there, and put his finger upon this or that and say: "This day is mine, you must not work on it. Other days you may do as you will, but this is my day." He might choose to inspire somebody to write a book. Just the same or similar truths may be contained in other books; but he could say, "This is my book." He might choose certain persons, and consecrate them to special service, and say, "These are my saints, my priests: you must give them a reverence that you do not to other people; you must pay special regard to their word." And so through the whole round of places, persons, things, God, it is said, has come in, in this arbitrary way. He has chosen and set his mark upon and declared as sacred those things which he chose so to declare.

5. It follows, in view of the explanation that I have given, that the sacred things of this world have not necessarily been those things that are inherently and vitally connected with human welfare and happiness. They have not sprung out of the wants and needs, the hopes and aspirations, of men. They have been interjected into human life from without. Why, for example, should God not have chosen some other day than the first of the week for a holy day? There is no reason why he should not have chosen Thursday as well as Sunday, in the nature of things. If he had, it would have been wrong, according to this theory, to have done certain things on Thursday; but, on Sunday, one could have done what he chose. There is no reason as touching the welfare of man why that particular day should have been chosen.

So, in regard to the sacraments, there is no reason in the nature of things why some other ceremonial should not have

been selected as well as the breaking of bread and the drinking of wine; and, if God had chosen some other one, that would have been the sacrament, and we never should have had any ideas of holiness connected with breaking bread or drinking wine. The choosing of these things was arbitrary; and the penalty attached to disobedience is arbitrary. Suppose I disobey the law of the Sabbath or pay no regard to the sacrament. It is not the same thing as though I break my arm, or eat something which is unwholesome, or pursue some course of thought that vitiates my brain so that it becomes useless. These would be purely natural penalties. But, in the other case, God says in an arbitrary way, "I will punish you, if you do so and so." It is not a vital, necessary thing, springing out of human nature.

So much for explanation as to what these sacred things are and how they have come to exist. But, now, as the result of modern investigation, the development of knowledge, the growth of science, we stand face to face with what is a very great problem. As I intimated at the outset, the domain of the sacred is perpetually growing narrower, as the world grows wiser, as the spirit of science becomes more diffused, and the domain of that which is called secular is perpetually growing larger. Science is, every year, wresting from the kingdom of the sacred some new province, and annexing it to the secular country.

Let us see what this process means and how it is going on. I said that the sacred things of the old world are arbitrarily dependent on an exceptional, external power, not inherent in the nature of things. They are dependent on things which are connected with occasional events, with the mysterious, the supernatural, the unknown. The progress of science means a perpetual widening and widening of the domain of the known. It brings more and more of the

universe within the limits of recognized order and law. It is narrowing the limits of the mysterious, the unknown, the arbitrary. It is teaching us, day by day, that things we supposed were arbitrary are natural, only we did not understand them before.

Let us note a few examples of this process, and see how natural it is and how rapidly it is growing. Down to and since the day of the discovery of the laws of planetary motion there was no way by which men could conceive how the planets were held in their orbits and how their motions were produced. These motions, it was supposed, were produced by some supernatural power. Even Kepler, who discovered the laws of the motions of the planets, still believed, up to the day of his death, that there was an angel residing in each one of these heavenly bodies, guiding its course and controlling its revolutions. He could understand no natural way of explaining their movements. You will remember the case — and it is illustrative of this whole theme — of Anaxagoras in ancient Athens, who promulgated the theory that the sun was not a god, but a ball of fire, and the horror of the citizens of Athens at what they regarded as his irreligion. He was condemned to death; and, although that sentence was finally commuted to perpetual banishment through the intercession of Pericles, the foremost man in Athens, yet even he could do no more for him. Until that time, it was believed — and believed by the masses of the people for a long time after that — that the sun was a god, riding in a chariot of flame along the daily road-way of the sky. You will notice that Kepler's theory is only a step in advance of this. Newton was the first to give us a natural account of the movement of the heavenly bodies, by the discovery of the law of gravitation. This accounted for their movements. It was considered daring impiety on the part of Newton, an

attempt to dethrone God as the ruler of the universe and to establish a law in his place. According to the old theory of religion, he had made that attempt. He was the most daring antagonist of the Almighty that the world, up to that time, had ever seen.

Since that day, the process has been going on. In old times, the rainbow itself—it is plainly declared so in the Old Testament—was regarded as a standing perpetual miracle; not the effect of the sun shining on certain drops of water, but as a sign that God would not again send a flood upon the earth. The explanation of earthquakes and volcanoes used to be that there was a giant down under the earth, and that this quivering and outpouring were occasioned by his turning over from one side to the other to get in an easy position, or by his struggles to get free from his bonds. In a book published, if I mistake not, within the present century, the revolution of the earth was attempted to be accounted for on the theory that hell was in the centre of the earth, and that the world was made to move by the struggles of the damned within its bowels, as a circular cage is made to revolve by the squirrel running around within it. This explanation was given in all seriousness. I speak of it to show you how very modern are some of these extravagant theories as to the way natural events were to be explained.

But this process has gone on until earthquakes, tempests, and pestilences, and all these things that were accepted as the arbitrary action of the Divine Being, are recognized as perfectly orderly and accounted for by natural processes. And the conviction is growing that this process is to go on still more; that there is no end to it, but that it will continue just as far as human investigation can reach. Almost every intelligent man believes that that which is at present mysterious and unknown is just as orderly, just as natural, as the

things which we are most familiar with, precisely as every such man believes that, if some one could thoroughly explore the continent of Africa, he would find the same forces at work there as in Massachusetts. He does not believe that there is anything unnatural or supernatural in Africa, because it has not been explored. So the result of the study of the past is that that which is mysterious, because it is unknown, is just as orderly as the things which are known, and that, by and by, the whole world, the universe itself, will all be regarded as just as natural as the rising or the setting of the sun.

We, then, are face to face with this question: What is to be the outcome? Is religion to die out? Is the sacred entirely to pass away? Is the world all to become secular? For this process is going on, not only in regard to natural events. People no longer believe that there is any inherent sacredness in any place. They no longer regard any one action as especially sacred. Thousands of the most intelligent and best people are coming to believe this. They have looked through all the sacred books of the world; and they believe that they can be accounted for on purely natural principles, as the outcome of the religious life of man. And so all these different things that have been regarded as peculiarly sacred are coming to be explained in accordance with natural principles. What is to be the end, then? Is secularism at last to reign supreme in the universe, and the religious to become something which is merely remembered as a part of the world's childhood?

The answer to that question will depend entirely upon your definition. If religion is to maintain its stronghold only in an arbitrary manner, only in the unnatural, the supernatural, the mysterious, the unknown, the occasional; if it is inconsistent with the natural order of the natural world,

then we may as well give up the contest, and admit that religion is to become less and less, and finally to die away. For I believe that there is no thoroughly educated man in the modern world, educated and free at the same time, but believes that this natural order is to go on extending itself until it covers all things.

Let us ask another question then. Religion is certainly to die out, unless we can find room for it in the natural, in the orderly, in the lawful, in the every-day affairs and every-day things of the world and of human life. Is there any ground for it there? I want you to note two or three of the essential things in religious thought and life; and then I want to ask you to consider whether there is not even more room for them in the world of natural law than there is in the world of miracle and caprice.

What are the essential things in religion? Is a miracle essential to religion? No. Is arbitrary action essential to religion? No. Is anything supernatural essential to religion? I cannot see that it is. What is essential? Let us examine the human heart for a moment in its relation to the outside world, and see what we would call the religious attitude of a man.

1. I should say first that a religious man must be reverent and worshipful. Is there any ground, any reason, in the modern world for reverence and for worship? It seems to me that this modern conception of the universe gives us a thousand-fold more range and sweep for these sentiments than were ever dreamed of in the history of thought before. Our conception of this universe, of the power manifested through it, of human nature and the possibilities of human life,—of truth, of beauty, goodness, of order,—are not these things unspeakably grander than they ever were before? And does not the pure human heart, the sane intellect, the

thoughtful mind, bow with reverence, with a sense of adoration and admiration,—and this is the soul of worship,—in the presence of these things, as never before? And, if you want mystery as an element of worship, never was so much mystery in this old world as is given us by just these modern discoveries, that make us believe in an infinite order. The slightest, tiniest thing with which we can deal is linked in with the warp and woof of the infinite. And, if we could solve the smallest, we could hold the mightiest in our grasp. Mystery, instead of resting on the occasional and the arbitrary, faces us at every turn, more insoluble by as much as we know the more.

2. I would next, as an essential element in the religious attitude of man, place the sense of dependence,—the feeling that we are in the presence of an Infinite Power that has given us life, on which we depend every moment, by whose laws we live. Is this taken away by the modern world? Rather is it immensely magnified, until the God of human thought, the God on whose will we depend, is no longer super-human man on the top of a mountain. Rather is he the infinite life and spirit that breathes in the zephyr, that fans our brow in the summer, that sweeps in the immensity of its circuit the star, so far away that it has taken millions of years for its light to traverse the vast abyss. This is the power, named or unnamed, uncomprehended because infinite,—this is the power on which human life depends.

3. Again, religion is the recognition of the law of right, the law of duty, the law of life, inexorably dominant, universal, from which there is no escape. Is that lessened by the discoveries of the modern world? Rather is it infinitely increased in its reach and its complexity. It clasps us around on every hand, as does the air, touching every infinitesimal portion of our body, and being the very con-

stituent power of brain and thought, the very life-blood of the heart, the very quintessence of our conception of life, the very breath of the spirit. This power touches us on every side, besets us behind and before, and lays its hand upon us. We can no more escape it than we can escape the atmosphere.

4. Then, there is ground in this modern thought for trust, for hope, for aspiration. There is reason, as there never was before, for personal consecration to the highest ideal and the noblest conception of life. There is ground for religious devotion, which is the essence of sainthood, such as the ancient world never dreamed. So it seems to me that, so far from the elements of essential religion being in danger of dying out, because they are recognized as natural everywhere, we are face to face with the inevitable fact that these things are coming closer to us and touching us with a more inexorable grasp.

Are, then, special sacred things to fade out of our life? Is there to be no more a sacred place, a sacred time, sacred actions, a sacred book, sacred persons? Nay, even here I would turn the tables on what seems to be a part of the popular thought, and say that the sacraments of human life are to be increased in number, beauty, glory, and power, rather than lessened. Only, we are to get rid of those old, arbitrary, artificial ideas of sacraments, and are to recognize those things that are inherently, naturally, vitally sacred. Are not our lives, though we have not learned this as we ought to have done, filled full of the memories of holy places, of places connected in our thought with the noblest deeds and highest hopes and kindling aspirations, the turning-points of our careers,—the places where the highest and the noblest in us was born? Are there not in our memories numberless sacred hours, hours consecrated to some noble

truth, hours given to the service of some worthy friend, hours connected with the highest and best things in us,—not observed by any rite or outward institution perhaps, but none the less real sacraments of the best and divinest life within us? Will there be any more sacred days? Are not our memories full of these? Are there to be no sacred books? They tell us that we rationalists dethrone the Bible. Nay, we lift it from its artificial pedestal, on which it has enjoyed what seems to us a sort of mock divinity. We take it from the position that it has held in the hearts of men; and eliminating all that is evil and contradictory in it—for they are there—we lift it up to an equal eminence with those things that are clearest, highest, divinest. We demand that the thing be looked at for what it is, that the real sacrament be recognized. Then we add to them, grading them according to their importance in the development of our spiritual lives, other books, holding any book sacred that has told us a new message from God, that has given us a new truth, that has kindled in us a new aspiration, that has taught us some higher duty, that has made it easier for us to bear sorrow, that has come to us as a friend in darkness and trial. We shall have a library of sacred books, not one alone, counting all sacred that tell us truth and help us to live.

Are there to be no more sacred men and women? Sacred men and sacred women, are they not those that have ministered to us in our hours of necessity; that have comforted us in sorrow; that have lifted us up when we have been bowed down; that have, by a word or a hand-clasp, perhaps unconsciously, made it easier for us to believe in ourselves, in immortality, in God? These have been to us the ministers and angels of the divine. Are there not such men and women that we know to-day, and that we remember

with a tear dripping upon our cheek or silently falling in our hearts, sacred to us forevermore? What is sacred, what is holy, what is hallowed, if not these? Because they link us by natural processes with the divine, instead of being arbitrary, because they are under the law of our daily life, are they not sacred?

Let me close by quoting to you, as typical of the whole idea, and as representing my meaning in one direction, and so illustrating it in all, the closing lines of Thomas Campbell's "Hallowed Ground":—

"What's hallowed ground? 'Tis what gives birth
To sacred thoughts in souls of worth!
Peace! Independence! Truth! go forth
Earth's compass round;
And your high priesthood shall make earth
All hallowed ground."

And the ministry of these high things,—love, aspiration, hope, duty,—shall not these make every place hallowed, every hour and day and deed noble, every true scripture sacred, every aspiring, righteous life divine?

MODERN SAINTS.

WE are accustomed to associate with the word "saint" some idea of special, peculiar virtue or goodness. But yet there is no necessary relation between sainthood and goodness, in our modern sense of that word. When Paul wrote a letter to any one of the ancient churches, he addressed the entire membership of that church, without any regard to their moral character or standing, as saints. He spoke of the saints in Corinth, the saints at Ephesus, the saints in Rome; and at the same time, in the course of his letter, he points out fault after fault, both in character and in method, complaining that they did not do what they ought to do and that they had done that which they ought not to do. So that Paul had no conception of any perfect or ideal goodness as connected with his use of the word "saint." He used this word strictly in accordance with its original meaning and idea. Originally, a saint is not a person who is good or bad intrinsically; but one who is consecrated, set apart, for the service of some deity. Any man, then, who is consecrated to the service of a god, is entitled, in the language of that religion, to the name of saint; for even material things, implements in the service of the altar, may be thus set apart, consecrated, sainted, in the strictest use of that term. Whether, then, a saint shall be good or bad, according to our modern use of language, will depend very largely upon the ideal which he has of the god whom he

worships; for it is a natural law that we are, year by year, progressively conformed to the likeness of our dominant ideal. That which we think of most, that which we admire, that which we learn to reverence and love, has such a power over thought and sentiment and life that it gradually moulds us into its own likeness. Even one of those insensate implements of service to which I have referred becomes so surrounded by the sentiment of worship, although its intrinsic character cannot be changed, that the qualities of the god to whom it is dedicated, the peculiar associations that surround the worship, are called up, whenever it is seen or spoken of. And the priest or the man, in whatever capacity he devotes himself to the service of any particular ideal of the Divine, will of necessity take on, ultimately, its character. He may, of course, claim to be dedicated to God, he may pretend to worship, he may go through the outward ceremonial or form, and yet all the time be secretly in his heart caring chiefly for something else. In that case, he will not be conformed to the ideal of the God that he outwardly worships; but he will be conformed to the ideal of that which he secretly prefers; so that the integrity of the principle remains.

To give you an illustration of the working of this idea, and to show you how justly this word "saint" may be used in very many different senses, and to show what a power there lies in real worship to transform the individual character, I wish to refer to several specimens of sainthood from some of the different religions of the past. This as preliminary to the discussion of sainthood in the modern world.

Before we step outside of the Bible, where we have begun with the usage of Paul, let us take him who, perhaps, is the dominant ideal, hero, saint of the Old Testament, who has been looked upon as the peculiar type of the coming

eternal king, the Messiah who was to rule over the nations. I refer to King David. Of course, it is only just for me to add that we are not to hold the Jews, in the later part of their career, responsible for a blind admiration of all the qualities and characteristics which really made up the man David; because they progressively idealized him, as the time went on. They wrought him over into the likeness of what they thought he ought to be. And, as they became more intelligent and attained to higher moral ideals, they made over, unconsciously, in their minds the actual David into quite another kind of man.

What was this actual David, this man after Jehovah's own heart? He was cruel; he was barbarous; he was blood-thirsty; he let no robbery nor wrong, not even murder itself, stand in the way of the accomplishment of any chosen purpose. And, so far from having resigned all these rougher characteristics during his later years, as he lay, a worn-out old man, on his death-bed, almost the very last injunction that fell from his feeble lips was a command to his son Solomon, a solemn, sacred command,—to be sure and see to it that an enemy of his, who had done him wrong, should not go down with his gray hairs to his grave in peace. This was the last word, almost, of King David: See to it that you punish relentlessly this man who, years ago, did me wrong. Do not let him die in his bed. This is the actual David of Israelitish history. And yet David was repeatedly called a saint; and he was, properly enough, termed a man after Jehovah's own heart.

All this finds simple and natural explanation, when we inquire into the ideal, the conception, of Jehovah held by the people of David's time. Jehovah was then the God of hosts, simply the national God of Israel, a man of war, the one who, David himself says, taught his hands to war

and his fingers to fight, the one who sat high in the heavens and laughed at the machinations of his enemies, foreseeing with joy the time when he should bring them to destruction, dashing them to pieces like a potter's vessel. This was the ideal of the God that David worshipped. And, by as much as David was a saint, consecrated to an ideal and conception like this, by so much is it perfectly natural that he should take on these qualities and characteristics.

Let us pass now from this God of Israel to look at one or two specimens of saints in ancient Hindostan. The old ideal of a perfect life among the Hindus divided it into four separate stages. I need not detain you with outlining the first three; but every orthodox Hindu, if he lived to be an old man, was expected at the last to surrender his property, make himself penniless, leave his home, and go into the forest and become a mendicant hermit, spending the last years of his life in meditation, and trying to become absorbed in his thought of Brahm; so fitting himself to leave this world by gradually detaching himself from all the bonds that held him to any of his human associations. When he reached this stage, having resigned the world and placed it under his feet, loving nothing, fearing nothing, hoping nothing, caring for nothing earthly, he was supposed to have become an ideal saint. And he had; for the God that the Hindu worshipped was the Brahm who slept eternally in the heavens, without hope or fear or care or sensation of any kind,—never moved by pain, never thrilled by a desire, rarely roused to effort. He who conformed himself to the likeness of such a god became so by taking on, so far as possible, the characteristics of this Hindu ideal of deity.

The Buddhists took one step ahead of this even. They reasoned, and it seems to me logical, If this is the highest ideal of life, why, then, postpone it till you are old? Why

not separate yourself entirely from the world while you are young, devoting your whole life to God, and not simply a fragment of it at the end? And so the ideal saint of Buddha became a man who devoted himself to mendicancy and to meditation, from the outset. He eschewed all the delights of love, all the sweetness of home, all the joys of childhood, and took no part in any attempt at the regeneration of the world. He had no interest in political life; he made no attempt to reorganize society, and bring it into accord with any higher thought or better purpose. He forsook his fellow-men and the world, and tried, so far as possible, to live utterly detached from all human interests. All this was perfectly consistent with the Buddhist ideal. It was a part of the creed of all Hindus that men had lived many lives before this, and, unless in some way they could escape it, they were doomed to live many lives after this. They were wearied out with this perpetual birth and perpetual death that bound them to a sort of Ixion's wheel, that now lifted them into the light of life, and now plunged them into the shadow of death, as the wheel revolved. They were doomed to be perpetually born, to live, to suffer and die. And so the Buddhist ideal of sainthood, the grand purpose of the Buddhist life, became an attempt to escape from this fatality in which, somehow, they had become enmeshed. In the light of this conception, it is perfectly natural that a Buddhist saint should have become just the kind of character that he was. Some of them carried it so far that, if you were to have wandered through some of those jungles of India, in those ancient times, you would have found men who had for many long, long years never washed their faces or hands, or combed their hair or trimmed their beard, or done anything except what was necessary to keep life in the body, and who sat absorbed in contemplation of the Infinite, attempting

thus to escape from the burdens and sorrows and cares of life. That is, one of those typical Hindu saints by as much as he became a saint became thoroughly worthless, so far as any human purpose is concerned. Yet, according to their conception of the divine and of human destiny, that was natural and logical.

One of the Hindu deities is Siva, the god of death and destruction, worshipped with cruel rites. Is it strange that, under the influences of a religion like that, there should spring up a religious sect like the Thugs, whose very religious service was ingenious and systematic murder? They worshipped the god of destruction and death; and they naturally became conformed to his character, and considered it the very essence of their religion to imitate their deity.

What kind of saints would they be, who sincerely worshipped and became conformed to the character of the Phœnician goddess Ashera or the Babylonian Mylitta or the Grecian Aphrodite or the Roman Venus, or who became moulded into the likeness of Bacchus, the god of drunkenness and revelry? And yet these had priests and priestesses, whose religious duty it was to imitate these qualities and characteristics. They did not regard these things as selfish indulgences. They were religious services, naturally so, when you take into account the characteristics of their deities.

We shall find other types of worship in the ancient world, if we search for them. One of the most important of ancient worships was that of the founder of a city or a tribe, as, in Rome, the worship of *Æneas* or *Romulus*; or reverence for the character of a man like *Curtius*, who was fabled to have plunged on horseback into the chasm that opened in the forum, thus threatening destruction to

the Roman State. The worship of an ideal like this made men patriotic and devoted, consecrated to the service of their country.

Let us pass, now, and look at the typical saints of the early Christian world, and see how they became modified, as the ideal of God became modified, in the course of human development.

Christianity was not something entirely new in the ancient world. Rather was it like a river, larger than any that had preceded it, because it was made up of the confluence of a hundred other streams. The ancient world paid tribute to this new form of religion that came to be called Christianity. It had elements in it from ancient Babylon, from Egypt, from Greece, from Rome, from the barbarian world. These were permeated through and through by the peculiar characteristics of the life and teachings of the Nazarene. And, when we see the inclusive character of early Christianity, we may expect to find different types of sainthood, just as we do. Jesus, for example, taught asceticism. He taught the forsaking of even father and mother and wife and child, for the sake of the kingdom. Very naturally, then, in those old times, these precepts came to be misinterpreted and misunderstood. So we have Saint Anthony fleeing, like the old saints of Hindustan, from wife and child and father and mother and friend, and living in the desert, and refusing to see mother or sister, even when they came in search of him. For Jesus had taught, along with this kind of self-sacrifice, that, though marriage was honorable in all, celibacy had about it some peculiar goodness that the ordinary life had not. So, with this, had grown up the ideal of perpetual celibacy, and a feeling that it was better to be apart from all human associations, and to live this lone life of contemplation and aspiration after the divine. So we have,

here again, just as in ancient India, as the typical saint one who, by as much as he becomes a saint, becomes unhuman, unfit for the service of this world.

Jesus again taught the glory of self-sacrifice; and, as Jesus taught it, it was all glorious,—self-sacrifice when necessary for a principle, for truth, for the sake of man. It was very easy at that time to misinterpret that doctrine, and make self-sacrifice a glorious thing simply for its own sake. And so we have Simeon Stylites standing upon a pillar year after year, utterly useless to the world, with no development of himself except, perhaps, in self-esteem, as he came to find how he was regarded as a saint, divorced from human life, rendering no service to any one.

On the other hand, Jesus also taught that it was good to labor for our fellow-men. And so we naturally have a class of Christian saints like Saint Christopher, a man who frankly said that he did not know how to pray or to worship; but, being a giant in strength, he could place himself by the banks of the rushing river that flowed across the path of pilgrims on their way to Rome and the Holy Land, and bear them over on his brawny shoulders, sainting himself thus to a life of simple service for his fellow-men.

Jesus, again, taught charity; and so we have one of the most beautiful legends of the ancient world in the story of the life and consecration to the service of the poor of Saint Elizabeth of Hungary, of whom it is told that, when, in defiance of her princely husband's express commands, she was going out with her robe full of bread for the hungry at her castle gate, she met this husband, and he demanded to see what she was carrying; and when she, trembling, looking only for rebuke, opened her robe, nothing was to be seen but a mass of flowers, God thus working a miracle to defend one of his saints, devoted to this beautiful service of charity toward the poor.

We have, then, these different ideals of sainthood in the Christian world, all of them determined by precisely the same principle operative in the ancient world,—by the different ideals of the divine character, and of the service God was supposed to ask of his human children.

Now, I wish you to note one or two points before I come to the consideration of some of the saints of the modern world. If any one was a saint in any one special religion, by virtue of that fact he could not be a saint in any other religion; for sainthood means consecration to a special god who is worshipped by him who is thus consecrated. And the differences of the religions of the world spring out of the difference of men's conceptions of God and of what they suppose he wishes them to do. If I worship one conception of God, by as much as I worship faithfully, moulding my character into the likeness of this ideal, by just so much am I necessarily antagonizing some other conception of God. The adherents of this other faith will look upon me as an outcast; while the adherents of the faith I follow may give me a name among the consecrated ones. You will see also how, necessarily, this practice of the exclusive worship of some one conception of God moulds one into the character of that God.

Just consider for a moment. We sometimes wonder, I suppose, as we survey the field of ancient history, that men could ever think that they were doing God service in following such careers as they laid out for themselves: that Saint Simeon could have supposed God cared to have him stand for years upon a pillar; that Saint Anthony could have dreamed that he was serving God by denying himself wife or family or friends, perhaps letting them fight single-handed and uncared for in the midst of the great, lonely world. What were these men thinking about? It is perfectly nat-

ural, perfectly logical. They believed that God was something distinct and separate from this human life of ours, separate from and outside of the world. They believed that he was the dominant power of the universe, the Almighty God; that he held their happiness, their very lives, for this world and for all future time, in his hands; that all things they could desire depended simply upon his arbitrary will.

Suppose you believed that to-day,—believed it with your whole soul,—that God was a power separate from your sense of duty, your family, and your fellow-men; that he had commanded you to leave husband, wife, father, and friend, and to go away from society and live in a wilderness alone; that he had told you, if you did not do this, you would suffer unspeakable tortures, the result of his displeasure, through all eternity. Face an alternative like that, and how many men are brave enough to meet the issue?

Then they believed, also, that all of their fellow-men ought to do the same, and, if they did not, it was on account of their wickedness, and that they justly deserved the wrath that would come upon them. It was not any lack of natural affection that made the old Calvinist believe that he could actually look over the battlements of heaven, and see wife and child writhing in the tortures of hell, and say that it was just and right. It was not lack of natural affection and tenderness, but because he had come to believe so thoroughly in the right of God to do as he pleased. He had identified his life so completely with the thought of God that the will of God was the measure of right, and he could not do any wrong. He had absorbed all these ideas; and this made all these little transitory things of a few years on earth as nothing, when looked at in the light of the eternal. This is what it means; and, when we look over this ancient world, we shall find that the gods in the main were so separate

from the ordinary life of man that they took very little interest in it. And, in many cases, they were even regarded as hostile to human happiness, jealous of human prosperity. One of the most striking features in the tragedies of the old Greek writers is this jealousy creeping out everywhere. If a man was a little prosperous or a little happy, his neighbors expected to see him lightning-smitten by the wrath of Jove. This is the meaning which lies at the heart of that marvellous legend of Prometheus, the grand old Titan, who was chained to a rock on Mount Caucasus, with an eagle gnawing at his liver. Why? For no reason but that he had rendered a service to mankind. By this, he had made himself an enemy of Zeus. It is this idea also, which lies at the heart of the Eden myth. Elohim is represented as being angry because the man and the woman had eaten of the tree of knowledge; and he thrust them out as a punishment.

But, as the world went on, as Jesus taught his more humane religion, and as the result of modern study and science, we have come to have an entirely different conception of the divine, and of the relation of God to human life. Right there lies the secret of the change of our conception of ideal human character. You remember Jesus, for the first time in the history of the world's religious teachers, placed the love of God and of man on an equality. The first commandment, he says, is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Jesus taught that, though men brought their sacrifices to the temple, they could not offer them acceptably so long as they were out of right relations to their fellow-men. Jesus taught that a man might not even know that he was serving God until he found at last that he had been serving him in the noblest way in the world. You remember the famous judgment scene, where those who

stand on the right hand are commended, and they reply, modestly, that they did not know that they had done these things for him, and Jesus answers, Inasmuch as you did it to the least of these my friends, you did it unto me. He made the service of man identical with divine service; serving man, the way to the service of God.

It was a thought like this that Theodore Parker had in mind when at the atheist's funeral he said, "O God, though this man did not know thee by name, *yet he kept thy law.*"

And like this also was the thought of Charles Sumner when he was asked about the two commandments, of love to God and love to man. He said he did not know that he understood much about the *first* commandment, but *he tried to keep the second.*

Now, then, we are prepared for this modern conception of sainthood. Where is God to-day? What are his laws? What shall a man do to find God and obey his laws? If a man discover truth in any direction, in the farthest star or in the lowest mine, what is he doing? He is simply setting his footsteps over again in the footsteps of God. If a man renders some service to his fellow-men politically, helping on a higher ideal, framing better laws, what is he doing? He is only finding within the realm of human society the laws of God as illustrated in the relationship between man and man. So, here again, he is on consecrated ground. If a man devote himself to art in some high and noble way, what is he doing? Only discerning, loving, worshipping, picturing a fragment of the divine beauty. If a man become a philanthropist,—if a genuine and devoted man,—caring most of all to promote human happiness and to contribute something toward making this life a little brighter for his fellows; what is he doing? Since the laws of happiness are the laws of life and the laws of God, and since he who is

happy is perfectly adjusted to God's laws, he again is following in the footsteps of God; trying to catch, by listening, the pure strains of eternal music, and sing them in the ears and for the joy of man.

And so, in any department of life, he who finds the truth, he who devotes himself to his fellow-men, is thereby consecrated in the noblest and truest way to God. Mark you, I have not changed my definition as to sainthood one whit. Sainthood is ever consecration to God. But he who has the truest, noblest, loftiest, deepest conception of God, and conforms himself to this ideal, becomes, in the very noblest sense of that word, a saint. And I dare to say here, before giving two or three instances, that, though we look upon these men as engaged in the secular affairs of the world, there are not in the entire course of Biblical history, from beginning to end, one half-dozen men who have sainthood in the truest conception of that word, so that they are worthy to stand beside the army of saints that I can show you in our modern, even our American world.

Let me give you two or three specific illustrations. Let us take a life like that of Charles Darwin. He was born in good society and endowed with an independent fortune and finely educated. When he stands on the threshold of his life, what is before him? A kind of life is before him which is followed by a great majority of those born and endowed as he was,—a life of ease, of social refinement, of culture, of dilettanteism, of self-indulgence, of selfish pleasure. Any of these was open to him. What kind of a life did he choose? From the very outset, he devoted himself modestly, simply, entirely, with no pretentious claims, to the study of truth, scientific truth, seeking out and striving to set his feet in the footsteps of God. Reverently, humbly, he followed out this plan his life through; and when, at last, as

the result of it, he gave the world a discovery second to none in the history of thought, it was met, as such discoveries generally are at first, with vituperation and abuse and a bitter flinging of words. What, then, did he do? He met them all with gentleness, seeming by his spirit to illustrate those words of Jesus, and to find the excuse for it in human ignorance,—“Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.” Still making no pretentious claims, he pointed out the weakest spots in his own system, putting weapons into the hands of his enemies to destroy him and his works, if they were able, living in charity and kindness, treating all men gently, until he was received up out of sight. I dare to say that, in all the records of the world’s saints in the past, there is no more saintly character, according to the truest definition of that word, than was his.

I may say substantially the same thing of Herbert Spencer; and of that great Frenchman, Littré, who devoted himself, in the midst of misunderstanding and petty social persecution, to the noblest, highest ends, and who, when well advanced in life, instead of sitting down to take his ease, laid out a plan of work which he persistently followed for twenty years, working much of the time eighteen hours a day. And, when he had completed this great monument of human devotion, he gave the remainder of his life to the service, in every way possible, of his fellow-men. These saints of literature, these saints of science, these saints of philosophy,—I seem to see them studding the firmament of human achievement like stars; and yet I have not time to even speak their names.

Turn to another department of human thought, and see another type of saint. I said that a man who devoted himself unselfishly to attempting to work out the divine ideal of human society thereby consecrates himself, in the truest

and most literal sense, to God. Look at a life like that of Charles Sumner. Born in the highest social circle, endowed with an independent fortune, he gives himself in his young manhood to a cause that was socially outcast, that was looked upon by all respectable men in Massachusetts with contempt. But he follows it unfalteringly to the end. He even becomes a martyr to his devotion. There is one side of the character of Sumner, illustrating this point, that few, perhaps, have known about. After the brutal assault in the Senate, he was obliged to go away for rest and medical treatment, under the care of Dr. Brown-Sequard. Dr. Brown-Sequard has put it on record that, while Sumner was abroad, conscious of the fact that he was being abused here at home and accused of staying away from his post of duty merely to enjoy himself and pass the time pleasantly, he was utterly unable to carry on a consecutive line of thought or even to keep up a consecutive conversation. Under these circumstances, he submitted to such surgical operations as very few have undergone. Dr. Brown-Sequard says that never in the whole course of his life did he submit any man or animal to such terrible tortures as Sumner endured, and endured voluntarily. For, when the doctor asked him if he would be etherized, he replied that he would not, if it would interfere with the success of the operation or the rapidity of his recovery. When told that he would recover more rapidly without it, five separate times he went through this torture. His life was devoted to the noblest ideal of human service,—to the political welfare of his fellow-men, to the enfranchisement of a race ordinarily looked upon as having no rights that any man was bound to respect.

Beside him stands that other modern saint, who has perhaps no equal in the ancient world,—another well-educated, socially high young man, consecrated from the beginning to

the end to the service of humanity. I need hardly say I refer to Wendell Phillips. Besides these, how many another life is eminent,—stars of guidance for our modern political life!

I can just hint at another type of saint, represented by men like Wilberforce and John Howard, and women like Florence Nightingale and Octavia Hill, devoting her life to lifting up out of the slums of London the lowest of the poor; and a hundred in our own American history, worthy to stand beside these.

Then there is the other type of saint, one of the most conspicuous representatives of which is Mr. Theodore Parker. A religious saint, consecrated to new religious advance, he gave himself in his young life to contumely and scorn, to bitterness and sorrow, that he might stand for the vision of his soul, for the highest conception of God that he believed had been born into the heart of man in these older ages of the world.

Not only this, but our modern life is full of saints who are not, perhaps, members of any Church; for a man may be a saint in his store, in his bank, in his office, on the street, in his home. Any man who, according to the light that he has and the opportunity that is given him, consecrates himself to doing honestly and truly the best he can for the welfare of his fellow-men is thereby consecrated to God. How many are there in our homes, how many unrecognized, living obscure lives, who make darkened pathways seem a little lighter, who take by the hand and hold up and guide the steps of those ready to fall, who bring courage and cheer to fainting, despairing hearts, who are sunshine and help and comfort to those whose lives would be lonely and troubled without their aid! These saints make bright the rough path that we are walking, and

are worthy, by and by, to shine as a sun set in the firmament of universal recognition and praise.

We have not, then, changed the definition. A saint is still one dedicated to God. We have changed our conception of God. He has come down out of the sky, without leaving it; for he is still in the most distant star. But he is here by our side. He is working for the uplifting of society. His are the bloody tracks on the world's battle-fields, where are fought out the great conflicts of right and wrong; his the rays of light that give us the later, higher intelligence concerning the great problems of the world; his the devotion, the fidelity, that, in the lives of statesmen, help to reorganize humanity; his the torch that guides the feet of the scientific explorer; his the dream of beauty that moves and thrills the soul of the artist; his is all that is true, that is beautiful, that is good in human life. If we seek for sainthood, let us find the opportunity for it in our common lives, wherever we are placed.

Here is the field for sainthood, here
Where is the hottest of the strife.
Stand not aloof, but enter in
And help men seize the prize of life.

Seek truth and noble deeds and peace ;
From wrong and sorrow set earth free !
And, doing this, thou'l hear the voice,—
“E'en so ye did it unto me !”



THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS.

LET me begin by attempting to outline for you what I suppose to be the essential meaning of the Church in holding and teaching this great doctrine. By as much as it has called itself "*the Church*," it is intended to represent its communion as universal, inclusive of all truth, of all beauty, of all goodness, of all that is divine, and exclusive of all that is outside of or antagonistic to the divine. This doctrine, then, of the communion of saints asserts and emphasizes, from the church stand-point, the organic unity, the oneness of all those in heaven and on earth, in the present, in the past, and in the future, who have, do now, or shall in any coming time become partakers of this divine life. This is figured forth clearly in that parable of Jesus, wherein he speaks of himself as the vine, and the people, his disciples and followers, as the branches. The branch lives not an independent life. It lives by virtue of the fact that it has organic, vital connection with the vine, drinks its life; and, if cut off from it, it must perforce wither and cease to be.

Suppose a gardener should go into his garden some spring day, after the roses were in bloom, and should cut off one branch from the parent bush. It might contain buds just opening, half-blown roses, full of beauty and promise; and he might set it out by itself in the earth. For a time, it would seem to be alive and to possess all the beauty and

characteristics of the parent bush ; but the gardener knows that the end of it all will be withering and death. It is cut off from the source of its life, and it must end in decay. So the Church would assert that, since the Church is this true vine, with Christ for the root, and all individuals are only branches, stems, twigs, buds, flowers, in this ; and in this alone can any individual find the divine life. So long as each is thus vitally connected with the source of all good, of all truth, of all beauty, so long it finds its life in this communion of saints. It enters into and partakes of this common bond, which is the source of all its good.

Now, then, you can easily see that, from the church stand-point, accepting this definition, it would logically hold that this one Church, this one communion of saints, was the source of all good ; that the individual lives only as he enters into communion with it ; that from it he receives all life and power and beauty and peace ; and that to it, in turn, he owes all duty, all devotion, all service. In the light of this truth, you get the Catholic stand-point from which to view the enormity of the position taken by the heretic. If it be true that this is *the* Church of God and the source of all life, the reservoir of all truth and beauty and goodness, then he who creates a schism within this perfect body of the Church of God, or turns a traitor to it, has committed the gravest of all conceivable crimes ; for he has not only committed suicide by detaching himself, cutting himself off from the only source of life, but he has struck a blow at the common life and common hope of humanity. And so, granting this premise as true, you see not only the logic, but the justice, of the punishment which the Church has always meted out to the heretic in this world, and threatened him with in the world to come. It is not only logical but just that Dante, following the church tradition and representing correctly the

church spirit, distinguishes Judas and Satan, the traitors and arch enemies of the faith, with this bad superiority over all the possible wickedness of all other beings in all worlds. And, when Dante has created his hell, down deep in the inverted apex, in the lowest, worst spot of the Inferno, he has placed Judas and Satan side by side.

Coupled with that doctrine,—I know not whether the Church would acknowledge any genetic and logical connection ; but coupled with it in thought—is another belief of the Church, that of a fund of stored-up merit, the result of works of supererogation. The saints are supposed to be saved on account of the merits of Jesus Christ ; but, beyond this and beyond anything necessary on their part simply to secure salvation, they have, by their patience, by their devotion, by their labors, by their self-denials and sufferings here, laid up a great fund of merit, which is at the disposal of the wisdom and the benevolence of the Church, to be set over against the debit account of those who have fallen and who are in need. So any one, who enters into this great communion of saints, enters upon, if he ever needs it, an inheritance of such a share of this great fund of stored-up merit as is necessary to make his account right with God. This is the doctrine in brief, in bald outline, of the communion of saints as held by the Church.

Out of this doctrine have sprung misconception, cruelty, division, persecution in the history of the race. And yet I believe that here the Church has always been reaching out after one of the most magnificent of truths. The error has been in assuming that only those that it had chosen to accept as members of its communion, or only those who chose voluntarily to come into membership in this communion of the saints, had a right to be classed as members of the household of God.

But we hold, in the light of our last discourse, in which I outlined the characteristics of sainthood, a broader conception of this Church of God, this communion of the saints, in all nations and all ages. You will remember that last Sunday we made the broad statement that any man, who devoted himself in any direction to the search for truth, to the search for the beautiful and the good; who was faithful in even the lowest departments of life; who was trying to add something to the common fund of the world's goodness and progress; who ministered, in however feeble or poor a way, to those things which tend to lift and lead on mankind to some better future,—that these, by as much as they were consecrated, sainted, devoted to these labors, had a right to the name of saints, and were already consecrated to God; for God includes all beauty, all goodness, all truth, all things that lift up and lead on. And so, if we define anew our doctrine of the universal, the Catholic Church of God, of the communion of saints, in the light of this principle, we shall include in it all men, all women, all children, from all ages, in all races, under every sky, called by whatever religious name, calling God by whatever name in their worship,—all who devote themselves to this common, better life of the race. These are the Church of God. These constitute the great communion of saints.

And is it not true, when we have come to this new definition, that we can make, on behalf of this communion, the very identical claims which the Church has always made on its own behalf? Here is all the truth, all the beauty, all the goodness, all the divineness of human life, in this communion of the saints. From this comes all of good that any individual life ever receives. We live by virtue of the fact that we are grafted into this one central vine. To this, we owe all devotion, all duty, all service. To it, we owe all that we have

received. It is our duty to swell the common tide of the world's life and the world's progress as it sweeps out into the future. And he who, through pride, through vain glory, through self-conceit, through selfishness in any form, cuts himself off from or antagonizes this common life, this communion of the saints, not only commits suicide, so far as his own highest and best life is concerned, but becomes a traitor to all that is divine and human in the world.

This doctrine, then, transformed thus in the light of a broader and deeper definition, comes back to us in a more vital form. It is just this common life of humanity to which the individual owes so much. By as much as we are linked in with this common life have we received all that is of value. We owe to it our endeavor, our devotion, our service. It is this which I wish to illustrate and to emphasize to your thought, and to bring home to your feeling as a weight on your conscience.

Let us see how natural, how true, how profound is this principle, by a few illustrations. I will begin by asking you to look at a life like that of Thoreau.

Thoreau, you will remember, for a time revolted against society and all its claims. He resented the external pressure of the great mass of mankind. He wished to be free, to stand alone, to walk his own way and think his own thoughts. He resented the claims which society made upon him. He denied the right even to tax him for the common good. Now, I shall not deny that a protest like this is occasionally a sign of health and sanity; that we need now and then to go a little apart from our fellows, to assert ourselves, to stand as much as may be alone, to resist the pressure of the majority, to think our own thoughts and feel our own feelings, and go our own ways, just so far as it is possible. But here is an important point: let us see how far it

is possible, how far it is sane, how far it is a sign of life. Let us see how far Thoreau himself, who was a good typical example of such an attempt, was able to go.

Thoreau went to Concord and built himself a hut near Walden Pond, and became a hermit in the midst of nineteenth century civilization. How much of what made that life of Thoreau's possible was his own? How much did he owe to the great communion of saints of humanity? Strip from him all that this world, against which he revolted, had given him, and what would be left? You would take the hat from his head, the shoes from his feet, the clothes from his back. His ability to build the house that sheltered him from the weather was the result of ages of experiment and inheritance on the part of the race. The tools that he carried with which to build his hut were the result of the ingenuity, the experiments, the toils of mankind. The very brain with which he thought, the very brain that made him desirous of getting apart and looking with fresh eyes, if he might, at the world, was the result of ages of struggle, of toil, of thought, of effort on the part of this same mankind from which he wished to escape. And then, curious contradiction, though he had fled from the world and resented its interference with the brain that the world had made for him: with the paper, the pen, the ink, that were a part of the gift of the civilized world,—with these he must perforce write books, and why? Write them to send them out into this world that he had deserted, that they might be read, and that there might be reflected back to him, through sympathy, the author's joy. All these things he owed to the world around him; and, without them, Thoreau would have been a naked, wild, uncultivated, rude savage of the woods, incapable of counting the fingers of one hand, or forming a single letter that made up one of his books, or even of think-

ing of the possibility of the existence of a book. All that made him anything above a brute was the gift of the world-wide communion of saints.

Let us take another illustration. Go back to the beginning, or near the beginning, of this human life of ours on the planet, to the time when the separate particles of humanity began to aggregate into clusters and organisms of a higher type. There was a time when the materials that make up this solar system were floating diffused and separate and, apparently, independent particles through space. At last, they began to collect, to aggregate in clusters, and to make up the sun with its family of planets and moons about him.

So there was a time, I suppose, when the individual elements of humanity were very largely scattered and separated. At last, they began to aggregate; and the first and simplest aggregation must have been that relation which now we recognize under the name of the family,— a man, a woman, and a child. These make up the smallest organism that we can properly call human. And now note how each one of these is dependent upon the rest. The man depends upon the woman for all that is best in himself, for the development of all that is noblest and finest and sweetest. And she, in her turn, depends on the man for the development of the most characteristically human things in her character and life. And the child is dependent upon the man and the woman for life itself and all things. But, on the other hand, the man and the woman depend in their turn upon the little helpless child; for through this relationship, this bond of sympathy, have been progressively developed those qualities that lift man above the brute, and make him feel that he is akin to the divine.

Then, this process of aggregation went on until families

were grouped and gathered into the tribe or nation. And here, again, how dependent, mutually, each upon each in all this tribal or national life! The very first problem that the race had to solve was the ability to form a tribe or nation compacted together into one organism, and able to stand shoulder to shoulder, life to life, in one organic whole. The tribe that was first able thus to assert itself would be the one that would survive, that could resist the attacks of wild beasts or wilder men, or the disintegrating influence of nature about them; that would be able to conquer the surrounding races and all those things that interfered with its onward progress. When we come to the national life, note how little could be done by one individual alone. The chief or king would be dependent upon the nobles and the people, and the nobles dependent upon the king and the people. The warriors would be dependent on the workers, and the workers dependent on the warriors; each a part of the one whole, the hand having no right to say to the foot, I have no need of you, and the foot having no right to despise the hand; and hand and foot having no right to despise the brain, and the brain having no right to despise the heart; many members in one body organized and compacted together by this mutual interdependence. And so there arose out of this disorder the germs of this great world-wide community life, by which, alone, mankind is able to develop and make progress.

I want to draw a simple and graphic picture of this dependence of each of us on somebody else in our modern life. Let me then enter the dining-room of any one of you this morning, and sit with you by your breakfast-table, and make a few suggestions in regard to your dependence upon the workers and the thinkers of all the past, of all the world.

How does it come to pass that you, gathered around your

well-spread table, are a part of the great nation that fears no power in the world, that is at peace with all the earth, that represents this universal prosperity of all its members? All the struggles of humanity from the beginning have entered into the production of this American nationality and this American prosperity and peace. The battle of Marathon was fought to make your breakfast-table possible. The struggle out of which came the Athenian republic, the Roman Empire, the States of the Middle Ages, the freedom of the German tribes; the character of Saxon and Briton; the conquests of the Conqueror; the Norman element added to the great life of England; the fight of the Barons for liberty against the despotism of John; the warfare of Cromwell against Charles; the rise of the Puritans; the work of Luther; the freedom that sprang up and came to fruitage in the English national life, and was then transplanted to these shores; the warfare of years with the aborigines, the long struggle of the Revolution, all the recent phases of our American national life,—all these, the entire history of the world, have contributed to lay the foundation of the prosperity, the peace, on which your breakfast-table rested this morning; and you talk about what you have done, and your ability to live apart from your fellows, and your independence, your thought, your brain, your genius, your power! Then how many an experiment, how many a failure, are woven into the carpet that was under your feet and the cloth that covered your table! How much of human genius and effort is displayed in the porcelain and china from which you ate! How many mines dug under ground, how much ingenuity and inventive skill, went to the construction of knife and fork and spoon! How many laborers in Japan, Rio, Java, how many ships whitening the sea, how many miles of railroad track, how many thundering trains, brought

to you your tea and coffee! How many farms furnished the butter and cream! How many patrolmen walked the streets; and what a strong, protective arm of government was held above you, that you might sleep in peace and arise with appetite for this same breakfast! How many despised, poor, outcast laborers have been contributing, while you slept, to the health and the sanitary condition of the city! And, then, what human labor created the beautiful patterns on your walls and hung the pictures that delight your eyes! What a world of invention and struggle, reaching back to and out from the inaccessible past, has laid a picture of the present condition of the whole planet for five cents beside your plate! And all this sympathy that makes you care to know about the world is the development of the civilized heart that makes it possible for you to enter into these world-wide relations. How much have you done yourself toward all this? How much do you owe to the world-wide communion of the saints, to those men sainted, devoted, consecrated to the development of all this civilization of which you are a part, and which brings the water of life to your individual lips?

And so I might go on and illustrate this truth in regard to the different departments of life, business, intellectual, social, moral, and religious. How did you come by all these? How is it that you are able to carry on your business to-day successfully? You owe it to the past and to the present civilized organization of the world. Suppose you wish to cherish a thought, to pursue or utter a train of ideas. In the first place, it is this communion of saints which has given you the brain by which to think. Then you are dependent upon the sympathetic brain development and culture in those about you for the ability to utter your thought and to get back the responsive echo of the intel-

ligent perception of it on the part of somebody else. If you wish to write a book, you are dependent upon the culture of the world for readers. It is the intellectual development and life of all the past that have created the intellectual world in which you live to-day. How do you know that you are not living, as men used to think they were, on a little flat plain of earth, with a solid dome like a metal cover shutting down over you to the horizon, and with a few lights, called sun, moon, and stars, a few miles overhead? How do you know these great facts about the universe and its immensity? How do you know that you are riding the chariot of earth that is whirled along with lightning-like rapidity on its pathway through the blue? How do you know all these magnificent truths? Why, we have looked through the eyes of an Anaxagoras, a Bruno, a Galileo, a Kepler, a Newton, a Young, a Darwin, and a Spencer; and to-day the little child, standing on the shoulders of these, is able to gain a grander view of the universe than had any of these magnificent giants of the intellectual life of the past. He who enters into this communion of saints receives the benefit of all that has been wrought and achieved, until it has become literally true, as Jesus said, that he who is the least in this kingdom of heaven is greater than the greatest of those who were not thus privileged.

And so of the social life of men. We are dependent on somebody to love us, we are dependent on somebody to love. Shut us off alone, and how much would be left of life that we would care to keep?

So, again, in the religious and moral life. It is the experience of all the past that we breathe as the very breath of our moral and religious life to-day. Entering into it, we are able to begin where the world has left off, and go on to higher and better attainments still.

Now, then, modern science, so far from taking away this grand doctrine of communion of saints, teaches it to us in the law of evolution by an accumulation of facts that the world never conceived before. We do not bear the root, as the apostle says, the root bears us. We are simply a branch, a twig, a bud, of the common life of the world, and all that is of value in us individually we derive from this communion that we hold in this common life. We have been developed by it; and this conviction of the common life of the race bears us up, and thrills our veins with this life.

It is, then, the one dream of the world to realize in its perfection this communion of the saints. It is the grandest problem of the modern world,—this ability to organize, and so relate to each other the rich and the poor, the ignorant and the learned, the capitalist and the laborer, that they shall enter into not only, but receive, their just share of this common life of the world. He will be the grandest saint, in the future estimation of men, who shall be able to solve this great problem. It is the one thing that faces us and that threatens the nineteenth century civilization more than any other danger; and, if we fully realize how vital a thing it is,—this common life of humanity,—we shall see that we cannot safely neglect it.

Consider, for instance, our life here in Boston. No matter where you live, whether on the finest avenue, the most beautiful hill-top, the noblest street in the city, if the city's health in the lowest slums is not regarded, then you are not safe. No matter how fine and sweet the morality which you see budding and blossoming in the life of the loved ones around your fireside, unless the morals in the slums of the city are regarded, neither your son nor your daughter is safe. It is a common life. We are on board one ship. Whether you are in the cabin or forecastle, if the ship goes down, we all

founder together. The nobility of the age of France preceding the Revolution thought that they could live their gay, butterfly, self-indulgent life in happy Olympian scorn of the common conditions of the common people of France. But when the earthquake came, and the ground trembled beneath them, and the pent-up lava burst forth, they found that the desolation swept all the superstructure away. It is our business to see to it that we develop in its entirety and completeness not only the upper structure, but the lower, in this common human life of ours.

There is no grander dream possible to any human soul, it seems to me, in the way of personal achievement, than that which George Eliot has so grandly expressed in that brief fragment which is so familiar, but which, as the world goes on, I take it, will be more familiar still. Here was the aspiration of her soul:—

“Oh, may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In minds made better by their presence: live
In pulses stirred to generosity,
In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
For miserable aims that end with self,
In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
And with their mild persistence urge man’s search
To vaster issues. So to live is heaven:
To make undying music in the world,
Breathing as beauteous order, that controls
With growing sway the growing life of man.
 . . . This is life to come,
Which martyred men have made more glorious
For us who strive to follow. May I reach
That purest heaven; be to other souls
The cup of strength in some great agony;
Enkindle generous ardor; feed pure love;
Beget the smiles that have no cruelty;

Be the sweet presence of a good diffused,
And in diffusion evermore intense.
So shall I join the choir invisible,
Whose music is the gladness of the world."

Here is the noblest human aspiration, here the highest human duty. How any one can fail to be thrilled with the thought of it, as he looks back, passes my comprehension. I am overwhelmed and awed as I sometimes gain even a little glimpse of my personal debt to the noble ones—nay, the thousands—who have struggled and lived and suffered and died to make my present life possible. As illustrating this concretely, I met Mr. John Weiss on the street one day, soon after I came to Boston to live, and he said to me in that humorous, pathetic way of his, "Mr. Savage, you ought to be grateful to me and some of the rest of us who have been killed to make it possible for you to do your work with freedom and peace." And I am grateful; for, indeed, he spoke the literal truth. He and a thousand true souls like him have died for the liberty that we rejoice in here this morning,—died by the year, though they dragged out a physical existence; died as truly as the Crucified One.

As we then are grateful to these men, to this communion of the saints, from whence we draw every breath and the blood of our life, let us feel the responsibility and duty that urge us to contribute our devotion and service to this common life.

But I believe this communion of saints is larger than George Eliot pictures it. She confined it to this world. Her immortality was the immortality of a life perpetual only in the onward move of the race here beneath the skies. I believe rather, with Paul, that this life here is but an arena where we run our race for the crown. We struggle, we smite, we strive after the victory; but all around us, invisible

at present to our eyes, is a great cloud of witnesses, tier above tier ranging off into the invisible. And I love to think this morning that George Eliot herself to-day sits in one of these higher tiers among the grandest of the immortals. And, as I strain my ear to listen, I seem sometimes to catch the faint echo of a cheer, as some grand blow for truth or right is struck here on earth; some whisper of inspiration or courage, as we face some new foe; and I feel some thrill of that common life which binds together past, present, future, earth and heaven, the one true church of God, the Catholic Church, the world-wide communion of saints.

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS CHANGES.

IN this series of sermons on which I have been engaged, I have made it apparent to you that I firmly believe religion is a permanent factor of human nature and human life. I think it is not likely to decline in the world, much less to die out or pass away. But, at the same time, I have made it apparent that the forms that religion at any one time assumes are subject to perpetual change. The heart, the soul, the essence of religion, is the endeavor of man to become rightly related to the universe outside of him, rightly related to his fellow-men. That is, an ideal life is the end and aim of religion. But the ceremonies that may be attached to religious services, the dogmatic beliefs in which men embody their religious ideas, all these externals of religion, the methods by which men may endeavor to carry out that which is the one object of all religious thinking and living,—these necessarily change as man changes and develops from age to age. It is my purpose, this morning, to consider some of the principles underlying these religious changes, and to note some of the more important of those that are taking place in the world at the present time, to which we, in our measure, are contributing, and of which we, of necessity, are a part.

We are apt to overlook these changes or not to note the significance of them, for the very simple and sufficient reason that we are in the midst of them. You learned a

similar lesson during the war, when it used to be a common saying that, if one wished to know what was going on at the front, one must come to New York or Boston. The soldiers in the army knew less about it than we who were at home. They were a part of those movements, in the midst of them, and consequently unable to estimate their drift or tendency as clearly as those who stood away from the passion of battle, looking at it from afar. So it has always seemed difficult for people at any particular age of the world to estimate correctly the great changes that were going on about them. Thus it is that another generation, separated from the passions of the conflict, can overlook the field, and see what was being done and what was the necessary and natural outcome. These changes, then, must always be going on, unless man ceases to advance; for they inhere in the very fact that this is an infinite universe, and that the human race is finite and is in process of development,—changing in thought, changing in feeling, changing in institutions,—going through intellectual, political, and moral changes age after age.

This necessity for change is connected with another fact of close kin with that which I have just mentioned,—a fact which is frequently spoken of as a discouraging one for man, a fact that is supposed very largely to vitiate all his attempts to understand and explain the great problems of the world. Goethe said, Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is. And this word “anthropomorphism” has played a great part in the thought and discussions of the religious world during the last generation; and, as I have just said, is supposed to indicate some terrible, mighty fact which is able to make of very little worth our attempts to understand the world. What is anthropomorphism? Why, it means simply that man is compelled, as he studies this

infinite universe, to think of it in terms derived from his own being, from his own experience. He is compelled to think of it as a man, and must therefore think of it inaccurately, so they tell us.

To illustrate what I mean clearly: I came across a statement during the past week, concerning an old satirical work written some years ago, that described a convention once held among the humble-bees, the purpose of it being to come to some better conclusion as to the nature of the universe and its purpose. And it goes on to say that they looked at it from necessity from their stand-point as humble-bees, and came to the conclusion that the universe was formed simply for them, and that they, their nature, their destiny, exhausted its possibilities. Why not? I propose this morning to defend the humble-bees, and all people, whatever their nature or degree, who look at the universe from the stand-point of their own nature. How else should they think of it, how else should they look at it? What difference does it make to the humble-bee what kind of a universe man lives in? What concerns him is whether the universe of the bee is suitable for him. That is the important truth and the only important truth for him.

You remember that short satire or satirical poem of Browning's in which Caliban, half-beast, half-human, waking up in an underground cave, comes to study the universe from his stand-point. The moral is that the universe is quite other than what Caliban thinks it. He measures it from his stand-point. But why should he not? So far as his welfare is concerned, he is right. It concerns him to know what the universe is to Caliban. It does not concern him to know what it is to any other creature. So why should not man be anthropomorphic? I look at the universe through my eyes: they are the only eyes I have. How else should I look at it?

If I am to estimate whether a substance is hard or soft, I must do it through my sense of touch: that is the only way I have for knowing anything about it. It does not concern me to know whether this desk might be hard or soft in some other planet, or to some other race of beings, so long as it is hard to me. What, then, is the use of telling me that some other creature might live, like the fabled salamander, in the fire, so long as fire is hot and ice is cold to my touch? What I want to know is what is the universe to me; and that which is the truth to me is the truth that supremely concerns me. I am perfectly well aware that my capacities, my faculties and senses, are not the measure of the universe; that, if I were suddenly endowed with a sixth sense, I might have a new world about me in an instant. But I am not endowed with a sixth sense at present: consequently, I must take the world as it is to my thought and to my five senses. It is this which concerns me; and it is a real universe to me, constituted as I am. And it is nothing to me that it may be something else to some other being, in some other world, constituted in some other way. Because the human race is anthropomorphic, therefore it follows naturally and of necessity that man must picture the Infinite in terms derived from his own nature and experience. And, therefore, as his nature develops, as he makes intellectual advance, as he makes political advance, he must of necessity change his conception of the universe. And you will find that nearly all the great changes that have been brought about may be easily grouped under these three great divisions,—intellectual, political, and ethical; for man, as he has stood contemplating the greatness of the world about him, has many and many a time been deceived like the traveller in the Alps when he has seen his own figure projected like a spectre against the clouds, and has not waked up perhaps for a long

time to the conception of the truth that it really is only his own shadow.

So man has projected, shadowed, against the Infinite his own political, intellectual, ethical ideas, and has named these the divine, has made them the constituent elements of his religious doctrines, his religious thoughts. It is perfectly natural that this should be so ; and it is right that he should have done so, only he should have been wise enough—and he is at last becoming wise enough—to know that this is all only provisional ; good enough for to-day, perhaps the best possible for to-day, but that it will be antiquated and left behind as he becomes wiser, as he is able to think more broadly and deeply and to feel more nobly.

I do not see how it could have been otherwise than it is. How is it possible for a man to transcend himself ? Those who tell us that we ought not to be anthropomorphic, that we ought to get rid of all this delusion, that the Infinite is not made in our likeness, that we ought not to use terms derived from our own experience when talking about the Infinite, it seems to me, are not otherwise. They tell me that I must not talk about God as thinking, because thinking is derived from a process going on in my brain, and God has not any brain. I know that very well ; but what shall I say ? I know that there is a process going on in the Infinite that is not less than thinking. If it is different from thinking, it is higher than that ; but thinking is the highest term that I am capable of using for it. They tell me that I have no right to talk about God as feeling, about God as loving, about God as a father, about God as a governor, about God as just, as forgiving, because they say that these are terms derived from man and his experience, and they cannot adequately measure the Infinite. I know it as well as they do ; but, if I am to speak at all, I must speak as a man, and I

must use terms derived from human nature and experience, or else I must be forever silent. I must, however, remember the justice there is in the criticism that these are terms that fall unspeakably short of the reality. But they are the best shadows I can use for setting forth so much of that reality as to-day is possible for me. I cannot think of anything higher along the intellectual line than that. I cannot think of anything higher than goodness. I cannot think of anything better than love; and so I use these terms temporarily, believing that they mean as much as at present we can express, but knowing that the reality transcends them on every side, and is infinitely beyond the power of expression.

These changes, then, are going on according as man is able to think more wisely, according as he is able to frame his conception of government more wisely, according as his moral nature develops and he comes to feel more justly, more tenderly, and to be more true.

I wish, now, to indicate in this brief way some of the principles underlying these changes, showing the necessity for them, and to note some few of the important ones that are taking place at the present time. We shall thus be able to see, in some dim way at least, the drift of the religious life of the modern world.

The first thing that seems to me very marked, as we look over the religious world of the last fifty years, is to find how the dogmatic side of religion is declining, coming to be considered of less and less importance. When I became a member of the church, I was obliged to stand up in the presence of the congregation and listen to a very long and detailed creed, a third of which I did not comprehend then and do not now, and give my assent to it, as a condition of church membership. Every one who has noticed the changes that are going on is aware that large numbers

of orthodox churches to-day make no such demand. They do not ask assent to a long creed. Sometimes, if they are intimately acquainted with a person's character and believe that the person is a good man or woman, they will not trouble about the creed at all. They only ask him to come in with them on the broad basis of this principle of moral fellowship, and to do what he can to make the world brighter and happier and better. The reason of this change is because we do not feel so certain as we used to as to what is perfectly true. We are not so wise as we were, for the simple reason that we are a great deal wiser.

Let me indicate a little more definitely some of these changes, that you may see how real and natural this fact is.

It was very easy for primitive man to worship a fetich, or to worship the spirit of his dead ancestors. He felt that religion was quite a definite and comprehensible thing, and that he knew all about it. But, when this little personal god disappeared in the god of the tribe, of the city, then this conception of what his god and of what religion was became less certain at each step. In the first place, each man had a little family god of his own. This god took care of his own household, and it was very easy to find out just what this god wanted. But, when he became the god of a tribe and of a nation, a greater number of elements was involved, and his own individuality was in danger of being lost. And when, at last, this god became not only the deity of his own tribe, but the God of the whole earth, then man began to think how little a part of the attention of this God he could expect to have personally; and he bowed in the dust before him, and began to speak of him as the Infinite, the Incomprehensible, the One whose thoughts were as high above him as the heavens were above the earth.

Even during the Middle Ages, God and the universe had

not grown so much but that man might reasonably expect to have definite and clear ideas concerning them. Until within two or three hundred years, this whole universe was no larger than the orbit of the moon. There was only one inhabited earth, and that was a little flat plain ; and the sun and the moon and the stars were made for this. Men knew perfectly well what God created the earth and man for. There had been rebellion in heaven ; and a third of the angels had been cast out, leaving a great vacancy. So God decided to create this universe, this little world, and to create man and place him on it, that he might be disciplined and fitted to fill up the blank that had been made about God's throne. . They knew when God made man, and just what his thoughts were, and just what God wanted man to do, and just how they must regulate their lives, their thoughts and beliefs, in order that they might become as the angels.

But, suddenly, this little universe that we could clasp, at least, with the arms of our thought, has extended, the firmament has become thin air and melted away into the blue ; and in the place of one little earth, with one little race of beings on it, we are lost in thinking how many worlds there may be and how many races may inhabit them, what different natures they may have from ours, how different their origin, their destiny, the purpose of it all. We have waked up to find ourselves lost in the midst of a universe to which we cannot even conceive a limit. We know unspeakably more than our fathers did ; but, just because we know so much more, we feel that we know very little. Our sense of the certainty of our knowledge has slipped away from us, till we feel that we are not so sure about things as we used to be.

The way this universe has grown upon us may be figured in this way. Suppose a child brought in his infancy into

one room, and told that this room was the world. He lives there, grows up in it, and knows nothing else. Year after year he studies it, its furniture, its books, its make-up, until he thinks he knows and comprehends the universe. But some day he finds a key, and, wondering what this key is for, searches for a use, till he finds a lock, and, inserting it, thrusts back the bolts, and the door flies open, and he finds himself in another world. His universe has enlarged. He does not know the world quite so thoroughly as he did, but yet he knows more than he did before he opened the door. In this room, he finds another key and another door, and so room after room, range after range, till he sinks down wearied with the sense of being overwhelmed and lost in the thought, I know nothing at all,—I, who thought I knew everything.

In this way, the knowledge of the universe has grown. Our intellectual conceptions of it have broadened; but we feel less dogmatic certainty about this particular thing or that,—not because we do not know so much as we did, but because we know so much more.

The next step that we need to take, and the next great change that has been going on in the modern world, is the natural and necessary result of the above. There has been growing a broader spirit of toleration for religious differences. When a man feels perfectly certain that he knows the whole of what God wants him to do, he has less patience with a man who differs from him. He knows he is right; he knows that the other man is wrong. But when he wakes up at last, with a sense of humility, to the consciousness that, perhaps, he is not altogether right, that he may not know everything, then he is ready to entertain, at least, a possibility of the other man's holding a part of the truth that may have escaped himself. So there grows up a sense of toleration toward those who differ from him.

We do not now feel toward other religious denominations as they felt toward each other fifty years ago. I used to have a pamphlet, written by a Congregationalist, in which it was proved with perfect logic that there was no chance for a Methodist's being right. The system of Methodism was denounced as bitterly as now a man in an orthodox church would denounce the most outright infidelity. You know, too, how our forefathers in Boston treated the Baptists and Quakers. It was only a few years ago, during the days of Dr. Channing, that a man was imprisoned for expressing a doubt as to the existence of God. These indicate a few of the changes that have been going on in this matter of toleration toward those who differ from us in religious ideas.

Not only that, but it is only a few years since that Christendom held that any one outside of Christendom was hopelessly doomed. When I was a little boy, I used to attend the "missionary concerts," as they were called, and hear earnest prayers and appeals for contributions in behalf of foreign missions, on the ground that the heathen were going down, by thousands and millions, to endless perdition. To-day, we know that even the highest orthodox authorities do not talk of Christianity as the one absolute finality in religion, and of all other religions as perfectly false. The London Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge has published some of the finest treatises that I know of concerning Buddhism, Confucianism, the religion of Mohammed, and the other great ethnic religions of the world. And the Canon of Westminster Abbey, one of the ablest scholars of England, has published a noble book about Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and Seneca, under the title *Seekers after God*. We have become, then, more tolerant of these differences, whether they be differences between our denominations or churches, or those larger religious differences that

separate the great religious names of the world. This has come about very largely because of the fact that we have learned so much more about this universe than we used to know, that we have become a great deal more modest than we used to be.

Suppose a man had been born, and lived all his life, in a little cottage on the southern slope or just at the foot of Mount Washington; that he had never gone away a mile from his home. Suppose that, some day, an artist should pass by, and should show him a picture of Mount Washington, and the man should say on looking at it: "That is not Mount Washington at all. I have lived here all my life, and I know." But the artist asks: "Have you ever been to a point twenty miles north of the mountain? This picture was taken from there." Then, perhaps, after a while, after he thinks about it and turns it over in his mind, the man may wake up to the fact that there may be just as many different pictures of Mount Washington as there are different points of view. So we are waking up to the fact that there may be just as many true partial pictures of the universe, of God, of the religious life, as there are possible points of view in the universe, from which to take these pictures. Therefore, we are becoming tolerant of these divergences. There is no doubt that every religion, every denomination, every little sect that lives and continues to live, does it by virtue of the fact that it holds, somewhere, a bit, a fragment, however small, of the truth. Men do not live on lies. They live on that which feeds them; and that which feeds one man, in one stage of his development, may not be at all that which is good for another. I believe that the lowest and crudest forms of the religious life had their value—nay, their necessity—in the condition of human nature at that time. The only danger about them is in

fixing them and making them permanent, not recognizing the possibility of larger, deeper, broader growth.

Then there is another reason. The ethical side of the religious life has been advancing; and men have begun to feel that all creeds, all thinking, all speculations, all science, all philosophy, are of value only as they culminate in moral character, in what we call goodness. Goodness is the supreme thing. It is the end toward which the world is moving; and intellectual ideas and views are of value only as they help on this development of goodness. Men are coming to value this more and more; and they are coming to the discovery that men of all sorts of opinions, and men who say that they have no opinions at all, still may be good men, humane, loving, kind, tender, true in their business relations, true as neighbors, as friends, true in their homes, true to their duties of citizenship. And they say, if these men reach these results, then it cannot be that the speculative ideas to which we hold are so vitally important after all. If the fruit ripens on the tree, that is the chief thing; and any method of cultivation must be a measurably good one that permits the culture and development of luscious fruit.

There is another change which helps on this spirit of toleration,—the development of the idea that each individual is responsible for himself alone in the presence of God. I have had occasion before to show you that, in the early development of government, there was the sense of a corporate responsibility. I have pointed out to you the fact that, when David committed what was regarded as a sin, the people were punished. Seventy thousand souls were slain by the angel of Jehovah on account of his sin. During the persecution in Spain, when the Jews and Moors were driven out, the reason was not so much personal

hatred toward the Jew or Moor as it was the belief that God held Spain responsible for the opinions of the Jews, and the king did not dare to harbor heresy, lest calamity should come on his whole people. This idea was of universal prevalence in the early world and until the last few centuries; and this lies at the foundation of nearly all the old persecutions. When a man knew that his neighbor held heretical opinions, he did not dare to keep still, lest his own family should be held guilty before God. We have, then, in the modern world, gained the belief that the individual alone is responsible for his own ideas, for his own opinions; that each man has a right to choose his own destiny; and that he, and he alone, must answer for it before God.

Another great movement, illustrative of the point I spoke of a moment ago, shows how governmental ideas of the world could be reflected in the heavens and represent the method by which God cares for the people of earth. There has come to pass, at the present time, democracy in government. The rights of man have come to the front; and the rights of the ruler have been put into the background. The king's will used to be the measure of all justice, of all law. It was a maxim that the king could do no wrong. Whatever he decided was right, and the ultimate from which there was no appeal; and the people accepted this. But we are developing more and more the idea that the people are the source of all power; that the ruler is not their master, but their servant; that he is simply the expression of their collective will. Along with this has come a transformation in the religious ideas of the world. The old theology is permeated through and through with governmental conceptions derived from these despotic ideas. God's will was ultimate. He had the right to do whatever he pleased. Men were created for his glory. If he chose

to create man and send him to perdition, to illustrate his power and justice, he had a perfect right to do so. If he chose to create another man, and take him to heaven as an illustration of his forgiveness and mercy and grace, he had a perfect right to do so. Humanity, as Paul said, was clay in the hands of the potter ; and the clay had no right to ask any questions, no right to rebel against anything the potter might choose to do. All this was a reflection in the heavens of ancient political ideas. The sultan, the king, was absolute despot ; and God was such a sultan or king.

We are beginning to feel more and more that the welfare of man is supreme. We dare to say God has no right to do wrong, God has no right to create useless suffering, God has no right to bring into the world a sentient being, unless he sees to it that the outcome of that life is good and blessed. There is no goodness off in heaven that is not goodness down here.

So these various ideas, derived from human nature, have come to the front in the modern world, and are supreme ; and they are working changes so far-reaching in theology and religion that it is possible for me to indicate only a few in outline. But I wish to touch two or three points, showing how certain things, that used to be regarded as essential in religion, are being taken away, only to come back again grander than ever. I do not wonder that the world is disturbed, perplexed, as to whether it has lost its religion or not, when it has lost those things which used to be thought the great primal, eternal essentials of religion.

As illustrating what I mean, let us glance at this book called the Bible. We have lost the Bible as the infallible word of God. This has come about through the development of the intellectual, the political, and the ethical ideas of the world, the principles that I have just said underlie all

these changes. We have lost the Bible as the infallible word of God. We have found that it is full of errors; we have found that it teaches undeveloped morality, that it is partial, that it is not adequate to the growing life of the world. But, while we have lost it as the infallible word of God, it is coming back to us by and by. It is coming very rapidly. It is coming back to us as a book that we shall love to put our arms around, and hold close to our hearts with a tenderness and devotion we never felt before. It is coming back as a human book. We are no longer to be responsible for its mistakes. We are no longer to defend that which cannot be defended. It is coming back as the religious literature of a great people, full of religious fears, aspirations, hopes; a book profitable for doctrine, for correction, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness; a book that we shall read as we would read the history of our childhood, and find out the lines along which the human race has developed in its religious life, and the grand hopes that have animated it in the past.

We have lost Jesus. It is true, that which is quoted so many times, they have taken away our Lord, and we know not where they have laid him. The modern intelligence and the higher thought of the world have taken away our Jesus as Lord, as Master, as a unique man, as an incarnation of the divine, as a fact dropped into human history, instead of being an outcome of its natural development. Jesus has gone forever from the intelligent modern world in this conception of him; but I see him coming back again grander, more beautiful than before. The God is going away: the brother-man is to come and stay with us. He is coming to illustrate the possibility of a true, tender human life in the midst of the commonest conditions, a perpetual inspiration and example. Jesus comes to us a man like

ourselves, that we can imitate. He illustrates the fact that the divine and the human are alike, and that, therefore, the human can be filled with the divine. He illustrated it, lived it out amid ordinary conditions of human life. Jesus, then, as an exception, as a deity, goes away, to come back as brother-man, as counsellor, guide, helper, friend.

The whole process of the religious development of the world has been to take God himself away from us in one very important sense. I do not wonder that the religious world has stood appalled time and time again. Go to the fetish worshipper, and tell him that his fetish is only a fetish, and he will feel that he has lost his god. He does not know where to find him; for that was the highest and best thing he had at that time, and that is taken away, and his god becomes unreal to him in a sense that he was not before. Go to Rachel, as she was leaving her father, Laban. She has taken her gods with her; she has hidden them in the furniture of her camel, and is sitting upon them. She can carry her gods in her hand, and look at them. But tell her that they are only images, and she has lost her god. So, when Newton and Copernicus came with their new universe, and took away the God that sat on his throne just above the blue, I do not wonder that the world stood amazed for a while, and felt that it had lost its God. So, when modern thought tells us that we must not think of God as personal in the sense in which we are personal; that we must not talk about his thinking, about his feelings, as though he were just a duplicate of ourselves,—I do not wonder that the world starts, that its heart beats more quickly with fear, and that it wonders if it has really lost its God. The whole process in this line of development has been a going away on the part of God. He is removed far away, until, to-day, we say “infinite”; and the “infinite”

means that we cannot say anything adequate about him, that we cannot cover him with any word, that we cannot limit him with any definition, that we cannot think him with any thought, that we cannot measure him by the grandest flight of our imagination. We stand with Herbert Spencer, and say he is the "Unknowable," the one infinite Power behind and back of all things, the one that we cannot classify; and, therefore, we put our hands on our mouth, and our mouth in the dust, and say he is the Unknown. And, yet, in this process of going away, he has been coming back again to all who can think correctly and can feel rightly. For, this one unknowable, infinite Power which thrills in the farthest star is the same God who beats on the seashore in the tides, the same God who pulses in the human heart, the same God who looks out of the eyes of our friends in tenderness and love, the same God who is manifest in the beauty of the flower, in the fact of the awakening life of spring, ready to break through the cold, damp earth, and reclothe it with all the beauty and glory of summer. God has passed into the Infinite; but, when we say "infinite," we find that it is the closest thing of which we know. The infinite, where is it? If I could measure and comprehend the curve that a dust grain makes as it is blown about in the breeze this morning, I would measure for you the curve of the infinite. If I could comprehend the tiniest blade of grass, I would explain God for you. The Infinite which is beyond is right about us. In this Infinite One we live and move and have our being. He is the very life of our life, the thought of our thought, the love of our love. He clothes us about like the atmosphere. He besets us behind and before, and lays his hand upon us. Wherever we go, we must forever be in his presence, folded about by his care, sustained by his power, guarded by his justice, led on by his wisdom, and tended by his love.

THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK.

ON last Sunday morning, we considered some of the more important religious changes now going on. The next step that naturally follows is a consideration of the tendency of these changes and of the question, What is likely to be their outcome? What is to pass away in religion, and what is to remain?

In order to answer this, we must look for a little at the principle underlying these changes. What is the law in accordance with which they are taking place? If we can answer this clearly, then we shall be able to throw at least some little light upon the other question which we have proposed.

I believe that the one great law of the survival of the fittest—the law which underlies the growth of worlds, the development of life on this planet in all its forms—is the one which we shall find to give us the clew through the labyrinth in which we desire to find our way. It is the law of the survival of the fittest, in accordance with which these changes go on, as well as all other forms of growth and decay. And what is this law of the survival of the fittest? Since it was discovered and verified only a few years ago, it has seemed a very simple one. And we, perhaps, wonder that it took the world so long to find it out. We may observe illustrations of its workings all about us in these spring days, if we but watch the processes going on in the squares and

parks. In any little plot of ground where grasses, weeds, or flowers take root and grow, you will see this principle at work. After the seeds are planted, what is it that determines which ones of them shall continue to exist, to monopolize the soil, to drink up the life that is in the air, and maintain their place while others perish and decay? It is this law of the survival of the fittest which is at work; or the force which works according to this law, to put it in more accurate phrase. It is not of necessity the ideally best that survives. That is not what the law means. It is not the most beautiful flower; it is not the most valuable grass; it is not the plant which is of the most possible service to man. It is not the ideally best from our standpoint, but that which is best fitted to the conditions in which it is placed. To illustrate what I mean, suppose any one of you were fortunate enough to own a little garden of your own, and you should sow the seeds, or set out the developed forms of different kinds of grasses, flowers, shrubs, such as are to be found in every clime, in every land, in all parts of the world. You would find that some of them would flourish, and that some of them would die. What would this mean? It would mean that certain of them are adapted to this climate and to the particular soil in which you have placed them, and to the air from which they derive a large part of their sustenance. Those which are thus adapted, which are fitted to live in this climate, in your garden plot,—these are the ones that will live; and the others will die. It is in accordance with this principle that we find the edelweiss growing just under the edge of the glacier in the Alps; that we find the pine in Maine and in Norway, the palmetto in the Carolinas, the olive in Italy and Spain, the sensitive plant, where I have seen it growing in luxuriance, on the Isthmus of Panama, among

the rich flora developed near the equator. It is under the working of this law that the distribution of plants has taken place all over the world, till each has found its appropriate home, a place where it can survive and grow.

And what is true in this department of life is true everywhere. It is just as true of governments, of systems of philosophy, of scientific theories, of religious institutions, as it is of the grasses, the trees, the flowers. It is not necessarily the best form of government that survives in Italy or Spain, for example. That form of government takes root and maintains itself in either one of those countries which is best adapted to the nature, the intelligence, the moral character, and the general characteristics of the people. That is what the law of the survival of the fittest means. No people can maintain for any length of time a better form of government than that which is representative of its average characteristics. Precisely the same is true of a philosophical theory. That philosophical theory may not be the one which will take root and grow at any particular stage of the world's advancement, which is ideally the best and truest, which is nearest to the actual nature of things. The philosophical theory will flourish that is best adapted to the intellectual stage of the people who hold it. You cannot have a highly intelligent theory—one that demands and receives verification on the part of the people—held by those who are intellectually undeveloped, who are not scientific, who are not accustomed to ask for proof, and who know nothing of the methods of verification. Because any great national religion thrives and grows, it is no proof that it is true ideally, or that it is to spread and become permanent over all the world. It indicates simply the fact that this particular phase of the religious life is, for the time, adapted to the stage of growth, or the intellectual life of the people that hold it.

Now, with this principle in mind, let us go on and ask the question as to what form of religion, what essentials of the religious life, are likely to become permanent as humanity advances. It used to be held that Christianity was the only true, divine, and therefore perfect religion, and that it was destined by and by to supersede all other religions and rule over the whole earth. It was believed that all the other religions of the world originated with the evil one; that they were developed by his inspiration, through the dishonest machinations of conscious impostors, and foisted thus upon people, in order to stand in the way of their reception of the true religion. One of the most famous of the Jesuit missionaries of the world, when he went to China a great many years ago, and first came face to face with Buddhism, sent word to the authorities that he represented that the devil had been there before him and had copied Christianity so accurately in its main essentials, its doctrines, and rites, that it was almost impossible for him to get a hearing for the true religion. This indicates the way in which the other religions of the world have been regarded until within modern times. But we are come to a time when this type of thought is passing away. We believe that all the religions of the world are honest efforts on the part of men groping in the darkness to find the secret of life in the knowledge of and obedience to God. It seems to me, in this great contest among the national religions of the world for supremacy, that the probability is that no one of them is to win. I believe that each one of them is more likely to develop along the lines of national progress of its own race, gradually eliminating its errors, leaving behind its crudities, its moral incompleteness, its superstitions; and thus, along these converging lines of advance, the whole human race is to progress toward some common outcome. For, as the

world becomes more intelligent, as it demands substantially the same standards of truth in matters of belief, as it demands substantially the same ethical ideas and conceptions of right and wrong, do you not see that by necessity there is to come a common sentiment of religion and life? Humanity is essentially one; and, as it grows intelligently and morally, this common consciousness will be developed more and more. So much, then, in regard to the development of the great national religions of the world.

We are to narrow somewhat our range of investigation this morning, and discuss simply those forms of religion, or such systems as are offered as substitutes for religion, within the limits of our own Christendom, and find out which ones of these are most likely to survive and become permanent in the world. In order to do this, we must take account of the direction in which man himself has developed. What characteristics of human thought, human feeling, human life, are developing, as the world becomes more and more civilized? Which of these characteristics are likely to become permanent? That is, we are inquiring what is the nature of the soil and atmosphere of human nature in which religious institutions must root themselves and grow, if they are to survive at all. We are attempting to find out the different environments to which any institution that is to survive must adapt itself, and so prove that it is the fittest. This is a necessary preliminary to the answer of our question. In raising this question, we must remember that we are to judge by the highest and noblest specimens of the race with which we are acquainted.

If you go back two or three hundred years, you will find that certain ideas, which were held then by a very few, are to-day the common property of the race, and that those

ideas which were held by the masses are very largely outgrown and left behind. That means that the world has made progress; and that, if we wish to find out the type of thought that is likely to predominate in one or two hundred years from now, we must look toward the highest and best specimens of the race to-day, because that which is the best thought and the noblest feeling of the present time, if the world really does make progress, will become the common property of the masses by and by. In other words, humanity is like an army on the march. Where the vanguard is to-day, if the whole army continues to march and move forward, the main body will be to-morrow or next week; and the rear-guard, and even the stragglers themselves, will by and by come up to the position occupied by those that to-day lead us. So, if we wish to find out what is to be the common type of life and thought in the future, we must find out what is the best type of thought and life to-day.

Which way, then, is humanity moving? What characteristics or peculiarities of our human nature are growing to more and more, and are likely to dominate and control the future development of the race?

1. Intelligence. Brain power is developing more rapidly than ever before in the history of the world. It is only within a few years that books have become the common property of the race, within the reach of the poorest and the lowest. I was reading in a review, only this last week, the opinion of one of the leading novelists of England in regard to the numbers who would be readers in a hundred years from now; and he says, what you will probably acknowledge as true, that, whereas a popular writer has now an audience of thousands, within a hundred years he will have an audience of millions. The great masses of the

people are gradually, but very rapidly as compared with the rate of progress which has characterized the past, coming up to this level in their interest in literature and the literary expression of the life and hopes of man.

Intelligence, then, is coming to the front; and along with this is coming what we are learning to recognize as the scientific method of investigating truth. The scientific method is nothing more nor less than organized common sense. It simply asks people, before they shall believe a thing to be true, to be careful about observing their facts, then to be careful to verify these observations, and, only after they have done this, to formulate their theories for general belief. It means the application of common sense to questions of truth or falsehood. That is all there is to the scientific method. This, then, is going to rule in the future. And here is the application of this point: only those beliefs in the field of religion which can bear the application of this method are likely to survive. Everything is to be tested in the light of the clearest and freest intelligence of man.

2. The world is growing freer all the time. Go back far enough, and you will find that such a thing as individual liberty was as a fact unheard of, as an idea almost unthought of. The individual was nothing: the family, the tribe, was all. Individual responsibility was neither defended nor permitted. Such a thing as individual research in matters of religion was looked upon not as a duty, as we look upon it to-day, but as a crime. Despotism in politics, even aristocracy in politics, is virtually becoming a thing of the past. Just as fast and as far as the world advances, these democratic ideas of government, in literature, in religion, in life everywhere, are coming to supersede the old. The individual is coming to be more and more in regard to

these great matters. Instead of being led by a few leaders here and there, or driven in a mass like a flock of sheep, men are coming to demand that the law to which they shall submit themselves as right shall be a law that appeals to them personally, to their intelligence, their conscience ; and they are coming to refuse to submit to any power in heaven or on earth that simply presents itself as a power, and that does not appeal to their common sense and to their moral instincts. That is another great change that is going on, and that is to continue in the future.

3. The gradual uplifting of the moral level of the world to a higher standard, a nobler ideal of duty, a more general recognition of the law of right as being the very law of life, the law that binds men not only by right, but that appeals to reason and self-interest, as the one to which they ought to submit themselves. This is going on until, to-day, a thousand things that were recognized as right a hundred years ago are now clearly seen as wrong ; and this process is to go on more rapidly in the future. And whatever appeals to men, whether under the guise of government or science or art or philosophy or religion, must be able to be measured and proved by this ever-growing moral sentiment of the world. To-day, nations themselves are no longer free in this matter. They are amenable to this unwritten, unspoken law ; and they are perpetually being brought before its bar, tried, and sentenced or acquitted in accordance with their approximation to it or departure from it.

4. There is another characteristic of the race. There has developed, along with this sense of individual right and freedom, a more general, broader, grander hope for man as man. Go back only a few ages in the past, and you find that general government, everything, was ruled entirely by the opinions and thought of the few,—one here and one there.

The great mass of the people, their rights, their hopes, were utterly ignored. There was no general hope for the world. Athenian citizenship itself was confined to only a few. The great mass of those who lived in Athens had no powers and rights which anybody respected ; while all the outside world were barbarians. And what was true in government was true also in religion. There were an elect few chosen out of the great mass ; and these elect few were favorites of the gods, and all the rest were ignored. They had no hopes, no rights, no outlook for the future. But there is coming a development of sentiment in this matter,—a feeling that there shall be a common hope and a common destiny for the race, the lowest as well as the highest, whether it is to be in the dust or in heaven. There is coming a demand, on the part of the best thinkers, that the whole race shall be included in some common destiny. This is the direction in which the world is growing ; and as man grows wiser, as he grows better, as he grows more hopeful, more sympathetic, these principles will become more and more dominant.

Now let us, in the light of these principles, bring before the bar of our investigation a few of the great religious types of the world, and see whether they can endure the examination. My time will only permit me to do this rapidly, and not in the way of an exhaustive discussion.

Let us take that which has claimed to be Christianity *par excellence* for the last fifteen hundred years, the great Roman Catholic Church. Has it a chance for survival in the future as it is to-day ? It seems to me that most clearly it has not. It has manifestly been declining for the last hundred years among the most intelligent and better part of mankind. And, if you test it by these principles which I have just been illustrating, you will find that in almost every particu-

lar it fails to meet the demand. In the first place, a large part of its dogmas cannot justify themselves before the bar of human intelligence. Test them by the scientific method of investigation and verification, and some of them are proved untrue, and many of them are shown to be incapable of substantiation.

Test the Catholic Church again by this criticism of the better humanity that is coming, the growing freedom, the development of the individual and of the race. The Catholic Church in its origin, in its whole structure as it pertains to this world and the next, is a hard and fast despotism. How can a church organized in that way survive in the presence of a world that is ever developing more and more individual liberty?

Then, again, test it by the moral standard, and a large part of its doctrines have sprung out of and are consistent with a lower stage of moral development than that which the best part of the world occupies to-day; and, as the world elevates the standard of its morality, the gulf will become ever wider and wider. A large part of the dogmas of the Catholic Church are not only inconsistent with modern liberty and freedom, but they are immoral, distinctly and definitely. Test it again by the last standard, the growing universal hope of man. Its outlook is a narrow one,—bliss for the few, destruction for the many. Test it, then, in the light of all these principles which are becoming more prominent in the better part of the world, and it fails to meet the demand.

Let us next look at the principles of the orthodox Protestant world. I group them all together, because, in so far as the churches are orthodox, they agree doctrinally in the main, not only with themselves, but, with a few exceptions, they also agree with the doctrines of the Catholic Church.

And precisely the same points that I have made against the claims of the Romish Church for perpetuity will hold equally, only in a lesser degree, as against any form of orthodox Protestantism. The intelligence of the world is gradually rejecting all these dogmas. While it has not one pope that claims absolute domination over the mind and heart and the conduct of all the world, every sect and denomination has a little pope of its own, who claims almost as exclusive a jurisdiction over his own sect as does the Romish pope over the Catholic Church.

Then, again, many of these dogmas are repugnant to the noblest morality of the world, and must, as the world grows better, be rejected and left behind. The secret of many of the changes going on in the Churches about us is the revolt of the human heart, the revolt of the better moral sense of the world. It says, These things are bad, or they would be bad here on earth and among men; and we cannot intelligently believe that what is mean and partial and evil and hateful here can be just the opposite in heaven. Against these doctrines also holds this other objection that I have indicated, the fact of this narrow outlook for the hope of humanity.

Now, then, let us turn from this and glance for a moment at that form of thought which in many directions is claiming to be a substitute for religion. I shall group in my discussion two or three phases of thought which are really distinct in some particulars, because they agree in the main, and because I have not time for more particular discussion. There are those who call themselves secularists, those who call themselves materialists, many who call themselves agnostics. They differ in many important particulars, but they agree in those points which are most important for me to notice this morning. All these forms of faith are consistent

with the largest liberty and the noblest morality. But they seem to me to fail to meet the other two standards which I have set up as rules for judgment. In the first place, they dare to limit human intelligence. They advise us to study and think about only this little world and this little life of ours here on this one planet. They tell us that we can never know anything about God, if there is a God, and that it is useless for us to speculate about a future, even if there is a future, because it does not concern us. But this restless thought of man which looks before and after, which wanders through eternity, refuses to be limited to one world. The growing intelligence and mind of man demand the universe for a field. And if you set up any limit, and say, Beyond that is the unknown, it replies, That is a question to be settled by further investigation. We demand leave to pass the old limits, and to believe that a thing is unknowable only when, after ages of effort, the human mind has failed to gain a foothold on that field. Then, again, this human hope of ours is not satisfied by any of these forms of secularism or exclusively this-worldly religion. The hope of the human heart will forever follow the track of those who have left us and gone out through the mist into the beyond. You may talk to a man who has never lost a friend, a man who is prosperous in business, who is young or only in middle life, who has not begun to think of death, to whom misfortune has never come,—you may talk to him, if you will, about being contented with what he can see and hear and feel; but just so soon as one of our own personal friends has gone over to the other side, or so soon as we begin to feel that we are growing old and that our days here are fewer and fewer, or as trouble or calamity or sorrow comes upon us, we begin to wake up to the fact that there is no satisfaction for our highest, noblest aspirations here. Man refuses to be

limited to one planet. He looks up to the stars, and finds there a hint that possibly there are other lives, possibly a higher destiny. He demands at any rate a right to think, to dream, to hope, and, if it be possible, to investigate beyond the limits of this life. It seems to me, then, plain and palpable that none of these limited types of belief are going permanently to satisfy the human intellect or the human heart.

Let us consider a moment what we in this church are claiming to represent,—the general liberal movement of the modern world. Is this likely to be permanent? In one sense, it is, and, in another, not. I do not feel at all sure that the dogmas,—for we have them,—the special ideas, the institutions which we have developed to-day, are to be permanent. But the one characteristic of liberalism is that it is not a dogma hard and fixed. It is not a scheme of things; it is not an institution. It is a movement; it is a method; it is a life. And just in so far as it is a method and a movement, just in so far I believe that it is looking in the right direction, and is, therefore, to be permanent. Our ideas, our special notions, our pet conceptions, perhaps, may pass away; but the method, the free inquiry, the scientific investigation, the devout aspiration, the human help by the way,—these are of necessity and in their very nature a part of the best that is in man, and so likely to remain so long as the heavens and the earth endure.

What about Christianity as a whole? Is Christianity to be a permanent form of the religious life? I cannot answer that question; and for the sufficient reason that I do not know of any six people, belonging to different forms and phases of religious life, who are in any sort of agreement as to what Christianity is. When I can find somebody who will give me a definition of Christianity that people in differ-

ent sects and different denominations will accept, then I can form some sort of clear and rational judgment as to whether that is likely to survive. Christianity, according to the popular definition of to-day, assumes as many different forms as the cloud in Hamlet. It is a cloud, or a whale, or a weasel, or a camel, according to who looks at it. But, instead of this being something against Christianity, I regard it as the grandest thing about it. If Jesus had formulated a scheme, if the apostles had elaborated a system, if they had turned Christianity into a dogma or an institution, as some of the more modern churches have done, then we could say with a good deal of assurance, This scheme or dogma or institution will not survive. But Jesus is represented by the writer of the Gospel of John as having said a very profound and significant thing,—“The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.” And here is the reason why Christianity survives through so many changes, and is able to dominate so many civilizations. It is as flexible as a river, starting in the mountains, capable of flowing through all sorts of soil and all types of landscape into the infinite sea. It is spirit and life, not dogma, institution, rite, or ceremony. Just in so far as Christianity is that, is in accordance with the highest liberty of thought, with the highest hope and life, Christianity will survive; and I doubt not that something that shall go by the name of Christianity will be held by the intelligent world for hundreds of years yet in the future; and all that is true in it, all that is divine, human, vital, will live forever under whatever name.

Now, then, it remains for me to do one other thing. I shall not be able to point to any special church, any special form or institution of religion, and say, I believe that is likely to be permanent, to rule the world in the future; but

we may consider another thing quite as satisfactory. I want to ask: What are likely to be the permanent religious wants of the most highly developed men in the future? What are likely to remain as religious ideas, hopes, thoughts, institutions, that are capable of feeding these wants?

I believe that, in order that there should be anything that can be rightly called religion, the human race must continue to think of a Power, infinite and eternal, outside of itself, out of which it has come, on which it is dependent, toward which it stands in the most intimate relations. I believe that man must recognize a law as above him, a law rightly controlling his life, to which he must be ready to submit intelligently and voluntarily, as a law that has a right to control his thought and his action. I believe that there must continue some permanent motive power adequate to make men obedient to this law; for I believe that men will always have this hunger.

Let me turn to the other side of this question, and, briefly as I may, tell you what I believe to be permanent essentials in the universe about us. I believe that the time will never come when this human race shall cease to believe in an infinite and eternal Power, of which all worlds and all life are the manifestation,—a Power that was before us and will be after us. We have come out of this Power, we are intimately related to it, and we are dependent upon it every moment of our lives. The law of its life is the law of our lives; and the main motive for keeping that law lies in the fact that keeping it means life. Keeping this universal and eternal law of righteousness means life, physical, mental, moral, spiritual. Breaking it means death, complete or partial, according to the degree to which that breaking is carried.

I believe that there will remain, in the highest and grandest development of the world, a reason, in the nature

of things, for the continued existence of the Church,—a voluntary organization of men seeking after the best things, looking for the secret of life, trying to live the truth and the goodness and the beauty of the world, and help others to live it; that there may remain such rites, ceremonies, and services as are vital and as express the real feelings, hopes, and aspirations of the race; that there will remain a reason for that prayer which is communion with the infinite Life, and that does not seek to change these laws or interfere with them; that there will remain ground for the deepest hope, the noblest outlook, for the individual and for the race on this planet, and in some at present unknown world.

I cannot see how any of these by the utmost development of the intellectual, the political, the moral life can ever be outgrown. It seems to me, therefore, that here we have a reason for the permanence of religion not only, but for the permanence of all those things connected with the religious life which are noblest and sweetest and best. And here also is ground for the grandest hope for the future.

EVOLUTION AND IMMORTALITY.

THERE is, I think, a quite popular impression abroad that he who is a consistent believer in the teachings of modern science, who adopts the theory of evolution, can no longer rationally or logically hold a faith in a future life, or the continued existence of the soul after death. My purpose, then, this morning, in treating as closely and as carefully as I can this theme, will not include a general treatment of the subject of immortality. I shall not necessarily tell you all I think about it, all I believe, and all I hope. I believe the theory of evolution to be, in general, the true theory of the world and of the development of life. I wish simply to tell you what I think I have a right to believe concerning this matter of immortality, while I occupy this stand-point in regard to evolution. This, simply and comprehensively, is my theme.

It will be necessary, at the outset, for me to ask, and to briefly answer, What is evolution? The answer of that one question alone, if carried to its logical conclusions, would be the solution of the problem which we raise.

Evolution, then, is simply a scientific theory as to the methods, the processes, by which the worlds have come to their present condition, by which life has developed from its lowest, through all the intermediate forms, until it has reached man. It is a theory, then,—and that is the point I wish to emphasize,—of methods, of processes. It does not

undertake to answer any question concerning ultimate origin or ultimate destiny. It leaves that old problem, as to the beginning of the universe and its end, where it was before. It leaves the question as to the beginning of life, its end, its origin, its destiny, where it was before ; or, if not quite where it was before, if it throws some light upon it, if it gives us hints concerning it, it does not attempt a full, complete, and final explanation. It rather teaches that these questions are, in their very nature, insoluble, beyond the grasp of the human mind ; for the human mind is within this universe, and is a product of it. It is, in the nature of things, then, absurd for us to suppose that it can go outside the universe, and look at it from without and tell when and how it began. Indeed, we are compelled to believe that it never began ; that, in some way, life, power, always was, is now, and ever will be. From the stand-point of evolution, then, this is just as true as it was before that wonderful inscription was written upon the statue of Isis in ancient Egypt : "I am the one that was and is and shall be ; and no one has ever lifted my veil." No one ever has lifted it, or, perhaps, ever will. Advocates of the scientific theory of evolution, at any rate, are not so unwise as to attempt the impossible. The question then remains for us, as it does for the advocates of the old theory : What is the soul ? When did it begin ? By what process did it become connected with the body ? What is its relation to the physical life ? Is it distinct from the physical life ? Can it act independently of it ? If not, will it continue to be, when the physical has gone back to dust ? These questions, I say, remain for the evolutionist just as real, as rational questions as they were for the believers in the old theology.

The advocates of the old faith have not been clear on these points. Their views have not been harmonious and at

one. I am spoken to frequently by men and women who seem to suppose that this question as to what the soul is, and how and when it became connected with the physical life, is a question peculiar to modern science, to evolution. They seem to assume that it was no difficulty under the old faith, but a natural part of it.

Let us look at it for a moment. Suppose I open the first chapter of Genesis. I read there that the Elohim created the body of the first man in their own image, and then breathed into its nostrils the breath of life, and that it became a living soul. But, when we look a little more carefully, we find that this same phrase, "living soul," carries with it no special significance concerning the nature and destiny of man, because precisely the same phrase is used in connection with the various forms of animal life. They are spoken of by the writer of Genesis as possessing this living soul in precisely the same way that Adam himself is. So the difficulty pertained to the old theology just as much as it does to the new ideas of the modern world. We find, from the history of the Church, that there has been no end of discussion concerning this question as to the nature and origin of the soul and how it is related to the physical life.

There have been three great theories, with reference to this, that it is worth while for us to look at. There have been those that believed in the pre-existence of the soul; that it is, in its nature, eternal, not only destined to exist in an endless future, but as having already existed in an endless past. The old difficulty attaches to this theory—to understand how this soul becomes incarnated, incorporated in the body.

There is another type of belief, that which is called technically Traducianism; that is, it is the belief of those that hold that the soul of man is derived from his parents by

the process of natural generation, just the same as is the body.

There is another theory, that of Creationism; that is, that God especially creates a new soul every time that a new being is born into the world.

I mention these simply to make clear to you that this difficulty as to what the soul is and where it comes from, and how it gets incarnated, is not any new difficulty that modern science is specially called upon to answer. It is a difficulty as old as human thought. And it is just as insoluble on the old theory as it is on the new. I wish thus to show that this is not any new or added difficulty with which we are specially called on to deal.

But there is another point which is frequently raised; and those who make it seem to think they are raising a good and insuperable objection to the rationality of any faith in the future life. They tell us that, when once we have granted the fact that man is derived by natural descent from animal forms, that we are bound logically to accept one of two positions,—either that all the animals are also immortal in their nature or else that man, who is naturally derived from them, is not.

Now, I will say to you very frankly that, even if we were compelled to be impaled upon one or the other of the horns of this dilemma, it would not trouble me in the least. At the same time, I wish to say just as frankly that I see no necessity of my accepting either of them. In the first place, there are large numbers of rational, and some even of scientific, people, who are earnest advocates of the doctrine of the natural immortality of animals. It would not trouble me one whit, if I found myself compelled to accept that belief. Indeed, I have had, now and then, such tender, devoted friends among the inhabitants of the animal

world that it would be to me even a great delight if I could hold that faith of the simple Indian, as Alexander Pope pictures him, dreaming of that far-off future when "his faithful dog shall bear him company." I have known many a dog, many a horse, that seemed to me, if goodness and service and merit are to come into this discussion, to deserve continued existence much more than many a man I have known. And, if I could have my choice as to future company, I would gladly leave out some of the men I have met, and take some of the animals in their place. But I do not see any logical necessity for such an alternative. Man is differentiated from all forms of animal life in one very significant particular. Man has developed a conscious personality, which we look on as the essence of that which we call soul; and there is not, so far as I am aware, any proof that any animal, however sagacious, however highly developed, has ever attained anything even approaching to this. If I should find any manifestation of this in the lower forms of life, I should look upon it with as much amazement and wonder as I now look upon its manifestation in the human world.

Suppose, for example, that I should find out that some noble dog had risen to the point of thinking, "I am a dog; and outside of me is a mysterious, wonderful world, out of which, in some strange way, I have come." And suppose he should begin to wonder: What am I? Whence did I come? For what destiny am I intended? And suppose, sitting beside some dying companion, he should raise the question: Is this the end? Is it possible that this stiff, cold form beside me is all; or was there something contained in this body, connected with it for a time, that had in it the essence of a life not dependent on this fleeting breath? Is it possible that there is a spiritual dog that survives the death of the body, that continues to exist, to care, to love, to

progress in some other sphere? Suppose, I say, that it should come to the knowledge of the scientific world that such a course of reasoning as this had been gone through with on the part of any member of the animal world, would we not be compelled to at once revise our definition of the word "animal," and to raise as a rational question precisely the same one that confronts us here this morning? It seems to me, then, that it is not only true that there are no new difficulties confronting us as scientific students and believers in the doctrine of evolution, but that we may find here, in the highest and best results of modern science, several very important hints that will well repay our most careful attention. I shall not attempt to go over all of them, but simply concentrate my attention on one or two that I regard as of chiefest significance.

If any man comes with a theory that he is ready to propound as an adequate explanation of the world, we must demand of him, at any rate, that it be competent to explain the most important facts.

Suppose a man should come before the world to-day with a new astronomical theory, a theory intended to explain the development of suns and planets, and moons and asteroids,—a theory that should attempt to account for their relative size and position, their movements in the heavens and in regard to each other. And suppose that, while the theory was adequate to the explanation of some few minor, subordinate facts, it utterly failed and broke down, when it was confronted with the most important ones of all. You would say at once that the theory had no rational standing ground, and that a wise man would be justified in brushing it one side as unworthy of attention.

Just precisely that do I say concerning all forms of the theory of materialism as they are propounded to us by their

eloquent advocates in the modern world. Here are two great facts in human consciousness, self-conscious personality and thought. Any theory of man or of the universe that fails to explain these is thereby proved to be utterly inadequate. It breaks down in the presence of the very things that are highest and that most need explanation. Materialism, then, tried by this test, I regard as bad science, as false philosophy. Put to the highest test, it utterly fails. It cannot even approximate an explanation of the fact that I think, that I remember, that I hope.

According to all the laws of physical force with which we are acquainted, the physical life might go on, and mind be left utterly out of account. It is indeed true that my thinking is correlated with certain molecular motions of brain particles; but the motions of the brain particles do not produce thought, nor explain it. Cabanis said that the brain secreted thought, in just the same way that the liver secretes bile. The best modern science declares any such statement as that to be insufferable nonsense. If you could trace the motion of the very minutest particle of the brain from the time when the blood carried it there from the heart to the time when it was thrown out again as waste and worn; if you could trace every motion of these particles in all their near and remote effects, you would not have approached an explanation of thought, of the fact that it exists, or its nature. For all these physical processes can be traced and explained in the light of the law of the persistence of force; and thought is outside of them all. This self-conscious personality of mind is something that the best modern science declares it cannot explain. It is not a part of this physical life of mine; it is not the product of physical force; it is not a link in any physical chain.

What is it, then? The result of the teaching of science,

though negative, is at least a hint that it may be something not dependent on physical organization, and that may not cease to be when the physical organization is taken apart.

There is one more truth wrought out and illustrated as the result of modern science. We see in the world processes, of which we are a part,—beginning millions of years in the past,—we see life by slow steps of progress rising grade after grade. First the physical forces predominate. Then life is ruled by the intellect, as cunning or as reason. Then slowly emerging, we see what is called the moral idea or moral sense of man,—love, goodness, hope, these things that pertain to the spiritual ideal of the race. We see this rational process, or progress, through the ages, until the world that began as brute becomes human, and that which was merely physical or intellectual becomes dominated by ideals like those of Jesus of Nazareth, than whose there is not a mightier name on earth to-day. We see the spiritual coming to the front. And yet, as I have traced it, we are conscious of the fact that we are only in the midst of the process. It is not yet complete: it reaches out with promise toward the future. Promise of what? Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what; but something, something grander than to-day, or else the universe stultifies itself.

We see then, and we are a part of, a rational process of progress through the ages. Do you say we have no right to call this process a rational one, no right to assume anything concerning this mysterious progression?

Let us see. These reasons with which we assume to measure things are products of this universe, whichever theory about it you take. Reason has come out of and is the product of the universe. If, then, reason is not competent to decide a question like this, it may be that the

universe is only created as a sport of fancy. If reason itself is not reliable, why, then, your argument breaks down, because the decision to which you rationally come is irrational, or may be itself an irrational decision. If, however, the reason is reliable, if we can trust its decisions concerning a great problem like this, then one of two things follows: either the universe itself, of which it is a product, is rational, or else the universe has produced something that is higher and nobler than itself, which is absurd; for no stream can rise higher than its source. It seems to me, then, that we are justified, on the basis of modern science and in the light of the strictest logic, to advance and hold fast the conclusion that this process of which we are a part in the universe means some grand outcome that shall justify it all.

I cannot think that we shall end in naught;
That the abyss shall be the grave of thought;

That e'er oblivion's shoreless sea shall roll
O'er love and wonder and the lifeless soul.

It seems to me, in other words, the very height of unreason to suppose that this age-long process of the development of the universe is to end at last in a grand consummation of *nothing*. That would be the most stupendous *reductio ad absurdum*. If the universe means anything, and we can trace a rational process from ages ago up to the present, it is only rational to suppose that this process will go on to something higher and better yet; and it is only putting it mildly to say that we are justified in hoping the grandest things for the future.

Now, then, we have reached this point. We have no quarrel with the man who cannot possibly see any force in reasoning like this. His mind may be constituted differ-

ently from mine; and I cannot dogmatically say that my mind is the measure of the universe or even the standard for his. But this much I can say, and say it in the face of all the world: there is no modern knowledge, no modern science, no modern authority of any kind, that has the slightest right to charge me with being irrational or unscientific, if I hold fast this grand hope of a personal immortality. I have then a right to stand here, and, with a gleam of joy and trust in my eyes, hope for that which is as yet invisible.

Now, then, occupying this stand-point, let me hint to you two or three things that seem to me perhaps worthy of your attention.

1. I wish to recall to you a wonder of human nature parallel to that which I suggested a moment ago as a supposition concerning some member of the animal world. Did you ever attempt to measure the mighty significance of the fact that men have had a universal belief, a daring hope of a future life? If there is no reason for it, if it is not true, how comes it that such a daring, magnificent delusion ever entered the human soul? The universe, so far as we are acquainted with it, is not accustomed to lie to us. It generally gives what it promises; and, when a longing in any department of our nature is felt, it generally indicates some source of supply. Are we to suppose that, in the highest illustration of this hunger, it is only a delusion, a mirage, a cheat, the most stupendous cheat of a universe that thus becomes false all the way through? Just consider the fact, and think how marvellous it is. There never has lived on this earth a single human being, or creature of any kind, except those that still remain, and who look forward to the same destiny, that has not died. And yet, in the face of this universal fate, think of this frail child of the ages daring to stand up and look death in the face and defy it, saying:

“I do not believe thou art real: thou art only the shadow. Life is mightier than thou art; and I will yet triumph over all thy power!” Just think of the significance of an act like that! Think of a man standing by the grave of a friend, ready to lower the coffin into the earth and cover it over and leave it, knowing that it is only a matter of time when he himself shall be put there too, yet daring to look down into it, and say: “I do not believe it is a grave: it is only a cradle. It means a new birth and a grander start than the old.”

2. The belief in a future life has the field; and it has a logical, legal, rational right to hold the field, until it is logically, legally, or rationally driven out. And I know of no power manifested in the ancient or modern world that has any right to tell this hope of man that it shall vacate its position. It has the field.

3. On any theory of the universe that you choose to hold, our moral intuitions, our moral sense, our ethical ideas, are the outcome and development of the universe. And what do they tell us? They say to us over and over again—it is an echo from the farthest past, an echo that comes up and rings itself anew in the ears of every generation—that this world is not a field where complete justice is done, where an ideal righteousness is attained. While the ethical thought of man declares that righteousness does exist somewhere, and that it ought to rule and shall rule, as a matter of fact it does not in this world. I cannot help admitting that there is an immense logical—yea, evidential—force in the argument which is advanced in favor of a continued existence, in order that the unevenness of things here may somewhere and somehow be righted. Theodore Parker used to say that he never believed so firmly in immortality as he did when looking in the face of a little

vice-produced and vice-taught child, ragged and outcast in the streets. As he looked upon that face, with no conception of moral ideals, and thought of its origin and destiny, he felt that the child had a right to demand that it have a chance,—a chance which this life does not furnish. The completed result does not seem to be reached here.

If I stand on the banks of a river on some foggy morning, when the mist is so thick that I cannot see more than thirty or forty feet away, and I see at my feet an abutment and the arch of a bridge, springing, reaching out, until it is lost to sight, I feel logically, rationally warranted in assuming that my vision is not the measure of it, that it reaches over and finds another abutment, and rests securely on the other side. So, when I see the unfinished arch of justice and righteousness springing here at my feet, reaching out through the mist, incomplete, my logical reason demands that I believe that it is somewhere complete, that the ideal demand is satisfied.

4. You will not all, perhaps, receive the next point from my lips without question or possible mental protest; but I say, as frankly and fearlessly as I have been accustomed for years to utter what I believe,—for I have never yet learned the art of concealing my opinions,—that there are two or three wonderful properties of this human soul, or mind, or whatever name you choose to call it by, that seem to me demonstrated, and at the same time to contain suggestions of immense significance.

I believe, for example, three things concerning the human mind:—

1. I believe that class of phenomena which is named mesmerism or hypnotism — the power of one mind under certain conditions to control not only another mind, but another body, and physical movements through that mind

—is no longer questionable, but proved. Not that all reported cases are true, but that it contains a truth that is demonstrated.

2. I consider that there are many well-authenticated cases of clairvoyance, or that which goes by that name, and that it is no longer rational to doubt this power of the human mind. If any man tells me that he does not believe it, I cannot help thinking that in this particular he is not a well-instructed person.

3. I believe in what the London Psychical Society has come to call telepathy, or the power of mind under some circumstances to influence other minds at a distance, without any physical contact or any of the ordinary means of communication.

These do not prove anything, you will say. I make no claim for them beyond the fact, except as to what they suggest. They do suggest a good deal more independence of this ordinary physical organization of ours, on the part of the soul, than we are accustomed to take for granted.

I am reminded by this fact of an anecdote of Emerson. It is said that Mr. Emerson and Mr. Parker were walking in Concord one day, when a wild advocate of second adventism met them, and announced to them in an excited manner that the world was coming to an end on a special day. Mr. Emerson replied in his calm, quiet way: "Well, suppose the world does come to an end: it would not trouble me any. I think I can get on without it."

And so, when I find this marvellous human mind of ours, this soul, able to do these wondrous things while still connected with the body, it raises the question, at least, whether in the last resort the soul cannot afford to say of the body, as Mr. Emerson did of the world,—"I think I can get on without it."

Here then we stand. Human science is utterly unable to disprove this old age-long, world-wide belief in an immortal life. It has the field. It is a logical, rational belief. We may not as yet be able to demonstrate it. I certainly am not able to. But, at the same time, I am not quite ready to concede, what some scientists claim, that it never can be demonstrated. I do not know. I shall give up the hope that it may be only when it is proved that it cannot be demonstrated. It is not as yet. And so I will but hope that some day we may be able to demonstrate that death is what I believe it to be, a shadow; and that life is the grand reality. In any case then, we have a right to cherish this grand hope, to be comforted through it, to be lifted by it in the vicissitudes of life, to take it as balm for our bleeding hearts when we stand in the presence of the death of those we love. In the words of Campbell, I believe we are entitled to say:—

“Eternal Hope! when yonder spheres sublime
Pealed their first notes to sound the march of Time
Thy joyous youth began,— but not to fade.
When rapt in fire the realms of ether glow,
And Heaven’s last thunder shakes the world below,
Thou, undismayed, shalt o’er the ruins smile,
And light thy torch at Nature’s funeral pile.”



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